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THE MORALITY OF BASING-POINT PRICING



AN ORDINARY consumer lives, buys and dies without ever understanding the intricacies of price determination. Supply and demand seem to be the main causes. But sometimes neither supply nor demand seem important as prices get "stuck" at a certain level, whether buyers take little or much. Sometimes the suspicion arises that sellers are following the policy of charging all that the market can bear. Politicians and employers frequently blame labor unions for rising costs and prices. Then, to complicate matters, inflation and deflation make money cheaper or dearer, which is the same as raising or lowering all the prices at once.

Actually, pricing policies are even more complicated than most people suspect. One does pay more when buying on credit; is the higher price due to the financial accomodation, or are there "penalties" included for not buying cash? What about zoning systems? A roll of newsprint sells for one price

throughout Canada, no matter where it comes from and where it arrives, while the prices in the United States change according to zones that radiate from Canada. Why must such a price system be used?

This article deals with basing-point pricing, one of the more complicated systems. In its most simple form,

a single-basing-point system is a practice wherein all products of a given nature are priced to all buyers in all markets as though originating at a single shipping point. Actually, however, shipments may be made from that point or from any of a multiple number of producing points. The most widely known of these systems was the practice employed in the steel industry for about 50 years prior to 1924, known as Pittsburgh Plus. Under that practice, steel was sold to buyers in all markets at f. o. b. mill prices based upon the fiction that the point of origin for all shipments was Pittsburgh. . . . The buyer paid, irrespective of the location of his seller's mill, the f. o. b. mill price plus the rail freight cost from Pittsburgh to the buyer's destination. Thus an Iowa buyer of steel from a Gary, Ind., mill paid the f. o. b. Pittsburgh price plus the cost of rail transportation from Pittsburgh to Iowa.

This practice has long since been held illegal by the courts. . . .¹

By making the system a little more complicated, the steel and cement companies thought they would avoid trouble. The change was very simple:

The multiple-basing-point system is distinguished from the single-basing-point system in that it includes two or more points of origin from which transportation costs are computed, which may or may not be the actual points of shipment.²

Since the system operates on exactly the same principles, but over many small areas instead of one big area, the Federal Trade Commission has attacked it and sought its discontinuance.

One way of analyzing the implications of this pricing practice would be to concentrate on its immediate objective: achieving

¹ U. S. Senate, *Interim Report on Study of Federal Trade Commission Pricing Policies*, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 27 (Washington, 1949), pp. 2-3. This source will be referred to as the *Interim Report*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

a single price to every buyer no matter where, or from whom, he buys. According to Prof. Machlup,

The quoting of identical delivered prices is the immediate objective; that it involves price discrimination on the part of individual producers located in different regions is in a sense merely incidental to the attainment of the major objective.³

This was also the conclusion of the Temporary National Economic Committee:

Extensive hearings on basing-point systems showed that they are used in many industries as an effective device for eliminating price competition. . . .

The elimination of such systems under existing law would involve a costly process of prosecuting separately and individually many industries, and place a heavy burden upon antitrust enforcement appropriations:

We therefore recommend that the Congress enact legislation declaring such pricing systems to be illegal.⁴

However, this approach would not lead to conclusive results in a moral evaluation of the system because it can happen (as it did in the case of steel in 1948) that, for political reasons, producers may keep their product prices at artificially low levels.⁵ When monopolistic injustice is blunted in this way, the argument against such pricing is also blunted.⁶ So we must take the position that the incidental but necessary discrimination that this pricing system involves is sufficient to condemn it morally.

³ Fritz Machlup, *The Basing-Point System* (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1949), p. 170. In one of his examples, 31 sealed bids were received by the United States Navy for cold rolled or cold drawn steel on May 26, 1936, all offering \$20,727.26. In another, eleven cement firms submitted sealed bids to officers of a United States Engineer Office on April 23, 1936; all the bids were \$3.286854 per barrel.

⁴ *Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee* (Washington, 1941), p. 33.

⁵ Machlup, *op. cit.*, p. 103, footnote.

⁶ No Catholic moralist has yet found anything wrong in the mere control of a market. Interestingly enough, some lawyers claim that, after the Aluminum (1945) and Tobacco (1946) cases, market control is illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Cf. E. W. Rostow, *A National Policy for the Oil Industry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 129.

Furthermore, in taking this approach we must go through two lines of argument because the defenders of the system jump from one basic assumption to another in making "explanations." However, in both lines of argument, it can be proven that this practice necessarily leads to discrimination both against certain producers and certain buyers.

General Moral Principles To Be Applied

Our procedure, then, will be to accept one of the assumptions, to analyze the working of this pricing practice, and then to see how discrimination occurs. It goes without saying that if we find consumers getting charged for a service they are not getting or asking for, such a practice will be labeled "theft." But discrimination may not go as far as theft, and such cases will be labeled a "sin against charity" or, in plain terms, hating the neighbor in a practical way in business. If the discrimination is severe and grave damage results to the discriminated parties, the sin against charity would be grave. For the benefit of moralists, the discussion will be continued in the accepted scholastic terminology, but there is really nothing more profound in what follows than what has just been stated on the level of principle.

THE COMPETITIVE ASSUMPTION

One line of argument against this pricing system is based on the assumption that the industries concerned are ordinary industries and, therefore, should charge a competitive price. Historically, the industries themselves chose this line of argument by claiming that basing-point pricing was ordinary pricing: f. o. b. plus the cost of actual freight to the buyers. Furthermore, the most elaborate defense of the practice, put out by the United States Steel Corporation, insists that "competitive forces determine the prices quoted at all destinations."⁷

⁷ Frank Fetter, "The New Plea for Basing-Point Monopoly," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (October, 1937), p. 601.

The Basing-point System

The purpose of basing-point pricing is that the producers of some product, e. g. steel and cement in the past, may know the exact price at which the product is sold to every buyer. Each producer can figure out the exact final or "delivered" price (original price plus freight and handling costs) at any destination.⁸ The final price is important because, as these industries maintain, the transportation costs for these products are so high that "buyers . . . are seldom interested in its (steel's) price at any place except where they need it."⁹ Competition is in terms of the final price.¹⁰

The procedure may be illustrated by Mr. Lumberman who knows that the United States is divided into forty-eight sales territories known as "basing-point areas." In our crude example, the sales territories coincide with the State areas; and the capital of each State is a basing point. The price of lumber at all the basing points is published in the Lumber Trade Journal, or gets around some other way. Since Mr. Lumberman does not have the rate books of all the railroads, he is generally given a compilation of "applicable" freight rates.¹¹ Now he is in a position to figure out the price of any amount of lumber

⁸ Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph No. 42, "The Basing Point Problem," 76th Congress, 3rd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 81. There is a qualification involved in this language, as we shall see later.

⁹ *TNEC* Monograph No. 42, p. 81.

¹⁰ Of course, delivery may be by ship, barge, truck or rail, and this variation in delivery methods would make the final price somewhat vague. The usual way of getting around this difficulty is to charge for rail transportation, no matter what method of delivery is used. The cement industry forbade the sellers to permit truck deliveries (Machlup, *op. cit.*, p. 77); the steel companies allowed certain discounts when the buyers sent their trucks to the steel producer (*TNEC* Monograph No. 42, p. 73). Forcing any definite method of transportation, or charging more than the transportation costs, is clearly a matter of theft. Label it "holdup."

¹¹ These rates are generally the actual rates; but if the actual rates change, the members must still follow the most recently distributed "applicable" rates. *TNEC* Monograph No. 42, pp. 103-4. When actual rates are less than the applicable rates, we have a "holdup."

anywhere in the United States. For example, if he wants to know the price of maple-flooring in Chicago, he takes the basing-point price at Springfield plus freight from Springfield to Chicago plus some quantity and quality "extras."¹² The price of maple-flooring in New York City is the base price at Albany plus freight from Albany to New York (even if it comes down the Hudson by barge). The price in Buffalo is the base price at Albany plus freight from Albany to Buffalo.

One peculiar result of the system is that, as far as the buyer is concerned, it does not matter where the producer's mill is located. The buyer buys just as cheaply from a producer in Los Angeles as from one in Seattle, St. Paul or Nashville. This may sound absurd, but the point was clearly illustrated during the depression of the "thirties" when some government agencies ordered from the most distant points because "they felt that this at least would contribute to the prosperity of the railroads."¹³ Such "illogicality" is inherent in the system and is, ultimately, the source of its discrimination.

This "illogicality" is even driving the champions of basing-point pricing to fantastic and desperate arguments. They claim, for example, that basing-point pricing is more competitive since one has more suppliers to choose from, instead of going to the nearest one, as in f. o. b. pricing.

This circumscribing of consumer choice by f. o. b. mill pricing fails to meet the first test of a competitive market. It deprives the buyer of a choice of sellers and compels him to purchase from the geographically closest supplier.

Required f. o. b. mill selling would virtually necessitate each contractor acquiring his supplies from the steel mill, cement plant or producer of other commodities located closest to the site of his construction job or be unable to compete.¹⁴

¹² These "extras" would also be in the trade journal, freight rate book, weekly newsletter, or in some other handy form. There will be no further reference to them.

¹³ John F. Cronin, S. S., *Economic Analysis and Problems* (New York: American Book Company, 1945), p. 251.

¹⁴ *Interim Report*, p. 10.

Under f. o. b. pricing

A steel fabricator whose plant is not located close to a steel mill or to a large consuming area finds itself at a disadvantage both as to the cost of its raw materials and as to its competitive ability to sell in distant markets.¹⁵

One can hardly believe that fear of competition would drive our anti-monopolistic businessmen into such a mental confusion. Since useless traffic helps the railroads, they actually secured the testimony of the Deputy Chief of the Army Transportation Corps and of the chairman of the Railway Labor Executives Association to tell the Senate subcommittee how useful it would be to have a healthy railroad system in time of war.¹⁶

However, to get on with the market terminology and the various situations that may arise, we suppose, first, that Mr. Lumberman is located at a *basing-point*, e. g. Austin, Texas. Then the cost of maple-flooring in Houston is the price at Austin plus freight to Houston. In this case, although the basing-point system is being followed, the procedure is fair and just if (1) the base price is fair, (2) the method of transportation is such as the buyer would choose, and (3) the freight is fair. If these conditions are met, the delivered price is fair. Everything is proper.

Not all the transactions, then, that take place under this pricing system are unjust. There is no discrimination and no fictitious charge in the example just given. Mr. Lumberman of Austin can face any government investigator and assert that, as far as these sales go, it is ordinary competition.

We may suppose, then, secondly, that the producer is still at Austin, but finds that he needs more than Texas sales to move his stocks. He meets a friend from Tulsa and sells him a carload of lumber. The price at which he sells is the base price at Oklahoma City plus freight from Oklahoma City to Tulsa. It is a strange transaction: Austin wood is shipped from Austin to Tulsa at the price of Oklahoma City wood which might have been shipped from Oklahoma City to Tulsa. Two fictitious

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

prices are operating: a fictitious base price and a fictitious freight charge.

If we assume further that the base price is the same in Austin and Oklahoma City, the Austin producer clearly suffers a loss on his Oklahoma sale; for Tulsa is only one hundred miles from Oklahoma City (the freight charged to the customer) but the actual shipment is from Austin to Tulsa, about 500 miles. The Austin producer pays more in freight than he charges his customer. He "absorbs" freight; and this freight absorption causes a smaller net profit at his own mill than he gets from Texas sales. The "net profit at mill" is commonly referred to as the "mill net." And it is clear that the mill net varies inversely with the amount of freight absorption. There is a uniform mill net on all Texas sales; and a decreasing mill net the further the Austin producer reaches out of Texas for business. The fictitious base price and the fictitious freight charge are necessary, as the Austin producer sees it, because he must meet the price of Oklahoma producers.

There is still nothing basically unjust in the action of the Austin producer because he can practice "freight absorption" even if basing-point pricing is declared illegal. If he *must* enlarge his market, he may grant more favorable handling costs, share some of the freight charges, or simply lower the base price for all his customers (assuming that this is within his power). In the first two cases, we have freight absorption, or its equivalent; in the third, we have a search for more customers in the ordinary competitive way. The disadvantage in the last method lies in the "bargain" the local customers get as the producer "makes a play" for more distant customers; a greater difficulty is that this independent action of the Austin producer would upset the established market areas.¹⁷ "Freight

¹⁷ This is the way the crude oil producers operate. The "competitive" price is considered to be at the "fringe" of the market area, and the well-head price is found by subtracting the transportation cost from the "fringe" to the well-head. An enlargement of the market is achieved by lowering the "fringe" price and thus pushing back the oil from other competitive sources. Then, since larger transportation costs are generally involved because the radius of the market area is now

absorption" adds distant customers without lowering prices to the local buyers and without changing the usual market areas.

If one is to believe the campaign-managers for the defense of the basing-point system, they are really defending the privilege of competitors to absorb freight because freight absorption leads to varying mill nets just as basing-point pricing does when the sellers get outside of their territory. If varying mill nets are declared illegal, they claim that the prices of chewing-gum, newspapers, magazine, etc. will have to be scaled according to the distance of the buyer from the producer—a most absurd consequence.

The whole outcry about freight absorption is beside the point. The point at issue is basing-point pricing, not freight absorption, which is incidental to certain types of sales under a basing-point system. As Prof. Machlup suggests, basing-point producers were anxious to "broaden the opposition" to the Federal Trade Commission in its attempt to end basing-point pricing; so they attempted to convince "more and larger groups that they are threatened by the same policy."¹⁸ The strategy is quite clever since few people stop to consider the economics of newspaper pricing, post-office policies, or chewing-gum price practices. Fewer still know what basing-point pricing is. And even if the analogy applies (from postage stamps to steel and cement), fewer still are sharp enough to distinguish between freight absorption caused by an agreement between several producers scattered through a basing-point area and the freight absorption of a *bona-fide* independent single seller.

Returning, then, from a consideration of this "herring," we may recall that what has been described so far as basing-point practice is morally irreprehensible. We now come to the crucial cases in which we finally suppose that Mr. Hardwood has a *non-basing-point* mill at Fort Worth, Texas. All his Fort

longer, the well-head price is lowered even more as these costs are subtracted from the lower "fringe" price.

We are not considering this pricing system in the article.

¹⁸ Machlup, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-8.

Worth customers are charged the Austin price plus freight from Austin to Fort Worth. Since the wood does not come from Austin, this is known as charging "phantom freight." Should Mr. Hardwood sell some lumber to a Dallas dealer, the difference between what he actually pays for freight (for a shipment from Fort Worth to Dallas) and what he actually charges (for a nonexistent shipment from Austin to Dallas) is also known as "phantom freight." Just as freight invariably leads to a higher mill net; the lower mill net is a sacrifice to meet competition, the higher mill net is a reward for not being at the basing-point.¹⁹ We shall see later that there is some justification for this "reward."

There can be a mixture of the two, as for example, in Mr. Hardwood's sales towards Austin, e. g. Waco; for a sale in this city, about half-way between Fort Worth and Austin will give him only one half the phantom freight he would get on sales in Fort Worth. Furthermore, since he has to pay the actual freight to Waco (from Fort Worth to Waco) this charge cancels the "phantom freight" he gains (from Austin to Waco). Such an acceptance of lower mill nets on sales towards a basing-point mill by a non-basing-point mill is also known as "freight absorption." To the seller, the lower mill net is equivalent to a penalty for selling toward the basing-point mill; and the closer he sells to Austin, the higher his penalty.

"Freight absorption" of this type is discriminatory. For the Fort Worth producer is not taking a lower profit on just the distant sales of temporarily surplus production, but consistently getting less profit from the ordinary customers on one side of his plant (the Austin-side) and more from those on the other (the away-from Austin-side).

Such, in crude outline, is the multiple basing-point system. We are by-passing many interesting and often unanswerable questions, such as: (1) are basing-point prices necessarily

¹⁹ In the recent Senate inquiry, "the representatives of steel producers did not defend the charging of phantom freight, which had previously been the custom in that industry" (*Interim Report*, p. 30). A 50 year practice (p. 2) can be wrong.

collusive? ²⁰ (2) if they are collusive, who determines the basing-point areas and the basing-points? (3) what are the effects of basing-point pricing on new plant location? These questions are also beside the point. The outline given above, together with a review of some actual cases, is sufficient for a moral judgment on the practice.

Actual Cases

There has been little complaint about basing-point systems in the past because, generally, a buyer of certain minerals or chemicals is only another producer, or perhaps a building contractor. These items are, generally, a small part of his total costs. If he should complain, no other producer would offer him a lower price; besides, his complaining would only risk his supply of such materials, especially in periods of short supply. Furthermore, the buyer knows that the other buyers in the area have to pay the same price; so they all stay quiet and pass the costs along to the consumer. Besides, producers can avoid outrageous injustices by establishing a few more basing-points, as happened in the early twenties when large increases in freight rates occurred.²¹

Business men blundered badly, however, when this pricing practice was adopted by the glucose industry.²² In 1945 the Supreme Court decided against the system in the *Corn Products* and *Staley* cases. The decision was not too difficult to make since the producers of glucose and dextrose established a single basing-point area for the whole United States. What occurred,

²⁰ In the Conduit-pipe case, the FTC ruled that concurrent use of basing-point pricing by numerous competitors proves unlawful conspiracy (FTC Docket 4452; 1948). Individual use of the system by a single firm, in the knowledge that it was being used by competitors, was also ruled illegal. Cf. Kaysen, C. "Basing Point Pricing and Public Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (Aug. 1949) LXII, 289.

²¹ In a masterly bit of prose, the U. S. Steel Exhibit No. 1418 (in the TNEC Monograph No. 42) remarks: "The increase in the number of basing-points then accelerated" (p. 42). This is in line with the thesis that this pricing system ". . . had crystalized," and was "a natural result of basic economic conditions." It "has evolved."

²² Glucose is corn sugar. Dextrose is refined corn sugar.

essentially, was a return of an old situation when steel products were sold throughout the United States at Pittsburgh prices plus freight. The Pittsburgh Plus system merited a cease-and-desist order from the FTC as early as 1924; now, twenty years later, the glucose industry comes along with a "Chicago plus" system. On top of that, glucose, unlike steel or cement, is not a fractional but a major part of its final product; it makes up 85% of maple syrup and up to 90% of cheap candy content. So it was to be expected that in this industry, where "the margin of profit of such candy manufacturers is so narrow that business may be controlled on a concession of one eighth of a cent a pound,"²³ there would be trouble with an artificial pricing system. That is just what happened.

The largest producer of glucose, the Corn Products Refining Company, was located at Chicago, the basing-point, but it also had a plant in Kansas City. Glucose was made at the Kansas City plant and sold to a local buyer for \$2.49 per unit, with forty cents of the price covering a freight charge from Chicago to Kansas City. In another instance, the Kansas City branch actually paid 13¢ per unit to get it to Lincoln, Nebraska, but charged the 45¢ it would have cost had it come to Lincoln from Chicago. There were occasions when the fictional freight charge came to "approximately \$400 per carload."²⁴

The price asked by the Kansas City plant *might* have been just if the costs at this plant ran about 40¢ higher than those of the Chicago Plant. Then the phantom-freight charge might be taken as a charge for the difference in production costs.²⁵

The defense did not choose this line of argument, and so

²³ A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co. *vs.* FTC; FTC Docket 3803 in the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, April Session 1944, No. 8072, p. 3.

²⁴ FTC Docket 3633 in the United States Court of Appeals, January Session 1944, No. 8116, p. 4. These amounts are "small pickings" when one considers that the amount of fictional freight for steel bars, shapes and sheets produced on the Pacific coast ranged from \$10 to \$13 a ton. Before July, 1938 some steel sheets were sold on the Pacific coast at "Pittsburgh Plus," with phantom freight amounting to \$15 a ton. (*TNEC* Monograph No. 42, p. 112).

²⁵ *TNEC* Mono. 42, p. 36.

the basing-point system was ruled illegal by the Supreme Court precisely because of the discrimination, or injury to competition, that results from such pricing. The extra price paid by the Kansas City candy and syrup makers gave the Chicago producers of the same products a definite and systematic advantage in competition. For no reasonable cause, the Kansas City candy and syrup makers were being artificially discouraged from competing toward the Chicago area, because in buying their glucose they had to pay more on account of phantom freight. The closer their competitors were to Chicago, the less they had to pay for the corn products. So that if the fair price for glucose is \$2.00 per unit in Chicago and, fairness aside, \$2.40 per unit in Kansas City because the freight charge between the two cities is 40¢ per unit, every sale by the Kansas City producers towards Chicago supposes a raw material cost of glucose of, say, \$2.35 or \$2.10 according as the buyer is closer to Chicago. And it is simply impossible for Kansas City candy producers to sell in Chicago unless they meet the price of Chicago producers, *after* absorbing the freight from Kansas City to Chicago. Yet, at the same time, the Chicago producers had no difficulty in selling their products in Kansas City if they so wished, since *their* freight costs were part of the price of Kansas City producers.²⁶

Furthermore, if we suppose that the Kansas City plant is at least as efficient as the Chicago plant, with the costs identical in both places, and the freight charge is 40¢ again, then the Kansas City producers get 40¢ in windfall profits when they sell to Kansas City buyers. The Kansas City buyers get no benefit from being next door to their producers because the industry is pretending that the only source of glucose supply is at Chicago. As a result, for no reasonable cause, the Kansas City buyers are punished for setting themselves up near Kansas City glucose plants instead of in Chicago.

In the last two cases we have supposed, several injustices

²⁶ Some candy makers actually moved to Chicago. Cf. Corn Products Refining Co. vs. FTC, FTC Docket 3633 in the U.S. C.A., No. 8116, p. 4.

are apparent. The first injustice is the social (or "legal") injustices of restricting markets of both candy and glucose producers by the basing-point mills. The candy producers outside of Chicago suffer in the manner described above; and since their business is restricted, it follows that their suppliers, the glucose producers outside of Chicago, also suffer. But, in neither case is there any violation of strict justice since no producer has a strict right to any sale.

This is particularly clear when non-basing-point producers are partners to the scheme; and they generally are because the cramping of sales toward the basing-point is generally outweighed by the "phantom freight" that non-basing-point mills can collect on local sales. As an illustration of the latter point

The President of the Laclede Steel Company of St. Louis testified that its plant had been located in St. Louis because of the prospect of making money "by selling for more than it cost, on account of the protection we got, on account of the Pittsburgh Plus in existence at that particular time."²⁷

One can readily see, then, why it would be ungracious for the Laclede Steel Company to complain about the smaller mill nets it had to take on sales toward Pittsburgh. However, if the non-basing-point mills are forced into this arrangement and their markets are consequently restricted artificially, those who force them into this arrangement are guilty of a sin against charity.²⁸ The basing-point mills can give no good reason why

²⁷ *TNEC Mono.* 42, p. 133.

²⁸ There are difficulties in classifying sins against social justice. The traditional division of "justice" is into "general" or "legal" justice and "particular" justice. Legal justice governs the relation of the individual to the community and exacts from the individual that to which the community has a right. Particular justice exacts from the community or from another individual that to which an individual has a right; in the former case it is called "distributive," in the latter "commutative." However, difficulties arise in this classification because the term "community" is often taken as the government authority which distributes burdens and benefits. There is no place to put a group of buyers or producers who have certain rights that another group of producers must acknowledge. But if the term "community" is extended to refer to any person or group which distributes burdens or benefits whether to one or more persons, the classification has no gaps. Prolonged use of the wider concept leads to the realization that "legal justice" is only

they should cramp the markets of non-basing point mills. Both mills should have the same freedom of access to their markets in any direction. The golden rule is the touchstone of love of neighbor: would the basing-point producers be willing to change places with non-basing-point producers (supposing that adequate compensation is given to the producer who has the better plant)?

The only possible justification for charging "phantom freight" might have been that Kansas City production of glucose was inadequate to meet Kansas City demand. Then, in order not to discriminate against those candy manufacturers who would have to get their glucose supplies from Chicago, the Kansas City glucose suppliers would charge all their customers the Chicago price. In other words, the economic rule that there can be only one price in one market has to be followed. "Phantom freight" charges, then, become a reward to the glucose producer in Kansas City for putting up a plant in a "deficiency" area. This reward is justifiable as an incentive to producers to increase capacity in Kansas City so that local supply may eventually equal local demand and get rid of the uneconomical transportations of glucose from Chicago to Kansas City.

According to Prof. Machlup, the economic phenomenon operating in this situation is not "phantom freight," but a price differential.²⁹ The seller is taking a price he may charge, under the pretense that the difference is due to freight costs. If this pretense were forbidden to him, he could get the same profit by merely establishing another basing-point by the previous freight cost. In the example given above, the Kansas City producers could have merely raised the Kansas City price by 40¢ per unit instead of charging "phantom freight" to that amount.

The difficulty with this justification is that the companies must prove that there is only one market area, e. g. for glucose

another way of looking at love of neighbor, specifically, what each business man owes to his consumers or other producers.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

in the United States. There must be statistical proof that all *sections* of the United States either continually or frequently have recourse to the main source of supply. If they do not have such recourse, it is obvious that, somehow or other, local demand is being satisfied by local supply. For example, if there are no glucose shipments from Chicago to Kansas City and points west, we must conclude that another market area exists in the West. In that case the deficiency area argument does not apply at all.

The "one market" argument applies in different degrees to various industries. It is a much stronger argument for products like steel and cement since their supply depends on geological deposits; it is much weaker in the case of glucose since this involves the processing of an agricultural product. The strength of the argument also depends on the weight of the final product and on the transportation costs. The heavier the product, and the higher the transportation costs, the greater is the tendency towards smaller market areas because of the high shipping and handling costs. The heavy transportation costs that are alleged to be the reason for a delivered price system are, oddly enough, the reason why such a system is hard to justify.³⁰

In summary, then, the defendants have never backed their references to the "deficiency" area argument with statistical proof. If they could have proven their case basing-point pricing would be morally justifiable. In that situation, there has to be one price at which demand and supply balance out throughout the market area. If in some corners of that area, or throughout the area in fact, the sales price does not seem to bear any close relation to costs, this is only because the fair price in

³⁰ The recent increases in transportation cost have been highly instrumental in persuading the steel producers to give up their fight for basing-point pricing. "Industry is starting to realize that it does not make much difference what the Federal Trade Commission or Congress does about f. o. b. mill prices. Freight rates have gone so high, labor is so expensive, that it pays to exploit the area nearest the plant or plants." Thomas Campbell, "The Welfare State vs. Personal Initiative," *The Iron Age* (January 5, 1950), p. 126.

ordinary circumstances³¹ must take account of demand as well as supply considerations. In such circumstances the high price may be allowed as a means of rationing the product to those who are willing to pay the most for it. But if one corner of that area constitutes a self contained market, there is no reason for insisting that the one price system must cover the whole area. In a large country such as the United States, and when heavy costs are involved as in the case of certain metals, the proof that only one, or a few market areas exist, is a very difficult assignment.

Since market areas fluctuate in size, the stability of an artificial price system can also involve violations of social justice. A similar phenomenon, often called "inertia," occurs also in ordinary competitive-pricing, but it does not bother anyone's conscience. Someday someone realizes that supply and demand have been out of line, and the proper change is made with profit. But when some individuals take the responsibility of establishing a "fair price," and take "police action" against "price cutters," then price "inertia" is not an accident but a deliberate choice. For example, once a basing-point area is established, producers may be able to reduce costs of production without bothering to change the base price. This would lead to high profits which, in a competitive situation, would entice new firms or suggest the expansion of the old ones. But if entry of new firms can be blocked, and the production of the old kept at its previous levels, the individuals responsible for unwavering base-prices are setting an *artificial* monopoly price. In other words, the primary purpose of the pricing system (cf. p. 3), from which we have prescinded so far, *may* operate against the community of consumers and so constitute a violation of legal justice.

Violations of Strict Justice

Violations of strict justice in a basing-point system arise because artificial systems must be simple and stable.

³¹ St. Thomas and other scholastics treated of extraordinary situations, e.g. sieges and famines. We are not considering such circumstances here.

It has already been pointed out (pp. 7-8) that, in general, the freight charges included in the final price are the charges for railroad transportation. It is a violation of strict justice to make a person pay for railroad service when he prefers and can arrange for truck or barge delivery.³²

There is a strict violation of justice whenever non-basing-point mills charge "phantom freight" although they are not in a deficiency area. The amount of restitution due to the buyers in this case must be estimated; it would be the difference between the delivered price derived by basing-point mechanics and the competitive price that would otherwise prevail in that market area.³³ The roughness of the estimate, of course, is increased still more by the fact that the just price varies between a maximum and a minimum; but the roughness of the estimate cannot impair the obligation of restitution.³⁴

THE NON-COMPETITIVE ASSUMPTION

It is necessary, here, to recall that, up to now, we have been assuming that we are dealing with ordinary industries that should charge a competitive price. This might not be a correct assumption. In fact, the hard-pressed industries and many thorough students of this pricing system sincerely believe that most of the industries involved cannot be competitive. For example,

³² Another reason for insisting on one type of transportation, besides simplicity of calculating prices, is to prevent diversion of shipments. Smart buyers may place orders for distant deliveries (since the mill net for the producer is smallest for these sales), undertake to do their own transportation, and then divert the shipment to plants very near to the producer. The reverse trick occurs when a zoning price-system exists; then the buyers place orders for one zone and secure transshipment to a further zone. Some zoning systems were replaced by basing-point systems precisely for this reason. Cf. John R. Commons, "The Delivered Price Practice in the Steel Market." *The American Economic Review* (September, 1934), p. 505.

³³ Fallon, *Principles of Social Economy*, p. 232: "In the case of a competitive system wisely regulated and in normal circumstances, the price spontaneously established in the market is the fair price."

³⁴ In modern situations, the maximum and minimum of the fair price is merely the range of accidental variations.

In 1934, a trustee of the Cement Institute wrote to another trustee of the Institute: "The truth is, of course—and there can be no serious, respectable discussion of our case unless this is acknowledged—that ours is an industry above all others that cannot stand free competition, that must systematically restrain competition or be ruined. . . ." ³⁵

In much the same way, Mr. Charles R. Hook, president of the American Rolling Mill Company, was writing more like an officer of a public utility than the head of a competitive steel company when he declared:

It seems to me useless to attempt to cure the general ills of the steel industry until we make up our minds that we will courageously and definitely resist the pressure of the automotive or any other large consuming industry to break down a price structure that will permit of a reasonable return on our invested capital. ³⁶

A number of economists, too, are of the opinion that *some* of these industries have such a combination of fixed investment and heavy transportation costs that they cannot be exposed to competition as other businesses. It is too costly to shut down a shop and wait for more business, or to run at very low capacity of production since the overhead costs are so high. To judge their pricing problems by competitive standards is unfair.

An understanding of this basic fact makes much of the industry's argument more intelligible. The purpose, for example, of U. S. Steel Corporation's famous exhibit No. 1418 before the TNEC was to make the public realize that conditions of perfect competition do not exist and that one may call such delivered prices "competitive" because they are "basically" so. As Mr. Fairless put it in a letter to Senator O'Mahoney, a non-basing-point price would "still be a competitive price so far as competition is concerned, because the basis to begin with, the base price, was competitive. . . ." ³⁷

³⁵ C. Edwards, "The Effect of Recent Basing Point Decisions upon Business Practices," *American Economic Review*, (December, 1948) XXXVIII, 830.

³⁶ TNEC Mono. 42, p. 95.

³⁷ TNEC Mono. 42, p. 146. Note that for the steel industry, the base price is

They are not competitive in the usual sense of the word, as he himself testified:

We will concede, if that is the point we are trying to make, that if base prices as announced were followed in every transaction, and that the nearest basing point to the consumer governed, and that the rail freight was added from that point, and the delivered price was arrived at in that manner, there wouldn't be any competition in the Steel Industry. It would be a one-price industry pure and simple.³⁸

Mr. Gregg, a vice-president of the U. S. Steel Corporation, also admitted that if the basing-point system "were universally followed, there would be no competition insofar as one element of competition is concerned, namely, price."³⁹ In other words, the industry has been trying to stretch the meaning of "competitive" to include those situations in which prices are only partly affected by competitive forces; between "competition" and "monopoly" they have now somewhat succeeded in popularizing the idea of "workable competition," i.e. the competition that can be expected under the circumstances in which the industry operates.⁴⁰ Prof. Joel Dean put the matter in the usual and accepted terminology when he declared before the Economic Institute of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, "that under uniform f.o.b. pricing he believed that some kind of institution would be evolved to take the place of price leadership."⁴¹ That is, the economic facts of the situation argue for an administered price, and not a competitive one. And the basing-point system seems to straddle competition and

"competitive"; for the oil industry, the "competitive price is at the "fringe." Cf. note on p. 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 147. This is from Mr. Wooden's letter to Senator O'Mahoney.

³⁹ *Ibid.* These admissions were being made because, at that time, the industry was arguing that basing-point pricing was competitive because sellers were departing from the "right" prices (the industry had just passed through a period of low demand).

⁴⁰ Since the law of the land recognizes only "competition" and "monopoly" some such term manufacturing must be done to make the legislators and lawyers aware of the intermediate cases.

⁴¹ *New York Times*, December 11, 1948, p. 26.

monopoly very well, since the base price is allegedly competitive and the rest of the prices within the area are derived from that price.

Accepting this supposition, then, that not a competitive but an administered price must be charged, one finds that the basing-point system is still discriminatory without cause. If the buyers from the base point pay a "competitive" price, and the buyers from non-basing-point mills pay an artificial price? The "logic" of the system involves "phantom freight" and restriction of markets no matter what the prices must be, competitive, workably competitive, or administered. So the solutions offered under the competitive supposition apply analogously to any other supposition.

OBJECTIONS TO THE SOLUTION

The last year witnessed a renewed drive to legalize the practice despite the *Staley, Corn Products, Cement and Rigid Steel Conduit* decisions.⁴² The drive was almost successful since, at the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Trade Policies, the issue was confused, as is usual and partly unavoidable, by discussions of monopolistic practices, zoning systems, conspiracies, the Clayton and the Robinson-Patman Acts, and much indignant defense of freight absorption for competitive purposes. The public found the matter too complicated to get interested in it; and those who were interested in it got garbled or distorted accounts of the discussions, even in such a paper as the *New York Times*.⁴³ But, in the end,

⁴² Prof. Fetter lists the numerous arguments that have been used by the industries since 1920 in the *American Economic Review* for December, 1948.

⁴³ A classic case of news distortion occurred in the December 11, 1948 issue, on p. 22, in an article that "covered" the "Second 1948 Economic Institute" of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Dec. 9 and 10, 1948. One has to get a verbatim record of this Institute (available) to get the truth.

One more: the National Small Businessmen's Association testified for basing-point pricing before the Senate. Later it was discovered it was not a small businessmen's organization, but a "front" for other purposes, partly financed by U. S. Steel, Standard Oil and other companies. *New York Times*, February 22, 1950, p. 39.

President Truman vetoed S. 1008 after considering "high economic policy and bread-and butter politics."⁴⁴

One of the last-ditch arguments of the basing-point protagonists is that f. o. b. pricing will establish local monopolies:

The effect of required f. o. b. mill selling would be to give each supplier and his dealer a competitive advantage which in many instances might amount to a local monopoly in that area where he has a freight advantage. In areas where two or more competing dealers have the same outgoing freight advantage, the competitive advantage would accrue to the dealer whose product was purchased from the closest source of supply.⁴⁵

In other words, a possible injustice is worse than the present actual injustices. Furthermore, the possible injuries are exaggerated.

It is only common sense that monopolies cannot charge any price they please; for the higher their price, the narrower their markets will be. In fact, by making its price higher than it was under the basing-point system, the local "monopoly" would destroy itself:

The previous delivered prices as calculated under the basing-point system would become upper limits for the "monopoly prices" of the local mill, and the local mill can attain the distinction of being practically the sole supplier in its market territory only if it keeps its prices below those previously charged under the basing-point system.⁴⁶

Prices will, if anything, go down instead of up. The supposition is backed by the historical fact that, when the change occurred from f. o. b. pricing to basing-point pricing in the case of steel billets and pig iron (1933), prices increased by over \$3.00 a ton.⁴⁷

As for the argument that companies with huge financial resources will drive others out of business with temporarily low prices, the answer is that the same holds true under basing-

⁴⁴ B. J. Masse, S. J., "Muddle over Basing-point Prices," *America* (July 8, 1950), p. 371.

⁴⁵ *Interim Report*, p. 32.

⁴⁶ Machlup, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁴⁷ *TNEC Mono.* 42, p. 137.

point systems. Price-wars have actually been going on, not in terms of price, but in terms of mill-net returns, out of sight of the public. That is, a plant at basing point A can invade the territory of basing-point B, charging the prices that trade journals indicate for territory B. But since the freight costs are actually much higher than those charged to the customer, the mill at basing-point A absorbs the difference, thus receiving a lower mill net from the customers in territory B than those in its own territory. In this way, by concentrating on sales in territory B, while getting its ordinary prices in its own territory, the plant at basing-point A can ruin plant B. Plant B, of course, can reciprocate by stealing customers from territory A. If both are successful in stealing customers from each other, the volume of business remains the same but there is costly and wasteful "cross-hauling" of goods going on (particularly since transportation costs are generally high for these industries). Obviously, freight absorption and taking business away from competitive basing-points can continue as long as any company's finances hold out, or the larger volume of business pays for the lower profit on extra-territorial sales. So the Economic Research Department of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States asks:

If, under basing-point pricing there are stopping points for reductions in mill-net returns, why would there not be substantially analogous stopping points for reduction in mill-net returns under . . . f. o. b. pricing?⁴⁸

The only difference in the two situations is that, under basing-point pricing, the buyers do not get the benefit of lower prices while the "war" is going on.⁴⁹ We may conclude, then, that even if f. o. b. pricing is restored (it is not the only alternative), small producers will not be driven out of business—for the same reason that they are suffered to exist today.

⁴⁸ Chamber of Commerce of the United States, *Delivered Pricing and the Law*, p. 20.

⁴⁹ There is some benefit when other producers become impatient and establish "cut-throat" price in the locality of the price-cutter. For an example, cf. Edwards, C., *op. cit.*, p. 831.

Another argument for the basing-point system is that various industries have developed according to this price system. To abolish the system would be to ruin these investments. There would be great hardships in particular cases "probably without on balance improving the force and effect of competition."⁵⁰

As Prof. Machlup points out, there are two ways of understanding an "economic loss": the loss may be private or social. A fire that destroys a factory is both a private and a social loss. A fall in the price of inventory goods is a private, but not a social, loss. Losing exclusive rights to a patent is a private, but not a social loss. If competitors devise more efficient machinery, this is a private, but not a social, loss. Now, applying the argument to the present case, more efficient location of industries is in the same category as more efficient methods of production; the private losses of those who are inefficiently located would be on a par with the private losses of those who still follow antiquated methods of production. Consequently,

. . . this "destruction of capital values," this "dissipation of investments in plant facilities," would be (no cause) for regret by anybody who is concerned with the people as a whole rather than particular individuals, and with the national income rather than the private incomes of special groups."⁵¹

EFFECTS OF BANNING BASING-POINT PRICING

Corwin Edwards lists⁵² the four most likely changes that will occur if basing-point systems are abandoned by all industries: (1) consumers will be given the full benefit of water and trucking rates where these forms of transportation are available and desirable; (2) there will be less "extravagant interpenetration of markets, involving excessive cross-hauling and other unnecessary expenses of sale and delivery, by depriving buyers of any incentive to purchase from nearby mills rather than distant mills. . . ."; (3) ". . . there will no longer be an incentive for supplies and consumers of industrial products to ignore

⁵⁰ J. M. Clark, in the *American Economic Review*, XXXIII, 284.

⁵¹ Machlup, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

⁵² *Op. cit.*, pp. 840-2; only the quoted parts are in Mr. Edward's words.

some of the advantages of being near one another. . . ."; (4) non-basing-point mills will get more business in the direction of the previous basing-points if the "competitive" price at the base point remains in force.

It does seem, then, even apart from ridding the economy of discriminatory practices, the banning of basing-point pricing will bring improvements in over-all efficiency that should out-balance any private hardships. If there are *proven* damages to industry, the public might reimburse the industry.

Summary

There are two necessary injustices in basing-point pricing, and a third that may easily occur. The first necessary injustice lies in the artificial restriction of the markets of non-basing-point mills. No restitution is due even when the damage is serious.

The second necessary injustice, when there is no question of a "deficiency" area, is the charging of "phantom freight" by non-basing-point mills to customers so situated that the actual freight costs are less than those charged. Restitution is due to the amount of the "phantom freight."

In cases where the actual freight costs are more than those charged, the seller is practicing freight absorption that he considers economically justifiable; no special moral problems are involved in these cases as long as such expedients are sporadic occurrences and on a small scale. On a large scale, or as a continuing policy, the practice would fall under the category of "dumping" practices which I hope to treat at another time.

Restitution is due in those cases where railroad transportation is forced upon the buyer.

The third possible injustice is the charging of exorbitant prices, a circumstance that may easily arise under artificial pricing systems. The treatment of this case would fall more properly under a consideration of monopoly pricing.

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EUCLID AND ARISTOTLE

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THE TECHNICAL and philosophical interpretation of Greek mathematics is dominated by the opposite views of Plato and Aristotle, which have influenced even modern mathematical philosophy. Briefly, Plato teaches that mathematical objects are intermediate between the Ideas and the sensible world: as such, they reflect the eternal relations of their own Ideas and are separate from the external world; they are discovered and not invented; they are expressed in assertorical and not in problematical propositions. On the other hand, Aristotle thinks also that mathematical objects are intermediate between Being and the sensible world: but they cannot be deduced from the analysis of Being and have no separate existence; indeed, they are abstracted from the sensible world, which accounts for their being applicable to it. Hence Plato accounts mathematically, and Aristotle logically, for the rational character of the world.

These doctrines, which were widely known in the Greek world, have influenced most thinkers in one way or another. Is it possible at all to determine which conception is paramount in the work of Euclid the mathematician? The problem is made difficult by the absence of any direct information from Euclid himself, and also by the cosmopolitan and eclectic character of the intellectual climate of Alexandria where Euclid lived. While scholars grant that the author of the *Elements* has widely used in his work the Aristotelian theory of demonstration, most of them would insist that his ultimate vision was Platonic indeed. We believe, however, that the Euclidian systematization of mathematics is an application of the rational theories of both the Academy and the Lyceum; and that the Aristotelian trends in Euclid are stronger than any other. But

this debate must be prefaced with an account of the Alexandrian atmosphere and of the work Euclid left to posterity.

THE CLIMATE OF ALEXANDRIA AND EUCLID'S WORKS

The conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great in 332 B. C. had important consequences for the development of learning. While Athens still remained the seat of literary interests and speculative philosophy, Alexandria became the dynamic centre of scientific pursuits and of the technical arts. Owing to its geographical remoteness and to the political rivalry between Rome and Carthage, the Nile Delta was less open to an effective external pressure than Sicily or Greece itself. The death of Alexander in 323 B. C. and the wisdom and might of the Diadochs, gradually robbed Athens of its political preponderance. Founded at a point where East meets West, Alexandria soon rose to the status of a great intellectual and commercial metropolis.

With their broad cultural horizon widened by the victorious expeditions of the Macedonian conqueror, the Alexandrians came into contact with the esoteric as well as the empirical doctrines of the Persians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, and the Phoenicians. Moreover they had at their very door the ancient and complex knowledge of the Egyptian priests who had been the first masters of the Greeks and had still many things to teach in spite of their declining influence. The fusion of the Hellenic and of the Eastern civilizations made Alexandrian thought more cosmopolitan, but also more specialized and more mystical.

But on the other hand, these circumstances also favoured frequent exchanges between Greece and Egypt. The great philosophical schools of Athens had already given their best to the world: Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans, Sophists and Sceptics could cross over the Eastern Mediterranean and widen the circle of their disciples. Yet the attraction of so many different and contradictory doctrines was tempered by the mystical interests and practical minds of the Alex-

andrians themselves. It is obvious that all these mutual influences gave a great stimulus to intellectual pursuits, which could not be ignored by the leaders of the country.

Learning was greatly encouraged by the Greek rulers of Egypt, and especially by Ptolemy II Philadelphus and Arsinoe his wife. The Ptolemies were responsible for the foundation and maintenance of the Museum and the Library, which were housed in the royal citadel. In these two famous scientific institutions, eminent thinkers, scientists, engineers, alchemists and physicians were able to carry out research and experiments; while the wise discussed philosophy and religious speculations. They imparted their knowledge to the younger men who first flocked around them and then brought learning to distant cities and countries, without losing contact with their Alexandrian masters.

During that period, science learned to stand on its own merits and to develop single-handed remarkable specialized inventions. Mathematics and astronomy were graced with the discoveries of such famous men as Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius, Aristarchus, Eratosthenes and Hipparchus. And if the natural sciences did not produce any worthy successors to Aristotle, the experimental genius of the Alexandrians manifested itself in the more practical sciences of engineering, alchemy and medicine. Philosophy, however, turned its back on science and became more speculative, ethical and religious. It lost its universal character and encouraged objective compilations of past systems, instead of constructive syntheses based on the new scientific knowledge of the time.

This situation did not seem to encourage the growth of a mathematical philosophy comparable to that of the Hellenic period. True, Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism have used numbers as an integral part of their structure. But the numerological aspect of these systems was less scientific than mystical in character. On the other hand, the connexion of the Alexandrian mathematicians with philosophy had not a metaphysical, but a marked methodological value. These trends are illustrated in the decisive work of Euclid the mathematician.

The life and personality of Euclid have so far remained shrouded in mystery. The scanty information we possess about him comes from casual remarks from some later commentators. Most of the mathematicians who could have taught Euclid were pupils of Plato; and it is presumed that they gave him his scientific training in Athens at the Academy. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Lyceum also existed at that time; and that the influence of Aristotle was felt throughout the Greek world. So that if Euclid had been trained at the Academy at all, he must have been familiar with the current discussions of the day, with the textbooks used at the Lyceum as well as at the Academy, and especially with the *Organon* which gave to all thinkers a formal instrument of investigation and proof.

Though practically nothing is known of the early life of Euclid, there is evidence that he flourished in Alexandria during the reign of the first Ptolemy (306-283) because he is mentioned by Archimedes who was born just before the end of Ptolemy Soter's reign. He is even credited with the founding of a school in Alexandria where, according to Pappus, Apollonius of Perga afterwards "spent a long time with the pupils of Euclid."¹ But such a school was unnecessary in Alexandria which possessed scientific institutions under royal patronage; and it is difficult to see, in these circumstances, how a mathematical school could survive Euclid by two generations. It is more reasonable to think that Euclid taught mathematics at the Museum in Alexandria, where he formed many disciples. This view justifies more readily the statement that Apollonius spent a long time in Alexandria with the pupils of Euclid; and the story of Euclid's reply to Ptolemy, that there is no royal road to geometry.

An incident reported by Stobaeus shows the high conception Euclid had of mathematics. A pupil, who had just learned the first propositions of geometry, asked what he would get by that knowledge, whereupon Euclid bade his servant give the

¹ Heath, *Manual of Greek Mathematics*, p. 203.

pupil a piece of money "since he must make gain out of what he learns." There is also the testimony of Pappus, who praised Euclid for his modesty and his fairness to other mathematicians, quoting the case of Aristaeus to whom Euclid gave credit for his discoveries on conics without attempting to appropriate his methods.

The *Summary* of Proclus contains practically all that we know about Euclid, though his remarks seem to be based upon inference rather than direct evidence. We are also told that Euclid wrote several works on pure and applied mathematics. Those which can be attributed to him definitely are the *Elements*, the *Data*, the book on *Divisions*, and two treatises: the *Phenomena* and the *Optics* dealing with applied mathematics. Many other works are unfortunately lost, among them the *Porisms*, the *Plane Loci*, the *Conics*, and the *Pseudaria* on fallacious solutions; while some others, which have come down to us under his name, are not his own compositions. As regards its mathematical content, the Euclidian Corpus offers few additions to previous knowledge, with the exception of some original proofs and some new theorems. Indeed, Euclid is praised less for his inventiveness, then for his synthetic genius, logical rigour and perfection of form. These qualities are brilliantly shown particularly in the *Elements* (στοιχεῖα), his principal work, which is considered the greatest elementary textbook in geometry of all time, and a most notable witness of our debt to Greek mathematics.

The technical importance of Euclidian synthesis is due to its factual completeness and methodological structure. Before Euclid mathematicians had obtained many remarkable results which were expounded either in special treatises covering specific problems, or in systematic collections as those of Hippocrates of Chios (c. 470 B.C.), Leon (c. 400 B.C.) and Theudius of Magnesia (c. 370 B.C.), which were used as textbooks. The special treatises give an orderly exposition of investigations relating to some definite mathematical problems. But the systematic collections of propositions involved the discovery of certain leading theorems bearing, in regard to

those which follow, the relation of a general principle by which many properties could be proved. Such theorems were called *elements* (στοιχεῖα) as their function resembles that of an alphabet in relation to language. In this sense, it is said that Theudius "put together the elements admirably, making many partial propositions more general," and that Hermotimus of Colophon "discovered many of the elements,"² as was also said of Euclid later.

But the mathematical discoveries and methods of the fifth and fourth centuries had outgrown the rudimentary school texts of the time. Further progress required a well-organized inventory of the available material, including the Eudoxian theory of proportion. This was the task Euclid set himself to do: thus "in putting the *Elements* together he collected many theorems of Eudoxus, improved many propositions of Thaetetus, and gave an irrefragable demonstration of statements loosely proved by his predecessors."³ These investigations required necessarily the alteration of the arrangement of the books in the earlier *Elements*, the redistribution of propositions between them, and the invention of new proofs applicable to the new order of exposition. This successful effort was considered so important that Euclid is still known as the "Author of the *Elements*" (ὁ στοιχειωτής), as Archimedes was the first to call him. Indeed, it shows sufficiently Euclid's ingenuity and acumen, even though he left no record of more special research in mathematics, and made no claim to originality in his extant works.

The test of Euclid's achievement would be to compare his work with proofs given by his predecessors. In the absence of any earlier manuals (for these must have been displaced by Euclid's own), one of the best sources is Aristotle himself. For his frequent mathematical illustrations imply that he had at hand some textbook containing most of the things he mentions, probably that of Theudius. By comparing corresponding state-

² Proclus: *Commentaries on the First Book of Euclid* (ed. Friedlein, Leipzig, 1873), p. 67.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

ments in Aristotle and Euclid, one is able to follow the changes made by Euclid in the methods of his predecessors. For example, we find in the Aristotelian treatises the equivalents of Euclid's first six definitions, with the exception of that of the straight line for which Plato's definition is given. This may be taken as a fair indication that Euclid's correlative definitions of the straight line and plane were his own. Similar figures are defined identically by both, as is also the case with some of the terminology of proportions, for which Eudoxus no doubt provided the material. But Aristotle has certain terms like *inflected* and *verging* lines, which are not used by Euclid. He gives also some theorems which are not found in Euclid, like the one about the exterior angles of any polygon being together equal to four right angles, and like those about certain properties of the circle concerning plane loci and isoperimetry.

In a striking passage ⁴ Aristotle points out that the theory of parallels involved a vicious circle. In that case, even if the leading theorems on parallels were known before, Euclid seems to be the first to solve this difficulty by formulating the famous postulate upon which he based his own system. The fact that Aristotle does not give any examples of geometrical or mechanical postulates leads one to presume that the classical postulates relating to the straight line, to the right angle, to the parallels, and to the construction of lines and circles, may have been explicitly established by Euclid himself.

In spite of his logical theory of demonstration, Aristotle has not always given rigorous and final proofs of the mathematical propositions mentioned in his works. Many of them involve certain assumptions far more complex than the propositions to be proved. Some others differ from those of the *Elements*, as the one about the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle where mixed angles are used,⁵ which is given as an illustration of the rule that the two premises of any syllogism must have between them an affirmative and a universal proposition. This is also the case with the proposition

⁴ *Posterior Analytics*, 76 b 9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 94 a 30.

that the angle in a semi-circle must be a right-angle⁶ which Aristotle proves in two stages. He shows first that it is true for an inscribed isosceles triangle with the diameter as its base; for the median of the given angle bisects it and forms two right-angled isosceles triangles; and the proof is completed by using the equality of the angles in the same segment. The demonstration of Euclid (Bk. III, p. 31) is more direct and general.

From the strict standpoint of methodology, there are technical deficiencies in the works of all pre-Euclidian mathematicians. In the case of Aristotle, however, one must bear in mind that he was not concerned with mathematical research proper, but rather with the formulation of his logical and physical theories, and with their illustration by means of the best mathematical examples given in the current manuals of his time. In "putting together the elements," Euclid set himself a different task which he accomplished with a remarkable success.

Hence, the *Elements* is not only a complete compendium of elementary Greek mathematics, but also an illustration of the powerful combination of the Platonic method of analytic regression and synthesis with the Aristotelian conditions of logical necessity and demonstration. Before Euclid, philosophers had discussed and set down the characteristics of science in general and of mathematics in particular. Plato and Aristotle had pondered over the meaning of the latter, mentioned or described its features and method, and justified it with ontological principles or epistemological considerations. In this task they proceeded either from the consideration of the rational conditions of science, or from the analysis of the results obtained by mathematicians proper. But neither Plato nor Aristotle were actually interested in improving the arrangement or the proofs of the elements. The former expounded his dialectical method and used mathematics for the benefit of his Theory of Ideas and of his cosmology; while the latter gave mathematical illustrations to make good his generalizations concerning the struc-

⁶ *Prior Analytics*, 41 b 15.

ture, principles and method of deduction and demonstration. Yet, both provided Euclid with the rational means of systematizing the exposition of geometry. However, there is no reference to Plato or to Aristotle in the *Elements* or in the Euclidian corpus for that matter: hence the controversies about Euclid's philosophical allegiance. A preliminary analysis of the *Elements* would help to understand the problems and the solutions offered.

THE PATTERN OF THE ELEMENTS

The presentation of the thirteen books of the *Elements* is direct and strict as befits a textbook. Without any apologetic introduction or directional principles, the first book opens bluntly with twenty-three definitions relating to such fundamental concepts as point, line, surface, volume, circle, angle and figure. Without any comment, we are then given five postulates referring to the construction of straight lines and circles, and five original axioms or common notions which constitute the basis of geometrical reasoning. The difference between these types of statements is given by their content and not by any explanations. Among the postulates are the two famous properties of the straight line: (a) that two straight lines cannot enclose a space⁷ and (b) that two straight lines in a plane will meet when produced, if a third line cuts them so as to form on the same side two interior angles together less than two right angles. The postulate

⁷ The wording of the original definitions, postulates and axioms is not necessarily that of Euclid in all the cases. There have been so many transcriptions and editions of the *Elements*, that scholars and copyists have tried some minor improvements here and there by rephrasing, substitution or insertions. From the earliest times, however, the Euclidian straight line has been characterized by two postulates like those. Euclid's sagacity in this matter is illustrated by the failure of subsequent mathematicians to prove either of them. The failure of all such attempts led in the nineteenth century to the discovery of new systems of geometry characterized by different types of straight lines, which have caused endless philosophical and logical controversies. We have attempted ourselves to solve some of these difficulties with a new system of Euclidian axiomatics (*Essais sur la Pensée Géométrique*, 1943) involving a hypothetico-deductive rearrangement of the basic Euclidian intuitions.

requiring the equality of all right angles is equivalent to the principle of the invariability of figures, which makes congruence possible. The axioms are statements about the equality and inequality of magnitudes.

These opening definitions and hypotheses are followed by propositions about triangles and the mutual relations of their component parts. It is interesting to note that the first proposition refers to the construction of an equilateral triangle. In these initial propositions are proved the properties of vertically opposite angles, adjacent angles, perpendiculars, and congruent triangles. The theory of parallels (pp. 27-32) which requires specifically postulate (b) given above, leads up to the theorem that the interior angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. We come then to the areas of parallelograms, triangles and squares (pp. 33-48), including some cases of the Pythagorean *method of applying areas*. The book ends with the famous proof (and its converse) of the relation between the square of the sides of a right-angled triangle and the square of its hypotenuse, a relation discovered by Pythagoras, according to tradition.

The second book proceeds with the theory of the transformation of areas, and proves the equality of sums of rectangles and squares to other such sums. It introduces the use of the *gnomon* for the solution of numerical problems; and it gives the initial theorems of the *geometrical algebra* with which the Greeks solved elementary algebraic equations by means of geometrical processes and proofs and without using algebra proper. Just as Book I ends up with the Pythagorean theorem of the square of the hypotenuse, so Book II leads up, with propositions 12 and 13, to a generalization of the theorem for any triangle with sides a, b, c , proving what is equivalent to the modern formula $a^2 = b^2 + c^2 - 2bc \cos A$ by geometrical means.

Books III and IV develop the geometry of the circle. It begins with definitions, such as those of equal circles, tangent, chord, segment, sector, similar segments, angle in a segment and the archaic notion of the 'angle of a segment' referring to

the mixed angle made by the circle with the chord at either end of the segment. Then it goes on to prove propositions dealing with the form of the circle, intersecting circles and tangent properties; and it finishes up with the beautiful demonstration of the constant value of the product of the two rectilinear segments OM.ON of a straight line, cutting a circle at any two points M and N, and passing through any point O internal or external. Book IV proceeds to the inscribed and circumscribed polygons constructible with straight line and circle, the most important being the regular pentagon sacred to the Pythagoreans and the regular fifteen-sided polygon used in astronomy.

Books V and IV expound the general theory of proportion applied to commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes of any kind, according to the Eudoxian method. A ratio is considered as a sort of relation of size between two finite magnitudes of the same kind. Book V introduces infinite magnitudes, and defines quantities in the *same ratio* or in *greater ratio*, and the transformation of ratios by alternation, inversion, composition, separation and conversion. It proceeds to numerical multiples and equimultiples; and it proves the validity of the transformation of one proportion into another. In applying in Book VI this general theory of proportion to plane geometry, Euclid proves first the fundamental propositions that two sides of a triangle cut by a third side are divided proportionally. Then he shows its various consequences in the construction of proportionals and in the similarity of triangles; and finally, he uses the Pythagorean theory of application of areas in its most general form, with results which are equivalent to the geometrical solution of a quadratic equation having a real and positive root. The book ends (VI. 31) with a remarkable generalization of the theorem of the square of the hypotenuse, showing that proposition to be true not only of squares, but of three similar plane figures described upon the three sides of the right-angled triangle and similarly situated with reference to the sides.

Books VII, VIII and IX deal mainly with the nature and

properties of rational numbers represented throughout by straight lines and not by numerical signs. Following the traditional conception of the Pythagoreans, Book VII begins with the definitions of unit, number the varieties of number, including plane, solid and perfect numbers; then it demonstrates some elementary properties and operations referring to various kinds of numbers. Books VIII and IX relate to numbers in continued proportion (geometrical progression); and the latter proves that a number can only be resolved into prime factors in one way, that the class of prime numbers is infinite, and other important propositions.

Book X, the most finished of the whole work, deals with *irrationals* understood as straight lines which are incommensurable with any straight line assumed as rational. It begins with the famous proposition on continuity which is used by the Method of Exhaustion, and which was completed by Archimedes and known under his name. It states that if from any magnitude there be subtracted its half or more, from the remainder again its half or more and so on continually, there will remain a magnitude less than any given magnitude of the same kind. The whole subject was originated and expanded by Theaetetus. What we owe to Euclid in this matter, according to Pappus, is the precise definition, classification and exposition of rational and irrational magnitudes. The elaborate array of definitions and proofs given in this Book is due no doubt to the absence of the conception and symbolism of algebra. For the Greeks had to represent with straight lines operations which deal with the solution of equations and the discussion of their roots. But as all straight lines look alike, a detailed classification of linear definitions was necessary to cover all the operational distinctions required by the subject. The methodological contributions of Euclid to the systematic treatment of irrationals appear to be more numerous and elaborate than usual; for they will be used in Book XIII for the complete determination of the regular polyhedra.

Finally, Books XI, XII and XIII deal with solid geometry

which appears less systematized, however, than plane geometry. In some proofs Euclid allows more abrupt leaps than he permits himself in the earlier books; and the distinction between congruence and symmetry is not always clear. But this was, of course, the first attempt to organize solid geometry into an exact science. The required definitions are given in Book XI where the order of propositions is very similar to that of the first books. After proving a series of properties of straight lines and planes in space, it deals with parallelipipedal solids. The *Method of Exhaustion* is the core of Book XII and serves to determine areas of circles and volumes of the solids as well as various proportions between their elements. It is well known that the Method of Exhaustion was invented by Eudoxus (c. 408-355 B.C.) in answer to Zeno's dilemmas about the infinitely small: it showed that the mathematician does not require actually such an infinite, but only the possibility of arriving at a magnitude as small as we please by continual division. This is the Greek version of the modern method of limits, which allowed the mathematician to evaluate a magnitude by calculating others close to it by defect or excess and eliminating by a *reductio ad absurdum* the unwanted alternatives. Lastly, Book XIII deals with the construction of the five regular solids (tetrahedron, octahedron, cube, icosahedron and dodecahedron) and the determination of a circumscribing sphere. A number of preliminary propositions have to be proved before constructing the sides and angles of the polyhedra and determining the relations of those sides with the radius of the circumscribed sphere.

It remains to say a few words about the other works of Euclid. The *Data* developed some details of the subject-matter of Books I-VI of the *Elements*, with special reference to the construction of plane figures by means of some given elements. An example of the alternative methods used here is the solution of the simultaneous equations $y \mp x = a$ and $xy = b^2$, which is another form of the solution of the quadratic equation $ax \pm x^2 = b^2$ given in the *Elements* (II. 5, 6). The initial definitions

of the various meanings of the word *given* proposed by Euclid in the *Data* are among the interesting features of this work; straight lines, angles, areas and ratios are *given in magnitude* when we can find others equal to them. Rectilineal figures are *given in species* when their angles are severally known and also the ratios of the sides to one another. Points, lines and angles are *given in position* when they always occupy the same place. But the main purpose of the *Data* is obviously to help in shortening the analytical processes which are preliminary to a problem or proof: when we know that certain elements of a figure are given and that other parts or relations are also given by implication, it is often superfluous to determine that figure by an actual operation.

The book *On Divisions* corresponds to the description of the original work given by Proclus in his *Commentary*. The general purpose of the propositions it gives in strict logical order, but often without proof, is the division of plane figures by transversals or parallels into parts having equal or proportional areas. This treatise has been edited in 1915 by R. C. Archibald on the basis of the original text in Arabic discovered in 1851 by Woepke, and the portion of Fibonacci's *Practica Geometriae* dealing with the division of figures, which is supposed to have been written with the help of Euclid's work.

Of the two treatises dealing with applied mathematics, the *Phenomena* develops the geometry of the sphere according to the requirements of observational geometry. It contains the definition of the horizon, which is given for the first time as a single technical word: "Let the name *horizon* be given to the plane through us passing through the universe and separating off the hemisphere visible above the earth." The *Optics* deals with problems of perspective, explaining how figures look from different points of view or at different distances, as compared with what they are. Heath believes that this book may have been intended as "a corrective of heterodox ideas such as those of the Epicureans who maintained that the heavenly bodies are of the size they look,"⁸ Like the *Elements*, the *Optics* opens

⁸ Heath, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

with a series of definitions concerning the fundamental concepts of light and vision; and it proves a succession of propositions in strict deductive order. Indeed, all the works of Euclid reveal a methodological preoccupation which is paramount, and which offers much scope to the philosophical critic, both as regards its actual technique and its metaphysical implications.

THE EUCLIDIAN METHOD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

As a mathematician, Euclid is careful to remain within the definite realm of geometry. Perhaps the thought never occurred to him to venture philosophical pronouncements on matters already specialized as a science. In fact, his works make no allusions to Plato or to Aristotle, not even to their strictly methodological theories. Yet their philosophical implications are enshrined in his very method of presentation, and particularly in the exposition of the *Elements* to which we shall restrict our interpretative remarks.

The Euclidian method of *irrefragable demonstration*, as Proclus calls it, appears to be an elaboration of the principles which both *Analytics* of Aristotle discuss at length. In the *Prior Analytics*, we are told that no proposition should be admitted without showing its logical connection with earlier propositions already granted. It is true that Plato had also mentioned this rule of rational necessity; but his purpose was to force the mind back through such an analytical regression to the ultimate principles embedded in the Ideas. But Aristotle and Euclid with him meant only to base the whole deductive process on a small number of first principles stated at the beginning of a science, and granted as such without further regression. Going further than his master, Aristotle specifies the type of such primitive elements in the *Posterior Analytics*⁹ where he mentions the definitions (*ὅροι*), the postulates (*αἰτήματα*) and the common notions (*κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*) or axioms. Now, Euclid follows exactly this pattern, thus giving in the *Elements* the earliest evidence of a systematic arrangement of

⁹ *Posterior Analytics*, 74 b 5—77 a 30.

geometry beginning with these assumed elements, which are actually given as the basis of all subsequent deduction.

Without enunciating all these Aristotelian principles explicitly, or even trying to state in words their distinctive characters, Euclid begins abruptly the first book of the *Elements* with his famous definition of a point as that which has no part. His actual geometrical statements, however, show conclusively that he was familiar with the Aristotelian requirements: in other words, Euclid does technically what Aristotle proposes theoretically. This is particularly true of the *definitions*, which Euclid merely gives without discussion and whenever needed, usually at the beginning of a theory. This practice indicates that Euclid shared the Aristotelian view¹⁰ that mathematical definitions are separated from existence. As such they assert nothing as to the existence or non-existence of the thing defined: being simple answers to the question what is a given thing, they do not have to say that such a thing exists.

Indeed, Aristotle maintains¹¹ that existence is neither an essence, nor a genus, nor a quality. In order to be justified, the existence of a thing must be assumed or proved. It is assumed, when we have a clear intuition of that object.¹² It is proved, when¹³ we show not only *what* a thing is (*τί ἔστιν*) but also *why* it is (*διὰ τί ἔστιν*) by means of a construction. This is particularly true in geometry where, as Aristotle says, only points and lines must be assumed to exist; while the other notions must be proved to exist through some specific additions to the mechanism of proof. But this is precisely the Euclidian standpoint: in the *Elements*, the possibility of the definitions is neither questioned nor postulated. The definitions are merely asserted or proved, which entails that Euclid does not consider the objects they stand for as mere inventions of the mind, pointing to a strictly nominalistic or even pragmatic hypothetico-deductive conception of geometry.

The question arises here as to the type of intuition Euclid had of the geometrical objects he defines. If he were a Platonist,

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 92 b 10.¹¹ *Ibid.*, 92 b 14.¹² *Ibid.*, 76 b sq.¹³ *Ibid.*, 90 a 31.

he must have intuited them as the reflections of their ideal and eternal paradigms. But then, he would have failed on the count of methodology: for as a Platonist, he should have carried the process of analytic regression beyond the very notions he takes as ultimate in order to discover how points and lines and other such figures can be accounted for by means of the One and the Dyad, which are the most primitive elements of the system. Yet Euclid, who has so much to say about numbers in the later books of the *Elements*, does not choose to go beyond points and lines at the beginning of his geometrical exposition. In doing so, he rather favors the Aristotelian view that such notions are the products of abstraction as applied to bodies of our ordinary experience. It is not the contemplation of the Ideas which gave Euclid the basic notions of geometry, but the usual data of the sensible world: and these make possible both their apprehension by successive abstraction and their application to the physical world.

To be sure, even the biological categories of the Stagirite are hinted in Euclid's definitions, because these entail physical intuitions or experiments, because they involve a distinction between genus and species, and because they assume deliberately a nominalistic flavor in order to avoid a confusion between the physical and the ontological orders of being. The use of the class-concept, which is Aristotelian, is indeed more obvious than the use of the relation-concept, which is Platonic, in the Euclidian definitions. It is true that many of Plato's definitions of geometrical notions have also an experimental origin. But we must not forget that experience comes *after* the contemplation of Ideas; while for Aristotle experience comes *before* the conception of abstract notions. And nothing in Euclid's *Elements* encourages us to believe that the various geometrical objects he asserts, constructs or analyses, are reflections of similar but substantial Ideas.

With regard to the definitions the existence of which is proved, Euclid again follows the Aristotelian directives. The assimilation of the essence of a thing with its formal cause¹⁴

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

accounts for the transition from the subjective assumption of a basic geometrical notion to its objective proof. For the constructive process involved in such a proof postulates the Aristotelian principle¹⁵ that in order to know what is an object or a thing, we have to know that it is. In other words, the definition of a notion is not complete until it is made genetic; for it is the producing cause which first reveals the essence of the notion. Where existence is proved by construction, the cause and the effect appear together.¹⁶ It is in accordance with these views and with the practice of earlier mathematicians that Euclid assumes the possibility of constructing straight lines and circles in the first three postulates. The other notions are defined and afterwards constructed, as for example the equilateral triangle (Bk. I, Df. 20 and Pp. 1), the right angle (Bk. I, Df. 10 and Pp. 11), the square (Bk. I, Df. 22 and Pp. 46), and the parallels (Bk. I, Df. 23 and Pps. 27-29). The difficulty of constructing all geometrical notions with the original Euclidian assumptions is not discussed by the author of the *Elements*, though it was known to earlier and especially to later mathematicians.

As regards the characteristics or conditions of a correct definition, we are told by Aristotle that: (1) the different attributes of a definition, taken together, must cover exactly the notion defined; and (2) the different attributes of a definition, taken separately, must refer to the things better known or logically prior to the notion defined.¹⁷ Thus Euclid defines a square (Bk. I, Df. 22) by means of the notions of figure, four-sided, equilateral, and right-angled, each of which is wider, prior or better known than the term defined, and which cover exactly the notion of the square when taken together. Definitions breaking either of these rules are unscientific. There are several ways of breaking them; as for example, when a notion is defined by its opposite, or a coordinate species, or a synonym, all of which are coextensive with the notion to be defined.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 93 a 20.

¹⁶ Cf. Trendelenburg, *Erläuterungen*, p. 116.

¹⁷ *Topics*, VI, 4—141 a 26 sq.

There are several examples of such definitions in Euclid, among them the straight line "lying evenly with the points on itself": the expression "lying evenly" can be understood only with the very notion to be defined.

It is interesting to note that Euclid never states a primitive notion without defining it; though such a practice is current today as a requirement of logical rigor. Hence he does not merely assume points, lines and surfaces; but he also defines them by means of notions possibly satisfying our intuition without being justified in the system itself. In doing so, however, Euclid improved apparently the definitions of his predecessors. Indeed, Aristotle himself had criticized the earlier definitions of a point as the extremity of a line, a line as the extremity of a surface, and a surface as the extremity of a solid, by saying that they all define the prior by means of the posterior.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Euclid must have felt that his definitions of these and of some other notions did not fulfil all the requirements of a correct definition as laid down by Aristotle. For he thought of supplementing them with the very statements Aristotle had criticized. Hence we are told (Bk. I, Df. 3) that the extremities of a surface are lines, and that (Bk. XI, Df. 20) the extremities of a solid are surfaces. Yet, in spite of their technical shortcomings, these supplementary explanations help to form a better understanding of the Euclidian definitions, for we must consider first a solid, which is more closely related to the bodies of our experience, in order to understand correctly the definition of a solid, a surface, a line and a point, as results of successive abstractions.

Similar remarks are suggested by most of the Euclidian definitions; and not only by those of such controversial notions as the straight line and the parallels, but also by the elementary geometrical notions involving a construction. Without discussing these definitions as such in particular, a strictly technical task, we shall insist on the question of geometrical constructions, as they introduce the consideration of the *hypotheses* of

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 141 b 20.

geometry, and as they involve a major distinction between the Platonian and the Aristotelian conceptions of science.

We are told by Plato and Aristotle that geometrical constructions are made logically possible and mathematically useful by the hypotheses of geometry which are of two kinds: the *postulates* and the *axioms*.¹⁹ The first are more particular to geometry, as they beg certain properties of the straight line especially, on the ground of some idealized intuition or generalization no doubt, capable of justifying subsequent constructions and logical deductions. The second assert certain general properties of magnitudes, applicable to relations of equality and inequality between figures, and illustrating the elements of necessity in the actual process of demonstration. Euclid gives a set of propositions for each kind, but without explaining their logical character which he simply puts into use. Yet the classification of these statements shows that he knew the Aristotelian distinction between axioms which are *καθ' ἑαυτά* or self-evident, and postulates which are accidental and not *ἐξ ἀναγκης* or necessary. Furthermore, the remarks of Proclus about axioms and postulates indicate that the Greeks were conversant with the logical and practical technicalities involved in their distinction. But certainly Euclid meant to get on with his mathematical exposition, rather than getting involved in discussions.

Yet, neither the meaning nor the use of the geometrical hypotheses can be strictly independent from philosophical implications. To begin with, the argument already mentioned concerning the Euclidian definitions could be repeated here: If the geometrical hypotheses reflect properties of the Ideas, a

¹⁹ The term *axiom*, which is currently used by Aristotle, seems to have been introduced by the Pythagoreans; while the term *common notions* seems to be due to Democritus (Cf. *Sextus* ap. Diels, A. 111) who is also credited with a work on the *Elements*, the subject-matter of which is suggested by titles given by Thrasyllus (Cf. Diels, B. 11, n-p). In his *Commentary* on Euclid (p. 194), Proclus alludes to the habit of later mathematicians calling *common notions* what Aristotle defined as *axioms*, these terms being henceforth equivalent. However, Aristotle also refers to the axioms as *τὰ κοινὰ* or more rarely as *κοινὰ δόγματα* or common opinions (Cf. *Metaphysics* 996 b 26-30, and 997 b 20) implying that such statements are urged as requirements of common sense.

true Platonist should have tried to justify them by analytic regression in terms of more ultimate Platonic principles. Furthermore, if postulates express true properties of the ideal figures to which they refer, they should be stated assertorically. But Euclid proposes them as requests, that is, as something which is not intuitively clear and necessary. The various attempts to prove some of the postulates reveal their ontological weakness and their strictly hypothetical character. Finally, postulates are used mainly to solve problems and to justify constructions: but a problem involves a request again and a construction involves change, while eternal truths are changeless and assertorical. If Euclid were a Platonist, he would have given a different expression to his postulates, and he would have avoided the distinction between *theorems* and *problems* which is a fundamental feature of his method, in order to make all his statements assertorical. The weight of these difficulties is such that Platonists have tried to explain them away with psychological arguments.²⁰ The fact remains however, that Euclid has not built the foundations of the *Elements* according to a thorough Platonic pattern.

To be sure, the Euclidian method follows a middle course between the Platonic conceptions as expressed by Speusippus and the pragmatic suggestions of the disciples of Menechmus the inventor of the conics. Speusippus proposed that all mathematical truths should be expressed as theorems, insofar as they reflect unchangeable and uncreated relations; while the practical mathematicians who followed Menechmus maintained that all mathematical statements should be considered as problems, insofar as they deal with constructions and with analyses of mathematical objects. But Euclid thought rightly that some mathematical propositions are straight deductions from previous ones, while others involve constructions: in choosing to distinguish between them as he did, he follows the Aristotelian conceptions which insist not only on the psychological priority

²⁰ Cf. Abel Rey, *L'Apogée de la Science Technique Grecque* (Paris, 1948), pp. 163-194.

of experience, but also on the existential priority of individual objects. Indeed, the hypothetical character of the postulates and the zetetic expression of the problems entail an Aristotelian vision of the mathematical truths they assert, insofar as they point to an idealization of sense experience, rather than to a repetition of preconceived necessary relations or realities.

However, these ontological and epistemological implications of the presentation of the *Elements* do not affect their strictly logical structure; for both Plato and Aristotle insist on the rational necessity of the deductive steps in mathematical reasoning. So that Euclid need not be considered as an Aristotelian simply because he uses basically the *Organon* in his work. It is interesting to note, however, the structural refinements Euclid added to syllogistic practice, in order to strengthen the binding character of a systematic deduction in the particular field of mathematics. Here, the propositions expressing theorems, lemmas, corollaries and problems ²¹ are connected in such a way that the elements or steps necessary to the proof of any one of them are legitimately given in the preceding propositions, so that one can reason backwards, so to speak, until the basic apriori data are reached. This analytic regression is made rigorous by the technical elimination of intuition in the detailed expression of each connecting link within and between the statements which make up in a body the science of geometry.

The Euclidian pattern of demonstration requires three fundamental steps: the enunciation, the proof and the conclusion. But these are expanded into six for greater clarity: (1) the *protasis* or enunciation of the proposition in general terms; (2) the *ecthesis* or specification of the particular data indicated by letters on which the demonstration will be developed; (3) the

²¹ The meaning of theorems and problems has been discussed. A *lemma* is an auxiliary proposition which is required in a demonstration without being essential in the general exposition of a theory. A *corollary* is the statement of a consequence of a particular demonstration which is not necessary in dealing with subsequent propositions. The functional distinction of these four types of statements suggests a view of geometry which is more pragmatic and methodological than Platonic in character.

diorismos or statement of the conditions of possibility of what is required to prove or do in terms of the particular data; this is sometimes followed by a discussion of the limits of the proof; (4) the *kataskeve* or construction of additional elements to the original figure, which may be needed in the demonstration; (5) the *apodeixis* or proof, which draws the truth of the enunciation from the various data given or constructed, with the help of previous propositions, hypotheses and definitions; (6) the *symperasma* or conclusion affirming that the original statement satisfies the conditions of proof.

The rational process of demonstration is *direct* by synthesis or analysis, and *indirect* by reduction or exhaustion. Synthetic reasoning explicates the pattern of demonstration just outlined: it actually achieves the successive logical connection of the mathematical truths, and thus corresponds to the objective and permanent organization of mathematics; whereas the psychological processes of invention are different. As such, the synthetic method appears to be the most direct, not only insofar as it allows the conclusion to be drawn immediately from the data and the eventual constructions, but also because it exhibits the strict rational order of truths which is the goal of all knowledge. This should not mean, however, that these truths reflect a world of substantial ideas; or at least that Euclid had this in mind in choosing a synthetic pattern as its principal method of exposition. For the synthetic process is just as effective and fundamental in the hypothetico-deductive vision of mathematics, which corresponds more closely to that of Euclid and to the Aristotelian tradition.

The analytic proof is in a way the inverse of the former. It is a partial application of the general process of analysis, which allows the assertion of the truth of a statement by a logical regression to the fundamental definitions and hypotheses. It develops into two steps: the first is the *apagogy* or transformation, which assumes the truth of the proposed theorem or problem, analyzes the particular conditions of its proof, and then shows that these conditions can be provided legitimately for a

direct demonstration of the original statement. The second step is the *resolution* which discusses whether the conditions of possibility (or diorisms) of the transformed proposition are together sufficient to carry assent. In short, the analytic proof actually transforms a given proposition into a simpler one, shows the original data to be sufficient for the proof of the simpler proposition, and determines that the proof of the simpler necessarily entails the proof of the original proposition.

Indirect proof is either by *reductio ad absurdum* or by *method of exhaustion*. The former process shows the impossibility of a proposition contradicting the original one, and concludes that the latter is true on account of the principle of contradiction. Such an indirect method is a kind of elaboration of the apagogic reasoning which is also a process of reduction. On the other hand, the method of exhaustion reduces proofs which lead to infinitesimals to problems involving formal logic only. Thus it proves that an assumed relation of magnitude must be what it asserts, by showing that both assumptions of it being greater or smaller lead to absurdities. Here again, this type of demonstration appears in a way as a more complex elaboration of both the apagogic reasoning and *reductio ad absurdum*.

As a rule, the indirect methods and more particularly the apagogic reasoning always follow immediately the *ecthesis* in the general process of proof, when they are used, of course. The disadvantage of these indirect demonstrations is that they assume the result which has to be proved, so that mathematicians have to find it first by other and more tentative methods. Such demonstrations are used when a direct proof is difficult or impossible, and not because Euclid "had to convince obstinate Sophists who plumed themselves on their refusal to accept more obvious truths."²² Here again, Euclid's objective

²² Clairaut, *Eléments de Géométrie* (Paris, 1741), pref. pp. 10-11. A similar suggestion is made by Houel in his *Essai critique sur les principes fondamentaux de la géométrie* (Paris, 1867), p. 7 where he says: "Euclid's method is due to his desire to shut the mouths of the Sophists; hence his habit of always proving that a thing cannot be instead of proving it to be."

was to get on with the unrolling of his successive deductions according to the canons of logic, and not to skirmish with schools of philosophers about the meaning and possibility of truth.

It remains to add that the general organization of the *Elements* and the actual order of succession of its propositions have been influenced considerably by the historical evolution of geometry. Traditionally and psychologically, the easiest but not necessarily the simplest generalizations or relations were discovered first. And whenever some particular propositions were thus found, they were integrated into the group of truths of the same kind already known. Hence, it was natural for Euclid to have this in mind in writing his work, even though geometrical truths were not discovered in the logical order in which the *Elements* present them. For, indeed, it is logically possible to arrange the content of this work in many other ways: for example, one may begin with the arithmetical books, or even with more general principles; or again, one might put together the elementary and the general propositions referring to the same theory, which Euclid placed in different books, as in the case of the propositions on similarity. Thus it appears that in combining into a single synthesis the various geometrical theories known at his time, Euclid took into account what was done previously, but without sacrificing the demands of a deductive exposition.

The success of Euclid's effort is proved by the fact that his collection and arrangement of the *Elements* have survived centuries of controversies. Later mathematicians were able to supply minor changes in their wording or disposition; but none was fundamental or final. This is the case, for example, of the theory of parallels which had caused such a storm in the history of mathematics. In this as in any other theory, an analysis of Euclid's presentation shows that nothing is admitted that could be dispensed with, and that little that matters is left out. To be sure, there are a number of imperfections in Euclid's work: thus, a number of his definitions are intuitive,

as are also some of his demonstratious; some capital hypotheses are omitted, as those concerning order and direction, and the postulate of indeformability of figures; again, logical proofs are often and needlessly preferred to arithmetical or geometrical demonstrations; and finally, his systematization of geometry covers only a part of the field. Yet, the modern conditions of methodological rigor, and the various discoveries in synthetic and metrical geometry do not dim the brilliance of Euclid's work: they are legitimate extensions based on different or generalized systems of axioms, or required by the rational systematization of the new material provided by the growth of mathematics.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL VISION OF EUCLID

A mathematician can restrict himself to the study of his field, without having to choose of necessity a philosophy to account for his labors. It is possible that Euclid would be content with his title of *στοιχειωτής*, especially as his works offer no direct information about his philosophical interests. But there is little doubt that he was acquainted with the speculations of his contemporaries, not only because of the intellectual climate of his age, but also on account of his very mathematical training. Though specialization was more pronounced then, a division of labor did not preclude an interpenetration of the various disciplines, especially in the schools where the influence of the masters was paramount. On the other hand, if Euclid's mathematical teachers were pupils of the Academy, it does not follow that his technical training carried with it an acceptance of the Platonic doctrines.

The suggestion that Euclid favored Platonism is made by Proclus for the reason that he "set before himself, as the end of the whole *Elements*, the construction of the so-called Platonic figures."²³ But Proclus is careful to draw a distinction between the strictly technical aim of the *Elements* and the

²³ Proclus, *Commentaries* (*op. cit.*), p. 68.

ultimate intentions of their author. The latter "is concerned with the cosmic figures"; while the former is bent on "making perfect the understanding of the learner in regard to the whole of geometry."²⁴ Heath finds fault with this distinction, because the planimetical and the arithmetical portions of the *Elements* have no direct relation to the construction of the five regular solids as such.²⁵ Yet he admits casually that "Euclid was a Platonist"²⁶ when he shows that the Euclidian definition of the straight line is based on the definition Plato gave of that entity. And, in any case, the fact remains that the *Elements* does end with the construction of the solids, in spite of their indirect relation to its earlier parts. These circumstances agree much less with a rigorous exposition of geometry than with the alleged Platonic interests of Euclid, so that the initial statement of Proclus may be taken as something more than a mere attempt to connect the Alexandrian with Platonic philosophy. This idealistic interpretation of Euclid is also maintained by recent historians²⁷ with more potent arguments. They try to show that the whole structure of the *Elements* is a practical realization of the Platonic conception of science in general and of mathematics in particular.

The discussion already presented of the imposing structure of the *Elements* has already shown, however, that Euclid's systematization of geometry is not merely an elaboration of the Aristotelian syllogistic and theory of proof. To be sure, it entails a number of considerations which are closer to the Aristotelian than to the Platonic world-view. As a special application of Aristotle's logic to the exposition (but not the invention) of geometry, it suggests that Euclid organized the geometrical elements in such a way as to encase them neatly in Aristotle's *Analytics* where the logic of classes predominates.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

²⁵ Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements* (1926), Vol. I, p. 2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

²⁷ Cf. A. Rey, *op. cit.* But, on the other hand, L. Brunschvicg in *Les Etapes de la Philosophie Mathématique*, p. 89, considers the *Elements* "as a veritable *Analytics* of geometry parallel to the *Analytics* of formal logic."

Indeed, the biological conceptions of the Stagirite are hinted in Euclid's definitions, insofar as they involve physical experiments, as they use the distinction between genus and species, and as they assume a nominalistic flavor in order to avoid a confusion of the orders or levels of abstraction. The primacy of the class-concept asserts itself the more, when one remarks in the *Elements* the formal neglect of relational arguments, of spatial postulates, and of constructibility conditions, which are technically discussed by modern axiomatics.

It is true that Euclid uses also factually a relational logic in his processes of construction and proof; for this is a natural condition of the activity of the mind and of the development of mathematics proper. But the logic of relations was not formalized before the nineteenth century, though Aristotle speaks of conditional arguments and though the Stoic had developed a practical theory of the hypothetical syllogism. Hence Euclid does not share Plato's anxiety for the status and use of relations as such. He is quite satisfied with the more positive organization of the geometrical elements on the broad basis supplied by intuitive concepts copied on idealized experiments or constructed logically with them as material. Such an Aristotelian outlook prevailed also in the systematization of the higher geometrical theories developed by Euclid's successors: instead of stressing the relational structure of these new fields, they described and organized them with the help of categories or classes more pliable to an analytical and a syllogistic treatment.

The actual disposition of the mathematical theories which make up the body of the *Elements* provides a further argument against the alleged Platonic vision of Euclid. His work begins neither with number, the most immediate reflection of the Number-Forms, nor with the elementary triangles which Plato uses for the construction of the material world. For his purpose Euclid takes concepts which Plato would consider as intermediate between number and the elementary-triangles, but which Aristotle would obtain more directly from the external

world by intensive abstraction. Expanding this realistic approach, Euclid devotes the four first books of his work to a simplified systematisation of what may be called a natural geometry. He introduces much later the theory of irrationals, which a Platonist would have given at the very beginning. What is most significant, he bases the theory of irrationals on geometric considerations, which is not the Platonic scheme of accounting for geometry by means of numbers. In other words, Euclid geometrizes the continuum, instead of fulfilling the Platonic dream of its arithmetization.

This factual priority of geometry cannot be explained away on strictly methodological grounds: for it points obviously to a vision which does not fit with the overall Platonic synthesis. Moreover, the loose connection in the *Elements* between planimetry and stereometry suggests that Euclid incorporated in them the Pythagorean theory of the regular solids for the sake of mathematical completeness rather than as an illustration of his alleged Platonic faith. Hence the construction of the regular solids does not appear as the crowning of a strictly Platonic endeavor, but rather as the result of an Aristotelian effort to rationalize the very concepts obtained after a first abstraction from the solids or bodies presented to us by the external world. The intimate connection between this effort and the use of classes in the structural developement of the *Elements* is a further indication of a prevailing Aristotelian intention of influence.

In conclusion, it can be truly said that the work of Euclid is situated in the Aristotelian rather than the Platonic perspective, although it incorporates the methodological results of both. The rule of logic, already strengthened by the Platonic dialectic of numbers became supreme with Euclid who submitted geometry to its canons. As a consequence, the place given by Aristotle to geometry in the classification of the sciences was strictly adhered to until Descartes and even to the birth of modern analysis. Indeed, the intimate combination of logic and geometry made of the latter almost a real science: by

showing or constructing its objects Euclidian geometry was considered as the real picture of all motion in the universe, up to the present century, though Euclid does not venture to propose his mathematical system as the actual stuff of reality. Hence, it is true to say that the Alexandrian mathematician stamped with an Aristotelian seal the whole system of Greek mathematics. For his work is a factual illustration of a *qualitative interpretation of quantity*, rather than of a quantitative interpretation of quality, which is a Platonic ideal inherited from the Pythagoreans, and a debatable ambition of modern philosophy.

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CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

[Conclusion]

II. CAUSES OF CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

AMONG the causes to be discussed, the first three, i. e., the Holy Trinity, Jesus Christ the God-Man, and the Catholic Church, are in the strictest sense causes external to the freedom of the Christian soul and produce Christian liberty as efficient causes. Though they are inseparable from true liberty of soul, they are not *formal* elements integrated in the structure of Christian freedom.

But faith, charity, and all the other virtues, infused and acquired, which are treated here as agents in the liberation of the Christian, are, from another viewpoint, essential elements *formally* constituting Christian liberty.¹⁰³ In other words, they have the character of formal cause as well as efficient causality in relation to Christian freedom. The acquired and infused virtues, as human or divine perfections of the potencies they determine, are *forms*, accidental forms; as operative habits, however, ordered to acts¹⁰⁴ whereby Christian freedom may be developed, they are *agents* in the increase of freedom. It is in this latter sense that we speak of them here; we have previously considered the virtues in so far as they are formal constituents of Christian liberty.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Cf., *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 2-3.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 49, a. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Habitual grace is essentially formal in its causality in relation to Christian freedom. "Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white." (I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 1.) It is a form divinizing the essence of the human soul. In so far as it operates, mediately, through the supernatural habits which flow from it into the powers of the soul, habitual grace can be considered as active also in the order of efficient causality. (Cf. I-II, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1; ad 2.) In treating of the Christian virtues, therefore, we are treating by implication of the efficiency of grace, which is the principle of supernatural action through the medium of the virtues.

Law is an efficient cause of freedom in its Christian fulness because it is an *imperium*, an impulse to action. The New Law, however, in the sense that it is identified with charity, is a formal element (or rather, *the* formal element) in Christian freedom; it has then whatever is to be attributed to charity in the order of efficient causality.

Briefly, the following section deals with the chief causes of Christian liberty not only in its genesis but also in its development and perfection. From this viewpoint it is possible to consider the formal elements in Christian freedom as also operative, effectively, in the increase of that freedom.

1. *The Holy Trinity*

"Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom,"¹⁰⁶ is the formula of St. Paul for the liberty of the Christian.¹⁰⁷ The Holy Trinity is the first cause of all liberty of free creatures whether that liberty be potential, actual, or habitual, whether it be the natural freedom of the will, or the supernatural freedom of grace and glory, whether it be purely internal or manifested externally.¹⁰⁸ But the supernatural liberation of man, though an operation *ad extra* of the divine nature and therefore a work of the three persons, is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, since it is essentially a divine labor of love and sanctification.¹⁰⁹ It is also a supereminent expression of the divine liberty of the Holy Ghost, "who divides to everyone according as He will."¹¹⁰

When St. Paul writes elsewhere, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been

¹⁰⁶ II Cor. 3: 17.

¹⁰⁷ Though St. Thomas admits in his commentary on this text that "Lord" may be interpreted as referring directly to Christ, and "spirit" may be understood as relating to the New Law, the spiritual law of Christ, he also gives the interpretation which refers "Spirit" to the Third Person. *In II ad Cor.*, cap. 3, lect. 3:

In other places St. Thomas consistently interprets this text as referring to the Holy Ghost as, e.g., *IV Cont. Gent.*, cap. 22.

¹⁰⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 39, a. 7; a. 8.

¹¹⁰ I Cor. 12: 11. Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 3.

given to us,"¹¹¹ he is indicating from another viewpoint the role of the Holy Ghost in our spiritual liberation, since the love He infuses is chief among the interior causes of our Christian freedom. All the created principles of this true liberty are products of the uncreated liberty and love of the Holy Spirit: the Sacred Humanity of Christ; the Church; revelation, including both the Old and the New Law; grace and the infused virtues and gifts; and the glory of the elect.

Without the Holy Spirit there can be no liberty in creation except the perverse liberty of sin. Without God the undeveloped potentiality of created liberty tends to nothingness, to that privation of due being, order, and goodness, which is the essence of sin. Sin is freedom perverted, needing no uncreated freedom as its cause, because it is an absence of reality and a lack of being. God need not be, in fact cannot be, the cause of this moral deficiency, which arises from a creature's abuse of freedom of choice; the creature alone is responsible.¹¹²

2. *Jesus Christ*

"If therefore the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed."¹¹³ Christ reveals in these words His own part in the work of liberation which is elsewhere in the Scriptures appropriated to the Holy Spirit. The liberty given by the Holy Ghost is the same as "the freedom wherewith Christ has made us free."¹¹⁴ The Son and the Spirit whom He sent to sanctify us are inseparable in the work of freeing the souls of men from error and sin.

As God, Christ has, of course, the primary causality in the liberating of souls, a causality equal to, and identical with, that of the Father and the Holy Spirit. As Man, however, our divine Saviour has a special and unique part to play in the creation of supernatural freedom. Our freedom from spiritual bondage flows from His Sacred Humanity as well as from His Divinity. That is why our freedom is Christian in the full

¹¹¹ Rom. 5: 5.

¹¹² *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 49, a. 2.

¹¹³ John 8: 36.

¹¹⁴ Galatians 4: 31.

meaning of that term—it comes from Christ and through Christ both as God and as Man. As our Teacher, the God-Man gives us the truth necessary for humanity's intellectual liberation; as our Redeemer, He has won and He confers upon us the grace necessary for moral freedom. "Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ."¹¹⁵ And *only* from Christ can the freedom which grace and truth involve be obtained. There is no other source. "Christ *alone* can drive out the dreadful spirits of error and sin, which have subjected mankind to a tyrannical and degrading servitude . . . Christ *alone*, Who has rescued us from the sad slavery of sin, can point out the way to a noble, controlled liberty supported by genuine righteousness and a moral sense."¹¹⁶

The causal relation of the Humanity of Christ to that freedom He infuses into souls is so essential and so intimate that our spiritual liberty could not be more accurately described than by the name Christian. As Man, He is more than an efficient principle of supernatural freedom. In His human nature He is its exemplary, meritorious and instrumental cause. In these three ways is our liberty specifically Christian.¹¹⁷

Christ is the Exemplar of our liberty because He is *the* free Man, the Model to whose sinless image and likeness all men who are truly free must be conformed. In the order of formal causality Christ is the pattern of the supernatural liberty which the activity of the Spirit aims to reproduce in our lives. All the principles which must co-exist and cooperate in the emancipation of the human soul were in His soul pre-eminently in all their fulness: the indwelling Spirit and His gifts; grace, truth, charity. Before His Resurrection Christ was our divinely human Prototype for that freedom from sin which is the ultimate in liberty for this life; after His Resurrection, His glorified Body no longer subject to suffering, He was, and is, the Original of that fulness of liberty which includes deliverance from misery as well as sin. Thus all true freedom of

¹¹⁵ John 1: 17.

¹¹⁶ Pius XII, *Christmas Message*, 1943. (Italics ours.)

¹¹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 1, corp; ad 1.

grace and glory is Christian not only in the sense that it is an effect of Christ's activity, but also as a reflection of His perfect human life.

It would surely be enlightening to examine carefully the external conditions under which the human liberty of Christ was exercised, conditions which, from a purely human and natural standpoint, would have seemed most undesirable, but were yet chosen deliberately by the divine liberty and embraced freely by the human will of Christ. Influencing this choice must have been Christ's intention of emphasizing the absolute value of the inner freedom of grace in contrast to the relative unimportance of the external liberties which sense-bound humanity treasures inordinately; and of teaching that the highest interior liberty can be realized, with divine help, under the most unfavorable natural circumstances, economic, political, or social. Christ's family was poor;¹¹⁸ His social status was inferior, despite the royal lineage of His Mother; His country was subjugated and paid tribute to Rome. We do not mean to say that by His choice for His own earthly life Our Lord would teach us that such conditions are in themselves desirable and to be cultivated for spiritual purposes. But in a world which overestimates the importance of externals and earthly values He found it useful for His spiritual mission to minimize these things.

In a second way is the freedom of mankind through grace

¹¹⁸ "Undoubtedly the poverty of the stable in Bethlehem is a condition which He chose for Himself only, and it does not therefore imply any condemnation of the economic life as far as it is necessary for the physical or natural development and perfection of man. But that poverty of the Lord and Creator of the world, deliberately willed by Him, a poverty which will accompany Him in the workshop of Nazareth and throughout His public life, signifies and portrays the command and the dominance He had over material things. And thus it shows with striking efficacy the natural and essential subjection of material goods to the life of the spirit and to a higher cultural, moral and religious perfection which is necessary for man endowed with reason. Those who looked for the salvation of society from the machinery of the world economic market have remained thus disillusioned because they had become not the lords and masters, but the slaves, of material wealth, which they served without reference to the higher end of man, making it an end in itself." Pius XII, *Christmas Message*, 1943.

and glory Christian, in as much as it comes to us from Christ by way of merit and satisfaction.¹¹⁹ By His human activity and especially by His Passion and Death, Christ earned for us freedom from sin and from the tyranny of Satan. Our ransom was purchased by His sufferings, which had infinite value because of Christ's Divine Personality, to which the actions of His Humanity are attributed. Thus Christ offered an infinite reparation in recompense for the infinite insult offered to the majesty of the Creator by the sins of His rational creatures. All men who are freed from spiritual bondage, all who have ever been sanctified and saved since the fall of mankind, whether they lived before Christ's coming or after, owe their deliverance to Christ's merits. In His Humanity, therefore, He is not only the Teacher of the way to freedom and the Model in the use and attainment of freedom, but the Liberator who actually frees us. He championed the cause of spiritual freedom by His life and death, so that "delivered from the hand of our enemies, we should serve Him without fear."¹²⁰

In a third way our spiritual liberation is Christian, since it is brought to us by Christ Himself through the instrumental causality of His Humanity in begetting and expanding the life of grace in our souls. Not in the past alone but in the present too the liberating of the minds and hearts of men from error and sin is the labor of the human Christ, for He Himself actually applies His merits to souls whenever grace is given or increased. He carries on that work of emancipation especially through His Sacraments, but also without the instrumentality of these seven most important means of grace.

In these three ways the Son of God causes and perfects in men the divine sonship by adoption which bestows on us, "according to the measure of Christ's bestowal,"¹²¹ a share in "the freedom of the glory of the sons of God."¹²² Everything that contributes to the fulness of Christian freedom issues to us from Christ, through His Humanity from His Divinity.

¹¹⁹ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 2; q. 49, a. 1; a. 2.

¹²⁰ Luke 2: 74.

¹²¹ Ephesians 4: 7.

¹²² Romans 8: 21.

It would be a serious error to regard Christ's liberation of mankind as *exclusively* spiritual, because it is *chiefly* spiritual. Christ's influence and His dominion over men extends to temporal as well as to eternal affairs; His authority in civil affairs, unexercised in His lifetime on earth as it is today, is none the less real.¹²³ A recognition of His dominion over the exterior and secular life of men, public as well as private, is essential to man's temporal welfare and true liberty in society. "When once men recognize, both in private and in public life, that Christ is King, society will at last receive the great blessing of real liberty, well-ordered discipline, peace, and harmony."¹²⁴

3. *The Catholic Church*

Through time and space Christ continues His work of spiritual liberation for the human race through the supernatural society He founded for that purpose, the Catholic Church. In the Church's custody are the deposit of truth through which Christ frees the human mind from the deficiencies and limitations of a purely human wisdom, and the channels of divine grace through which Christ releases men from spiritual slavery and restores to the sons of Adam their lost inheritance as the sons of God. From Christ the Church has divine authority to speak, and divine power to act, in His name, in order to communicate His truth and channel His grace into the minds and hearts of men.

Christ has made His Church the true emancipator of the whole world and the Mother of human liberty by giving her the means to free men from error and sin.

¹²³ "It would be a grave error . . . to say that Christ has no authority whatever in civil affairs, since by virtue of the absolute empire over all creatures committed to Him by the Father, all things are in His power. Nevertheless, during His life on earth He refrained from the exercise of such authority and although He Himself disdained to possess or to care for earthly goods, He did not, nor does He today, interfere with those who possess them. . . . Thus the empire of our Redeemer embraces all men. . . . Nor is there any difference in this matter between the individual and the family or the state; for all men, whether collectively or individually, are under the dominion of Christ. In Him is the salvation of the individual, in Him is the salvation of society. . . ." Pius XI, *Quas Primas*.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

In the Catholic Church Christianity is incarnate. . . . She is the continuation of the mission of the Saviour, the daughter and heiress of His Redemption. She has preached the Gospel, and has defended it at the price of her blood. . . . She makes no terms with error, but remains faithful to the commands which she has received to carry the doctrine of Jesus Christ to the uttermost limits of the world and to the end of time and to protect it in its inviolable integrity. Legitimate dispenser of the teachings of the Gospel, she does not reveal herself only as the consoler and redeemer of souls, but she is still more the internal source of justice and charity, and the propagator as well as the guardian of true liberty. . . . The liberty which she gives in no wise conflicts with the rights of truth, because those rights are superior to the demands of liberty. Nor does she infringe upon the rights of justice, because those rights are superior to the claims of mere numbers or power. Nor does she assail the rights of God because they are superior to the rights of humanity.¹²⁵

Traditionally, Christian teaching is so concerned with the freedom which grace and charity bring to the soul that to the superficial observer the Church might seem to have been callously indifferent to bondage of the human body. St. Paul, for example, is clearly much more interested in seeing slaves made citizens of heaven and freedmen in Christ's Kingdom than in furthering their civil emancipation; in fact, he advises Christian slaves to pay little attention to the matter. "Wast thou a slave when called? Let it not trouble thee. But if thou canst become free, make use of it rather."¹²⁶ St. Thomas understands this as advice to use the human slavery in which the convert was born as a means to humility of heart, rather than to seek release from it. "We should be solicitous only regarding what pertains to salvation"; says St. Thomas in explaining St. Paul's attitude, "therefore slavery and freedom should be for us an indifferent matter."¹²⁷

Yet it would certainly be unjust to accuse Christianity of enmity to political and civil freedom on the basis of such advice. St. Paul does not advise those who are free to seek

¹²⁵ Leo XIII, Apostolic Letter of March 19, 1902.

¹²⁶ I Cor. 7: 21.

¹²⁷ *In I Cor.*, c. 7, lect. 4.

slavery. His advice to them is the same as that to convert slaves: "Brethren, in the state in which he was when called, let every man remain with God."¹²⁸ The doctrine of Christ does not favor slavery in civil society. But the civil liberty which is most in conformity with the dignity of the Christian soul must always be a by-product rather than the chief and immediate interest of Christian teaching. The Church, like her Master, knows what is in man and realizes that social freedom cannot always be quickly obtained; that the sudden change through grace from spiritual bondage cannot be matched in temporal affairs.

Moreover, civil freedom granted to men unprepared for such a blessing is calculated to do more harm than good to all concerned, to the newly freed themselves as well as to the freemen to whose status they have been elevated. That is why the early Church prudently

deprecatd any precipitate action in securing the manumission and liberation of the slaves, because that would have entailed tumults and wrought injury, as well to the slaves themselves as to the commonwealth, but with singular wisdom she has seen that the minds of the slaves should be instructed through her discipline in the Christian faith, and with baptism should acquire habits suitable to the Christian life.¹²⁹

In actual instances where imprudent haste has liberated slaves not conditioned by education and training in social virtues for the responsibilities of civil and political freedom, the result has been disastrous.¹³⁰ A fit preparation for citizenship

¹²⁸ I Cor. 7: 24.

¹²⁹ Leo XIII, *In Plurimis*.

¹³⁰ Note these words of a Pastoral Letter of the American Hierarchy, Oct. 21, 1866: "We must all feel, beloved Brethren, that in some manner a new and most extensive field of charity and devotedness has been opened to us, by the emancipation of the immense slave population of the South. We could have wished, that in accordance with the action of the Catholic Church in past ages, in regard to the serfs of Europe, a more gradual system of emancipation could have been adopted, so that they might have been in some measure prepared to make a better use of their freedom, than they are likely to do now. Still the evils which must necessarily attend the sudden liberation of so large a multitude, with their peculiar dispositions

is not the work of a day or a decade; for large numbers of men it may well be the work of centuries.

Because of the supreme importance of her work of spiritual liberation, the Church has never ceased throughout her history to claim for herself the widest freedom of action to deliver men from error and sin; she has never hesitated in any age to defy restrictions by which tyranny would check her influence upon the souls of men. And in defending the freedom that is hers by divine right the Church has become the truest champion of every other just liberty. "The struggles which, coerced by the abuse of power, she has had to sustain in defence of the liberty given her by God, were at the same time struggles for man's true liberty."¹⁸¹ Her independence of the State has always been, and must continue to be, the greatest safeguard society can have against exaggerated claims of secular authority over the lives of men. And the surest sign of latent or full-grown despotism is distrust and enmity of governments for the Church's independence. If civil powers disregard divine rights in this sphere, they are not likely to respect them in others.

If the Church had nothing more than her doctrine to offer as a contribution to the cause of true freedom, mankind would be indebted to her beyond all power of repayment. We have only to recall here her dogmatic defense of the freedom of the human will against every conceivable type of attack: theologi-

and habits, only make the appeal to our Christian charity and zeal, presented by their forlorn condition, the more forcible and imperative." *The National Pastorals of the American Hierarchy (1792-1919)*, (Washington, 1923), pp. 220-221. The foreboding of the American Bishops after the Civil War was more than justified by later events, up to and including our own day.

¹⁸¹ Pius XII, *Christmas Message*, 1944. The Holy Father said, in an address to the College of Cardinals, June 1, 1946: ". . . Liberty . . . to reach out to what is true and good, liberty such as will be in harmony with the well-being of every people in particular and of the whole great family of peoples—such liberty the Church has ever proclaimed, guarded, and defended. Over sixty years ago Our great predecessor, Leo XIII, called on the evidence of history to show the Church's incessant solicitude to protect the peoples against the despotism of princes careless of the common good, to defend municipalities and families against unjust interference on the part of the state and to uphold the dignity of the human person and the rights of every Christian (*Immortale Dei*). Have not these assertions received a new and convincing confirmation in the past few decades?"

cal, philosophical, or scientific; of the true freedom of the human conscience; of the rights and dignity of the individual and of the family against the encroachments of civil power.

But the Church has far more than her teaching to give mankind in the service of liberty.¹³² In her hands are the divine treasures of grace which expel sin and beget virtues, virtues necessary not only for eternal salvation but for temporal happiness as well. The help of grace alone can supply the strength needed by men to follow the lead of the Church's teaching, and the Church is the Mother of Freedom because through her Sacraments she is a supernatural Mother of grace. The Church is the surest support of temporal as well as eternal freedom when she is

free from envy and strong in her liberty as the minister of the Gospel truth and grace to the notable welfare of States. For as she has been given by God as a teacher and guide to the human race, she can contribute assistance which is peculiarly adapted to direct even the most radical transformations of time to the common good, to solve the most complicated questions, and to promote uprightness and justice, which are the most solid foundations of the commonwealth.¹³³

So notable and manifest are the Church's benefits to men in the temporal order, she could not do more for the human race on this earth if her aims were only earthly.

The Catholic Church has for her immediate and natural purpose the saving of souls and the securing of our happiness in heaven. Yet in things temporal she is the source of benefits as manifold and great as if the chief end of her existence were to ensure the well-being of our earthly life. And truly, wherever the Church has set

¹³² " . . . How and by what means can the Church and the Catholic religion make greater and better contributions to real well-being, whether of the individual, the family or society [than by Christian teachings]? The Church and religion do, in fact, something more and something better for they offer to provide every one of good will with the means which make it possible to derive from those teachings and principles the whole of that practical good whereof they contain the secrets and the generative power. They offer divine grace and instruments and vehicles of grace, prayer, the sacraments, and the Christian life. . . ." Pius XI to Spanish refugees, Sept. 14, 1936.

¹³³ Leo XIII, *Praeclara Gratulationis Publicae* (June 20, 1894).

her foot, she has straightway changed the face of things, and has pervaded the moral tone of the people with a new civilization, and with virtues before unknown. All nations that have yielded to her sway have become eminent for their culture, their sense of justice, and the glory of their high deeds.¹³⁴

It is of absolute importance for the world to realize not only that the Church contributes in this way to the external liberty and prosperity of mankind, but also that the Church *alone* can do this. No human agency can take her place. There are no other means in God's ordinary Providence in regard to mankind for reaching into men's souls and emancipating their minds and hearts but the means created in the Catholic Church. And it is not only the Church's principles but history itself that bears witness to mankind's need of the Church even for the temporal order. Pius XII has stressed this point. The Church's aid, he says in *Summi Pontificatus*, "is shown to be indispensable as never before, now that sad experience teaches that external means and human provisions and political expedients of themselves bring no efficacious healing to the ills which affect mankind."¹³⁵

Only where the Church's influence has been felt, have external liberties flourished. That is a historical certainty the enemies of the Church will never be able to explain away.

¹³⁴ *Immortale Dei*. Pope Leo expressed the same thought in the Encyclical Letter *Longinqua Oceani* (Jan. 6, 1895), on the Catholic Church in the United States: "... Without morality the State cannot endure. . . . But the best and strongest support of morality is religion. . . . Now what is the Church other than a legitimate society, founded by the will and ordinance of Jesus Christ for the preservation of morality and the defense of religion? For this reason We have repeatedly endeavored, from the summit of the pontifical dignity, to inculcate that the Church, whilst directly and immediately aiming at the salvation of souls and the beatitude which is to be attained in heaven, is yet, even in the order of temporal things, the fountain of blessings so numerous and great that they could not have been greater or more numerous had the original purpose of her institution been the pursuit of happiness during the life which is spent on earth."

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* "No defense of Christianity could be more effective than the present straits. From the immense vortex of error and anti-Christian movements there has come a crop of such poignant disasters as to constitute a condemnation surpassing in its conclusiveness any merely theoretical refutation."

Where Christianity flourishes, freedom flowers also in the social order; where Christianity decays, freedom dies also.¹³⁶

It is admitted by all who have studied history impartially that the greatest blow dealt to the institution of slavery was struck by the Christian Church. Writing of slavery and serfdom, Sorokin has said,

Christianity did not create these forms; neither did it aggravate them; if anything, after its inception it tended to mitigate and eliminate them. In the early Christian Church the slave members were not slaves at all; they were considered equal to the free members; even more, many of the early Christian leaders (preachers, priests, bishops) had been slaves. When the Church was legalized, the very entrance of a slave into the Christian Church often made him free. Subsequently, if the Christian Church did not eliminate serfdom entirely, it mitigated it and was the earliest and the main agent which fought for the freedom of the slaves and their humane treatment.¹³⁷

Freedom grows where the faith develops;¹³⁸ it dies where the Church is denied the exercise of her influence. Where the Church has not penetrated, there is no real external liberty for

¹³⁶ "The Christian society is not merely a free society, it is the *only* free society which has ever endured. It is not a coincidence but a consequence that, wherever the basic Christian institutions have been destroyed, so the powers and responsibilities of Governments, even in Christian countries, have had to be increased until today the tasks of government, and the funds required to discharge them, are alike so great as to tax to their utmost limits the resources of the richest peoples in the world. The end of this process is seen in the final necessity imposed upon governments which have destroyed all the institutions of a free society, to appropriate all the resources of their country to maintain their organization, and to destroy all the rights of personality in order to maintain their authority.' Douglas Jerrold, *The Future of Freedom* (New York, 1938), p. 10.

¹³⁷ Sorokin, *op. cit.*, III, 134-135.

¹³⁸ The history of the Church's part in widening civil freedom in Christian times has been masterfully summarized by Pope Leo XIII in an Encyclical which deserves far more recognition than it has been given. It is the letter *In Plurimis* to the Bishops of Brazil, written May 5, 1888, just a few weeks before the well-known *Libertas Praestantissimum*. The occasion for the document was the liberation of Brazilian slaves by the government. *In Plurimis* deals with the doctrine of the Church concerning human slavery and with the Church's efforts in past and present to alleviate the condition of slaves and to free them. It is a thorough condemnation of the system and a complete justification of the Church's attitude towards slavery.

the generality of men. In pagan countries even today slavery is a recognized social institution, and civil freedom for all is hardy even an ideal.¹³⁹ In the face of such lucid evidence it is difficult to understand how Christianity could ever be charged with hostility to freedom. Whenever the Church is so accused, the concept of liberty held by the accusers will merit re-examining.¹⁴⁰

4. *Faith*

"Jesus therefore said to the Jews who had come to believe in Him, 'If you abide in my word, you shall be my disciples indeed, and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.'"¹⁴¹ From these words of Christ it is clear that the truth which emancipates is the Gospel, the supernatural truth of His word which in its essentials is beyond the reach of human reason and is accepted on faith by those who come to believe in His authority as a divine Teacher. The relative liberation of man's mind by truth naturally knowable

¹³⁹ "A civilization in opposition to the holy doctrines and laws of the Church is a civilization in appearance only, a mere name without the substance. A remarkable proof of this is supplied us by the populations on whom the light of the Gospel has not shone. In their life a species of exterior culture may be perceived, but the real and solid advantages of civilization are not found. We cannot look on an audacious disdain of all legitimate power as a perfection of civil life. Neither can we salute by the name of liberty the pursuit of a disgraceful and unhappy course that leads to the unchecked propagation of errors, the unhindered satisfaction of the worst passions, the impunity with which crimes can be committed, and the oppression of honest citizens of every class. These are false, erroneous, and perverse principles." Leo XIII, *Inscrutabili* (April 21, 1878).

¹⁴⁰ "The Church the enemy of liberty! Ah, how they travesty the idea of liberty. . . . Do they mean by liberty the rational faculty to do good, magnanimously, without check or hindrance and according to the rules which eternal justice has established? That liberty, which is the only liberty worthy of man, none favors or encourages or protects more than the Church. In every age she has defended the feeble and the oppressed against the arrogant domination of the strong. She has demanded liberty of Christian conscience while pouring out in torrents the blood of her martyrs; she has restored to the child and to the woman the dignity and the noble prerogatives of their nature in making them share, by virtue of the same right, that reverence and justice which is their due; and she has largely contributed both to introduce and maintain civil and political liberty in the heart of the nations." Leo XIII, Apostolic Letter of March 19, 1902.

¹⁴¹ John 8: 31-32.

is insufficient for human needs. Though Christ's words are sometimes quoted as if He meant only the truth of philosophy, of the natural sciences, or even the factual truth of history, He was not speaking of these truths. Christ was emphatic on the need of the mind for an acceptance of the mysteries of faith if it is to attain full liberty from error. Anything less, no matter how good and desirable in itself, leaves the mind in spiritual bondage, and the heart as well.¹⁴²

What Christ said, equivalently, was, "Faith shall make you free," for it is only by an unconditional assent to His words that His liberating doctrine becomes truly ours. That liberation is itself essentially an interior, spiritual release from error and darkness which would hold the mind, and consequently the will, back from God, the goal of all human liberty. Freedom without faith is liberty in error, and the spiritual death of the mind.¹⁴³

It is not only individual spiritual freedom which rests on this supernatural wisdom, but the natural freedom of society as well. Leo XIII pointed out the necessity of supernatural guidance for society:

. . . Nowadays . . . states not only refuse to conform to the rules of Christian wisdom, but seem even anxious to recede from them further on each successive day. . . . We repudiate not the assured and useful improvements of our age, but devoutly wish affairs of State to take a safer course than they are now taking, and to rest on a more firm foundation without injury to the true freedom of the people; for the best parent and guardian of liberty among men is truth. *The truth shall make you free* (John 8: 32).¹⁴⁴

When Christ, in the same Gospel that proclaims the deliver-

¹⁴² "Our Redeemer said of Himself, 'For this was I born and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth' (John 18: 37). Likewise 'I came to send fire upon the earth and what will I but that it be kindled' (Luke 12: 49). In the knowledge of this truth, which is the highest perfection of the mind; and in divine charity, which in like manner perfects the will, consist the whole life and liberty of Christians." Leo XIII, *Sapientiae Christianae* (Jan. 10, 1890).

¹⁴³ "But what is a worse death of the soul than freedom of error." St. Augustine, Ep. 166 (alias 105; 10) (*ML* 33, 400).

¹⁴⁴ *Immortale Dei*.

ance of the human soul by faith in His truth, speaks of His own Person as "the Truth,"¹⁴⁵ He implies that it is He personally Who sets us free, and not just an abstract doctrine or set of moral principles. This He does by His own personal action on souls, as we have seen above. From Him, through His gift of faith perfecting our minds, we receive a share in His own infinite self-knowledge; our intellects are placed in contact with the First Truth, which is Divinity Itself. We are freed from the limitations imposed on our minds by their native incapacity for the attainment of supernatural truth, and elevated to a freedom which is, even on earth, a beginning of the liberty of perfect beatitude in the eternal vision of the Trinity.¹⁴⁶

The perfecting of the intelligence by faith in Christ not only looses the mind from the chains of error,¹⁴⁷ but delivers the whole man from the bonds of rational nature. Faith widens the horizons of the mind because it is like

an explosion which has broken down the walls of the world, or a storming of nature by the hosts of heaven that man might be released from the limitations of his humanity. It grants to man the

¹⁴⁵ John 14: 6.

¹⁴⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 1. Cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., *Christian Perfection and Contemplation* (St. Louis, 1937), pp. 114-129.

¹⁴⁷ Leo XIII, in the Encyclical *Tametsi Futura Prospicientibus* (Nov. 1, 1900), developing the doctrine that "Christ is alone the way, the truth, and the life (John 14: 6)," says concerning Christ as the Truth:

"If there are many things in nature itself which are mysterious and obscure, and which no human intelligence can explain . . . it will be a perverse freedom of thought not to allow for things existing outside the domain of nature altogether, which are above nature, and beyond our minds to fathom. To refuse to accept dogmas evidently means to do away with the whole Christian religion. The mind must be subjected, humbly and submissively, to the obedience of Christ (II Cor. 10: 5), so as to be held, as it were, captive to His will and sovereignty. . . . There is nothing servile in serving Christ our Lord with the understanding, but it is especially consonant to reason and to our personal dignity. For a man . . . attains at once the natural good of the mind and mental freedom. For truth, as proceeding from the authoritative teaching of Christ, sets in a clear light the intrinsic character and relative importance of things, whatever they may be, and thus instructed and obedient to the truth which he sees, he will not subject himself to creatures, but creatures to himself; he will not let passion rule reason, but will make reason rule passion; casting off the pernicious slavery of sin and error, he will be made free with the best kind of freedom."

freedom by which he can surpass not only the limits of the present, of the past, of space, of material things, but even the limits of all nature. By it his mind walks into the limitlessness of God.¹⁴⁸

As a created share in God's own view of the universe, the gift of faith places its possessor on a superhuman vantage point to understand many things, which, from the purely natural viewpoint, are almost totally unintelligible, as for example, the mysteries of suffering and sin.¹⁴⁹

It is a clear consequence from this teaching that whatever hinders the spread of Christian truth is an invasion of an essential human freedom, the freedom of the mind. No other body of doctrine can bring the mind which thirsts for the First Truth, anything more than an incomplete intellectual liberty. Yet even the truth of Christianity must fail to free if it is incompletely presented or carelessly credited by a more or less emotional and unthinking acceptance of Christ. It is a conscious assent to the whole teaching of Christ the mind of man needs for freedom, not a credulity which swallows crumbs of His doctrine and thinks itself filled.

¹⁴⁸ W. Farrell, O.P., *A Companion to the Summa*, III (New York, 1940), p. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Christ's teaching on the liberating power of faith finds a special concrete confirmation in the testimony of converts, who often confess, after entering the Church, that they have found a liberty as unexpected as it was unexperienced. "I have never been able to analyze the curious feeling of freedom which usually comes to the convert, when the exact opposite might have been expected according to any human calculation," wrote Msgr. Ronald Knox. H. Belloc and others, *Why I Am a Catholic* (New York, 1932), p. 75.

"I was told that if I should become a Catholic my mind would be fettered, my reason stifled. . . . I have found on the contrary that the Catholic Church placed me on a platform of truth from which even a poor mind like mine can rise to fathomless heights. I have found the truth that sets men free." O. F. Dudley, in *Through Hundred Gates*, Severin and Stephen Lamping, O.F.M., ed. (Milwaukee, 1939), p. 65.

"The very idea of submitting to authority had seemed to me like going into slavery. But I did not then know, as I do now, that to become a Catholic is . . . to find true freedom. . . . To discover truth, to know it is the truth, and to embrace it—what greater or higher freedom can one have than that." J. Moody, *The Long Road Home* (New York, 1935), p. 225.

"My first sensation . . . was one of freedom. . . . Here was liberty to believe and accept and love with all one's heart without any misgiving or restraint." A. Dulles, *A Testimonial to Grace* (New York, 1946), p. 116.

Christian traditions deeply imbedded in the Western mind and heart have been up to now the chief defense of Christian civilization against widely accepted errors.¹⁵⁰ But no freedom, either of mind or of body, will be secured by such a substitute for conscious belief in the whole Christian creed; opinion cannot purge the mind of error like the certitude of faith, especially since wavering assent to Christian principles is based more on human than on divine authority.

Fortunately, false principles do not always exercise their full influence, especially when age-old Christian traditions, on which the peoples have been nurtured, remain still deeply, even if unconsciously rooted in their hearts. Nonetheless, one must not forget the essential insufficiency and weakness of every principle of social life which rests upon a purely human foundation, is inspired by merely earthly motives and relies for its force on the sanction of a purely external authority.¹⁵¹

Slavery of the mind is far more degrading and a far more serious injury to human dignity than slavery of the body, for nobler powers are fettered by errors than by chains. Whatever semblance of intellectual liberty men gain as they uncover the humanly knowable with the searchlights of science and philosophy is inadequate to clear the mind's primeval darkness; only supernatural faith can restore its vision.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ "The last centuries have seen on the one side Christian civilization being systematically menaced in its very foundations, and on the other the heritage of that civilization being ever more diffused among the peoples. Europe and the other continents are still living, in varying degrees, by the vital forces and principles which the heritage of the Christian faith has infused into them by a kind of spiritual blood-transfusion. Some people come to forget this precious heritage, to neglect it, even to repudiate it. But the fact of that hereditary succession remains. . . . Those sons who have gone far away and become estranged from their Father's House hear always . . . the echo of that Christian heritage which often preserves them, in their decisions and conduct, from being entirely guided by the false ideas to which consciously or in fact they adhere." Pius XII, in a broadcast over the Vatican radio, Sept. 1, 1944.

¹⁵¹ Pius XII, *Summi Pontificatus*, Oct. 20, 1939.

¹⁵² "When Jesus was crucified 'there was darkness over the whole earth' (Matt. 27: 45); a terrifying symbol of what happened and what still happens spiritually wherever incredulity, blind and proud of itself, has succeeded in excluding Christ

The doctrine of Christ can free the individual and society not only from speculative error concerning God, mankind, and their mutual relations but also from practical error regarding principles of conduct in public and private life. Christ's teaching contains a code as well as a creed, and a knowledge of that code is essential to spiritual liberty. Thus Christ liberates the intellect in both its functions, the truth of His creed delivering the speculative intellect, the truth of His law freeing the practical intellect in its guidance of the will. It is logical, then, to turn here from a consideration of the Christian creed to the Christian commandments, the New Law of Christ.

5. *The New Law*

A. Law in general

The law of Christ is termed by St. James "the perfect law of liberty."¹⁵³ To many a modern mind the phrase might seem a blending of contradictories, for the idea that law and human liberty are necessarily antagonistic and irreconcilable is widespread in our day. The evil root of this opinion lies in the error of conceiving law to be primarily a product of the will, rather than of the mind, of the legislator; a wish or a whim, rather than a judgment. Every abuse of authority lends color to the mistake. The logical outcome is the mistaken notion of law as the imposition of the will of the superior on an inferior.

The Thomistic concept of law as a direction to a good by the reason of the superior is the only theory of law which can be

from modern life, especially from public life, and has undermined faith in God as well as faith in Christ. . . .

"Many perhaps, while abandoning the teaching of Christ, were not fully conscious of being led astray by a mirage of glittering phrases, which proclaimed such estrangement as an escape from the slavery in which they were before held; nor did they then foresee the bitter consequences of bartering the truth that sets free, for error which enslaves. They did not realize that, in renouncing that infinitely wise and paternal law of God, and the unifying and elevating doctrine of Christ's love, they were resigning themselves to the whim of a poor, fickle human wisdom; they spoke of progress, when they were going back; of being raised, when they grovelled; of arriving at man's estate, when they stooped to servility." *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ James 1: 25.

reconciled with true freedom. If law is primarily a product of reason, it is guidance for the right use of liberty, not a hindrance to freedom. The essential note of law is rationality, not wilfulness; law is for man intellectual direction to the achievement of moral good.

The classic definition of law was given by St. Thomas: "an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community."¹⁵⁴ The highest law of all is the eternal law of God existing from eternity in the divine mind, according to which God governs His universe. It is identical with God Himself as the Supreme Legislator Whose eternal decrees are to be carried out in time by His creatures, freely by creatures endowed with liberty of choice, necessarily by the rest of creation. In rational creatures there is a reflection of those eternal decrees as they concern human nature, an echo of the eternal law which is called natural law.¹⁵⁵ Instilled in man and essential to his nature, this law is a transcription of God's voice as recorded in human reason, commanding us to do good and forbidding evil actions. In the natural law are the broad general principles of human conduct, precepts and prohibitions to be observed in the effort to attain God as the last end of human life. In positive law human legislators, whose authority is a participation in God's legislative power, determine, according to the changing circumstances of time and place, specific means whereby the general precepts of the natural law will be more readily observed in society. Positive law derives its binding power from the natural law.¹⁵⁶

Without revelation the existence and obligation of these three types of law, eternal, natural, and positive, can be arrived at with certainty by human reason. Revelation adds to our knowledge of law by making known the existence of positive law which comes to us from God Himself, i.e., the revealed law of the Old and the New Dispensations; and also the so-called law of the *fomes* of sin.¹⁵⁷ The revealed law of the New Testa-

¹⁵⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 4.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 3.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 91, a. 2.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, a. 4; a. 5; a. 6.

ment is "the law of liberty" given us by Christ, the Gospel law which is here our chief concern.

B. Law and Liberty

All law is a true cause of real liberty. Law, if it be just, and liberty, if it be true, can never be at odds. The two are not opposed, but inter-related, because law implies liberty, and liberty needs law. Law implies liberty of choice by which law is fulfilled, law acting as the guide and the guard of freedom, directing it toward good, and protecting it from evil choices. Ultimately both law and liberty are traceable to God as their source; proximately, both are rooted in reason. There can be no conflict between them when both are properly understood; they are complementary, not antithetical. For the essence of liberty is obedience to law, and the essence of law is the guidance of liberty.¹⁵⁸

Wherever law and human liberty clash, there must be something vicious in one or other, or even in both of them. True liberty can never be in harmony with a corruption of law, as, for example, laws enacted to suppress the Christian faith, or in fundamental discord with the natural moral law. An antagonism of this sort, in fact, only serves to manifest in the most striking fashion the correlation between liberty and law, since rebellion would be liberty's accord with a higher law which demands that we obey God rather than men if men oppose His will.¹⁵⁹

On the other hand, just law will not crush true liberty, but only corruptions of liberty. License, impelling the individual will to vice, is of its very nature at war with law, directing the will to virtue. An embezzler's liberty contradicts both divine and human law, but the conflict makes no case for an essential discord between freedom and authority.

If, as may also happen, both law and liberty turn aside to evil rather than good, there may be an apparent harmony

¹⁵⁸ Cf. *Libertas*.

¹⁵⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 95, a. 2. Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 96, a. 4.

between them, temporarily at least. A decadent people may find no treat to their personal or societal liberty in legislation against the Church. Yet even in such a case as this reason will eventually reassert its rights either in law or in the exercise of true freedom, and the elemental conflict will emerge.

Between a well-regulated will and law there is no disagreement; law then exercises a directive function in the use of freedom. Between an evil will and law there is a conflict, which must be resolved in favor of law by its coercive power.¹⁶⁰ Yet law is always to be regarded as primarily directive, rather than coercive. The restrictive aspect is secondary.¹⁶¹ Coercion itself is motivated by the purpose of educating perverse wills in the right of liberty. For the just, however, the disciplinary and coercive power of the law need not be exercised. "Every law is imposed on two kinds of men. For it is imposed on some who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law restrains and tames; and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by law, are helped to fulfill what they desire to do."¹⁶²

The function of law as the helpful director of freedom for the virtuous man would have been exercised even in the social life of integral nature, if the race had not fallen in Adam.¹⁶³ The coactive aspect of law would have been true not only of the eternal law and of natural law, but of human law also.

For mankind as restored to supernatural life by the grace of the new Adam, law still has the same function as far as the just are concerned, since "law does not coerce them in the way that it does the wicked."¹⁶⁴ In this respect the just are

¹⁶⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 95, a. 1, ad 1.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, q. 96, a. 5, corp.: "The notion of law contains two things; first, that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive power."

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, q. 98, a. 6, corp.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, I, q. 96, a. 4.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 96, a. 5, ad 1. Cajetan comments on this statement that it is to be understood in the sense "that the just man for his part is not subject to the law as one who is forced . . . because the just man is subject to the law voluntarily." It does not mean that the law has no coercive power over the just, even though that force of the law is not exercised. The law has the power of coercion over all subject to it.

like the ruler, who is not subject to his own law as coercive but rather as directive.¹⁶⁵

For the just, then, law is an educator in the right use of free will, pointing ahead and leading the way to the fulness of liberty. The virtuous see the index finger of law and do not feel its grip, as others do whose lack of virtue gives them a sharper sense of the law's strength than its wisdom. The law must drive men when it cannot lead, and thus hinder evil-doers from misusing liberty to their own destruction, and from molesting others.¹⁶⁶

The reconciliation, if it may be so termed, between true liberty and the demands of law is through the mediation of virtue, i.e., fixed dispositions of character from which will flow voluntariness in the fulfillment of law. Virtue alone can lead men to love the good for its own sake and obey law freely rather than through coercion and fear of punishment. Virtue alone can so dispose a man toward law that he is inclined towards justice even without the law.¹⁶⁷

The real problem, therefore, is not so much the theoretical harmonization of law with liberty, but the more practical difficulty of developing virtues that incline men to walk voluntarily along the road of law. And revelation alone gives the full liberty for mankind. The sole true, permanent, and effective adjustment of the claims of law and of liberty comes from a supernatural source: the grace of the virtues and the gifts, which is the essence of Christ's Law. This is the law of liberty whereby God begets in man an interiorization of law capable of effecting spontaneous compliance with law, without the slightest prejudice to freedom.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 3.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 95, a. 1, corp.

¹⁶⁷ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 28.

¹⁶⁸ For St. Thomas's treatment of the revealed law of the Old and New Testaments, see *Summa Theol.*, I-II, qq. 98-108. The whole tract on law includes qq. 90-108, the last eleven questions dealing with divine law. In other words, the major portion of St. Thomas's discussion of law deals with divine positive law. Quantitatively, there are two to three times as many pages on revealed law as there are on eternal, natural, and human law, several of the articles on the Old Law being

Law is necessary for the direction of freedom of choice towards good and away from evil. The New Law of Christ gives perfect direction. Without the law of Christ as perfect guidance in the exercise of freedom all the guidance for liberty in lesser laws is insufficient. The New Law alone can make the human will *willing*, in the fullest sense, in the pursuit of true good.

C. The Old Law

The positive divine legislation is revealed to mankind in the Old Law of Moses and the New Law of Christ.¹⁶⁹ It is the teaching of the Scriptures and the Church that these two laws, both promulgated for men by God Himself, are not specifically different, but are rather related to each other as imperfect and perfect in the same species, standing in the same relationship as seed to tree or boy to man.¹⁷⁰ The New Law is the perfecting by Christ, the God-Man, of the Law given the Jewish people for their moral, religious, and political guidance. The Old Law was the divine preparation for the advent of the Saviour through the Jewish race; Christ Himself provides its fulfillment in the New.¹⁷¹

Binding on the Chosen People alone, except for those moral commands it contained, in the Decalogue, which were already obligatory for all men as included in the natural law, the Mosaic Law embraced three distinct types of precepts: moral,

among the lengthiest in the *Summa*. Yet Thomistic teaching on law is often presented with hardly more than a passing reference to divine law, to which St. Thomas himself attached so much importance. To omit or even to minimize the place of the Old and the New Laws in the Thomistic synthesis will not do justice to St. Thomas's mind; what is more important, it will fail to give an accurate account of the *de facto* situation of mankind, which is exactly what St. Thomas was trying to give. In this respect, the doctrine of St. Thomas falls victim to Naturalism. Granted the necessity of differentiating philosophical from theological problems, the conclusions of human reason from revealed certitudes, there is still no justification for presenting half of St. Thomas's analysis of law as the whole. St. Thomas treated law as a theologian; extracting the philosophical elements from his tract is legitimate only when these are not exposed as his complete teaching. It is St. Thomas's analysis of the New Law which suffers most from this neglect of the latter portion of the tract.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 91, a. 4; a. 5.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, a. 5; q. 107, a. 1.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, q. 107, a. 2.

ceremonial, and judicial.¹⁷² The Ten Commandments are the moral precepts, which bind man to worship God and to be just to his neighbor. In the ceremonial precepts are detailed instructions as to how the Jewish race was to fulfill that general command to worship God; in the judicial precepts, as to how justice might be done to men.

In every respect, when compared to the New Law, the Law of Moses bears the mark of imperfection. St. Thomas has summed up the various differences under three main heads: (1) the Old Law promised to those who observed it sensible, earthly, temporal goods; the New promises intelligible, heavenly, eternal goods; (2) the Old Law aimed chiefly at ordering man's exterior life; the New, his interior activity; (3) the Old Law induced men to virtue through fear; the New, by love, which, adds St. Thomas, "is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old."¹⁷³

In this last difference, the difference between fear and love, there is an implication of the chief deficiency in the Old Law. For the Old Law pointed the way to salvation, but gave of itself no help to follow the way; the New Law, on the other hand, can do both. The Old Law did not give the grace needed to fulfill the divine command; it could not justify those who lived under it and thus was incapable of accomplishing its purpose, the salvation of men. It was good, but imperfect in that it could not go far enough in accomplishing what only the New Law, and no other, can do: it could not give the grace of Christ and the Holy Spirit which man must have to obey the Law of God and attain salvation.¹⁷⁴ "The yoke of the Law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the Law did not confer."¹⁷⁵ The Old Law brought knowledge of sin and fear of its consequences; the New instructs, but also infuses a love of God and of virtue which always accompanies the grace of Christ. St. Paul wrote of the Law that it "brought nothing

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, q. 99.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, q. 91, a. 5, corp.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 98, a. 1.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 3.

to perfection.”¹⁷⁶ Its failure to help those under it made it a burden which St. Peter called “a yoke which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear.”¹⁷⁷ Though divine in its origin, the Mosaic Law was, in itself and apart from the grace available through faith in the Redeemer to come,¹⁷⁸ an impediment to salvation and an occasion of sin, for it prescribed what is good without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfillment.¹⁷⁹

There are still other differences between the Old and the New Laws which accentuate the imperfection of the one and the perfection of the other. Both came from God, but the Old Law came through Moses, the New, through Christ.¹⁸⁰ The Old Law was directed to one people; the New, to the whole world. The Old Law was meant to last only till the coming of the Redeemer; the New, till the end of time. The Old Law gave an obscure knowledge of the mysteries of faith and demanded observance of many difficult precepts besides the moral law; the New Law gives clearer knowledge of mysteries, and has few observances comparable to Jewish law. The Old Law was hard to observe, though by no means impossible;¹⁸¹ the New Law has its own special difficulties, inasmuch as it aims at a higher morality, but these are rendered easy to men by the abundance of grace that is poured out on Christ’s followers. Therein lies the reason why Christ asserted that His yoke is sweet and His burden light. The Old Law, finally, was promulgated on tables of stone, by the ministry of angels; the New Law is written “on the fleshly tables of the heart”¹⁸² by the grace of the Holy Spirit. And this last difference returns us to the main difference: the New Law helps towards the attainment of its purpose, that is, virtue and salvation; the Old Law did not, because it could not. And the New Law does

¹⁷⁶ Hebrews 7: 19.

¹⁷⁷ Acts 15: 10.

¹⁷⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 98, a. 2, ad 4.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 99, a. 2, ad 3; q. 98, a. 1, ad 2. Cf. Gonet, *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae* (Paris, 1876), IV, 560.

¹⁸⁰ John 1: 17.

¹⁸¹ Cf. Gonet, *op. cit.*, IV, 542.

¹⁸² II Cor. 3: 3.

so because "it is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts"; only secondarily is it a written law.¹⁸³ The New Law is fundamentally an interior, living law instilled in the mind and the heart with the infusion of grace. As such it is a Law which both instructs and sanctifies.¹⁸⁴ The written Law of Christ as contained in the New Testament, for all its importance and indispensability, is but secondary to the inner law of grace which is the prime element in the true Christian life.

It is true, of course, that many were justified under the Old Law, profiting, through faith, in Christ's work of Redemption. But their justification and salvation was by the grace of the New Law, not by the external fulfillment of the works of the Old. Those who were sanctified and saved belong, as such, to the New Law.¹⁸⁵

When we speak of the imperfection of the Old Law, however, we should not lose sight of the fact that in itself, as a divine gift for the complete guidance of a whole people, it was far more perfect than any law human wisdom could have formulated. The label "imperfect" should not be misapprehended. It is only by comparison to the New Law that it is imperfect.¹⁸⁶ Compared to any other positive law, it bears no such stamp of inferiority.

Because the Old Law is a law of fear, and the New, a law of love, the difference between them can also be expressed in terms of slavery and freedom. For fear is the characteristic motivation of the slave; love, of the free man.¹⁸⁷

The spirit of fear and bondage is cast out by the spirit of love and liberty which is the core of the Christian law. In this respect, as in all others, the Old Law was fulfilled and completed by the New.¹⁸⁸ "The end of every law is to make men just and

¹⁸³ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 106, a. 1.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 106, a. 1, ad 3; q. 107, a. 1, ad 2.

¹⁸⁶ "... imperfect, not positively but negatively and comparatively, that is, less perfect than the New Law." Gonet, *op. cit.*, IV, 544.

¹⁸⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 107, a. 1, ad 2.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

virtuous. . . . Consequently, the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this. . . . In this respect, the New Law fulfills the Old by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion."¹⁸⁹

D. The New Law

The most important truth about the New Law, and the one most easily overlooked, is that it is primarily not a written code embracing precepts and prohibitions like the Old Law or human law; it is a life imbedded in the human soul, mind, and heart. "That which is preponderant in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe in Christ."¹⁹⁰ In this interior Law is fulfilled the promise made through the prophet Jeremias: "Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord, and I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Juda. . . . This shall be the covenant that I will make: . . . I will give my law in their bowels, and I will write it in their heart: and I will be their God and they shall be my people."¹⁹¹ This law is no mere

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 106, a. 1.

¹⁹¹ Jeremias 31: 31, 33. St. Paul explains this prophecy as referring to the New Law in Hebrews 8: 8, 10.

It is worthy of note here that Pope Pius XII, in a radio message signalizing the end of the war in Europe, cited a similar prophency in Ezechiel 36: 26-28, the fulfillment of which the Holy Father regards as the *only* way to lasting peace:

"The war has aroused everywhere discord, suspicion, and hatred. If, therefore, the world wished to regain peace, it is necessary that falsehood and rancor should vanish and in their stead that sovereign truth and charity should reign. Above all, however, in our daily prayers, we should beseech God constantly to fulfill His promise made by the mouth of the Prophet Ezechiel: 'And I will give them a new heart, and will put a new spirit in their bowels; and I will take away the stony heart out of their flesh; that they may walk in my commandments, and keep my judgments, and do them; and that they may by my people, and that I may be their God.' *Then and only then* will the reborn world avoid the return to the tremendous scourge of war, and there will reign a true, stable and universal brotherhood and that peace guaranteed by Christ even on earth *to those who are willing to believe and trust in His law of love.*"

The spiritual conditions here laid down for true peace are the conditions required for lasting liberty. (*Italics ours.*)

instruction; it is, as St. James expresses it, "the ingrafted words, which is able to save your souls."¹⁹²

Though Christ's teachings and precepts are given to mankind in written form in the New Testament, the Law of the Gospel is not primarily in them. For they stand in the same relation to what is principal in the New Law as the Decalogue does to the law of nature. Just as the Ten Commandments given to Moses on the Mount are not in themselves, as codified on two tables of stone, the natural law indelibly inscribed on the human heart, so too the Gospels are not in themselves the supernatural New Law of Christ. That too is inscribed on human hearts. As an external reminder of natural obligations, the Decalogue is a guide and help to nature; the written Gospel is a like aid and guide to grace. "The Gospel writings," says St. Thomas, "contain only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or by directing us to the use thereof."¹⁹³ The New Law is fundamentally not a book, but a life. It is an inward renewal of man, for which there is no better analogy in the natural order than in the generation and growth of a new person. On the supernatural level this life operates with the instinctive drive of a nature. It is instilled like a nature,¹⁹⁴ and is developed like a nature, i. e., primarily from within, by the activity of intrinsic principles.

This inward law has a power no external code can possess, even an external code emanating from divine rather than purely human wisdom. The Old Law and the Gospel writings are like human law in that they can only make known what is to be done or to be avoided; but by the inward New Law, "the Holy Spirit dwelling in the soul not only teaches us what should be done by enlightening the intelligence concerning our activity, but also inclines our affection towards righteous action."¹⁹⁵

Fundamentally, then, the New Law is not "legal" in the ordinary meaning of that term. Compared to other laws, it

¹⁹² James 1: 22.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, ad 1.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

¹⁹⁵ *In Rom.*, c. 8, lect. 1.

bears far greater likeness to the natural law than to any other by reason of its inwardness, as the Old Law most closely resembles human law because of its externality. It is a law with power to move men as well as direct them, helping those subject to it to fulfill it. No other law of God or man can do that. Its "motive" power is not coercive only, for all laws have that quality; its specific power is rather "impulsive," in as much as it inspires activity in an instructive rather than an unnatural, violent manner.¹⁹⁶

The dangers in regarding the New Law as a more advanced version of the Old Law, a refinement of the ancient external code but not otherwise unlike it, are apparent, once we understand the difficulty involved in fulfilling either of them, but especially the New Law. The Mosaic Law with its attention to externals was in this respect, says St. Thomas, "a much heavier burden than the New, since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles added very few precepts to those of the natural law." The New Law's difficulties lie in the virtuous interior life it prescribes. "In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than those of the Old, because the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in the Old Law in all cases. . . . Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue."¹⁹⁷

If this higher morality is regarded as something entirely imposed and not also instilled, it becomes an even more unbearable burden than the Old Law was for the Jewish people. The written law of Christ is unquestionably more difficult to observe than the commands of other codes. The only reason Christ

¹⁹⁶ Note St. Thomas's use of the expression "*ex instinctu gratiae*." "through the promptings of grace," (I-II, q. 108, a. 1, ad 2). In the same place he points out that "man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature, since a habit inclines after the manner of a nature. . . . Since, then, the grace of the Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act rightly, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it."

¹⁹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 107, a. 4.

considered His yoke sweet and His burden light for men was that His grace makes the fulfillment of the Gospel possible. Without the inward law, the outward precepts cannot be kept. And St. Thomas shows no reluctance to admit that "the letter even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith."¹⁹⁸

As a participation of the divine nature, the grace of the New Law elevates and perfects the natural life of man. A supernature imbedded in the spiritual essence of the human soul, it does not and cannot violate the nature it thus exalts, for it acts in such a way as to leave intact the soul's natural freedom, as well as its other inborn endowments. Without the life of grace, however, the natural freedom of man tends too readily to choose evil rather than good, in spite of reason's innate urge to virtue. Only with grace can this inclination to evil be overcome.¹⁹⁹ The habitual proneness of fallen nature to evil is rectified by the infused life of grace, which sets up the contrary inclination to virtue. As an habitual disposition toward what is good, the grace of the New Law is a second "nature" on the supernatural plane, giving man in the pursuit of goodness something of the instinctive spontaneity which is associated with habitual natural activity.²⁰⁰

When the grace of the New Law is infused into the soul, it is always accompanied by other divine benefits, divinizing gifts and virtues which enable the Christian to live and act habitually on a supernatural plane. Chief among these infused habits are faith, to supernaturalize the intellect, and charity, to elevate and sanctify the will. Thus not only is the soul itself endowed by grace with a higher life, but its powers also are given a deifying share in God's mind, through faith, and God's will, through charity. Made God's adopted children by an ingrafted supernature which is a share in divinity, men are made at the same time one with God in mind and heart through these theological virtues.²⁰¹ Hope, a third theological virtue, the

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 106, a. 2.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 93, a. 6.

²⁰⁰ *In Rom.*, c. 6, 22, lect. 4.

²⁰¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 110, a. 4, corp.

infused moral virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost are other elements in the supernatural organism, all of which God places at the service of grace, faith, and charity.

Pre-eminent among the virtues and gifts in freeing the souls of men is the habit of charity. It is this virtue, above all others, which liberates the soul and the will from its proneness to evil choices, by giving our freedom a drive towards good which more than counteracts the vicious tendencies of fallen nature. Though the supernatural life of grace and charity does not exclude from the Christian life the struggle against temptation and wicked inclinations, the power of evil is broken by the habitual direction which charity gives the will towards God and goodness. The man freed from sin and in the state of grace can turn with greater freedom to good than to evil, no matter how strong the still-existing tendencies to sin may be. The "law of sin," as St. Paul calls it,²⁰² still dwells in his members; yet sin has lost its dominion, if not its power of rebellion. Those who are not justified and sanctified by the infusion of grace and charity, sin dominates and "captivates,"²⁰³ so that they inwardly consent to sin and act outwardly in a sinful manner; those, on the other hand, who are united to God in charity, are made "prisoner to the law of sin" only to the extent of suffering movements of concupiscence which tempt to sin.²⁰⁴

Thus grace and charity are the restorative of human nature's original bias towards goodness, and the corrective of its bent toward sin. Sin (*lex fomitis*) has lost its domination; if it attacks to regain its ascendancy, it can always be conquered by the just man who uses the grace given him, for God does not allow him to be tried beyond his strength.²⁰⁵ He will observe the law of God as a free man, willingly, and not because he is forced to do so, after the manner of a slave.²⁰⁶

Thus the New Law's first work in the liberation of the human soul is the overthrow of sin's dominion. After the infusion of

²⁰² Romans 7: 23.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ *In Rom.*, c. 7, lect. 4.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, c. 6, lect. 4.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, c. 6, lect. 3.

grace sin may be an insurgent, but need never be a victor unless the free Christian will lay down its supernatural arms and abjectly surrenders.²⁰⁷ And the more the life of grace and charity develops in the soul, the greater becomes the Christian's freedom from the bondage of sin.

In a more positive manner, the New Law bestows freedom upon the soul by giving it a voluntariness in the pursuit of what is right which cannot be otherwise present in the human heart. This disposition and readiness for virtuous action flows especially from charity. Friendship with God through charity impels the soul to comply readily with His will, since "it is proper to friendship to agree with a friend in what he desires. Now the will of God is set forth for us in His precepts. So it pertains to our love of God to fulfill His commands, according to the text: 'If you love Me, keep my commandments' (John 14: 15)." ²⁰⁸ St. Thomas explains why this service of love is a free service: "He who loves someone, repays what he owes him with willingness and delight, and generously adds something over and above; therefore the whole fulfillment of the law depends upon love. . . ." ²⁰⁹

Some men must be compelled to goodness by the threat of punishment; but not those who live by grace and charity. "These are so disposed that of themselves they freely do what law commands. . . . They are a law unto themselves, possessing charity, which gives them an inclination that takes the place of law, and leads them to act with freedom." ²¹⁰ Love, that is, the supernatural love which is charity, gives the Christian a liberty in the pursuit of justice which would impel him to do exactly what the law requires, even if there were no law. ²¹¹

In his commentary on St. Paul's dictum: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom," St. Thomas sums up the relationships existing between law, love, and liberty in this manner:

²⁰⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 106, a. 2, ad 2: "The New Law . . . as far as it is concerned gives sufficient help to avoid sin."

²⁰⁸ *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 22.

²⁰⁹ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 128.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

... A free man is the cause of his own actions; a slave, one whose actions are caused by a master. So whoever acts of himself, acts freely; but he who is moved by another, does not act freely. Therefore one who avoids evil not because it is evil, but because he is impelled by the Lord's commandment, is not free; but one who avoids evil because it is evil, is free. Now it is the Holy Ghost who brings this about; He perfects the mind inwardly by a good habit, with the result that out of love one avoids evil just as if a divine law were commanding. A man of this sort, then, is called free, not because he is not subject to divine law, but because he is disposed by his good habit to do what the divine law prescribes.²¹²

That charity itself is something we are bound to by a divine precept has no bearing on the fact that where it is present it gives freedom in the fulfillment of God's Law. For other precepts may be observed in a servile manner out of fear, but not the first and the greatest commandment. It cannot be observed without voluntariness and full freedom.²¹³

The New Law of grace and charity thus interiorizes, as demands of love, precepts which for the unjust man are purely external hindrances to the use of liberty. For the just man there is no strain, no compulsion in obedience to law. Indeed, this spontaneous identification of his own desires with the requirements of law places him, in a sense, outside the law.²¹⁴

By liberating men from the dominion of sin and by making the just man a law unto himself, the New Law of love is truly the law of liberty, delivering the will from its chief impediments in the way of goodness. This interior freedom overflows into external activity in two ways: it enables the Christian to do willingly whatever is exteriorly required of him as necessarily connected with the reception, preservation, or increase of grace and charity; it leaves him free with regard to outward actions which have no necessary relationship to his salvation.²¹⁵ In a word, what *must* be done is done with willingness; what *may* be done without prejudice to the soul's eternal interests is done with like freedom, the love of God and neighbor always the predominating motive.

²¹² *In II Cor.*, c. 3, lect. 3.

²¹³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 44, a. 1, ad 2.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I-II, a. 93, a. 6, corp; ad 1.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 1, ad 2.

Among the external acts which have an intimate and necessary connection with the life of grace and charity are the Sacraments.²¹⁶ Only a misuse of liberty will neglect these means which are essential to the life of grace and Christian freedom. The moral precepts too, which are common to both Old and New Laws, must be observed as essential for the life of grace and virtue, they command or forbid actions which are necessarily in conformity with, or in opposition to, grace and charity.

But beyond this the New Law does not go in placing limitations upon the Christian's freedom of choice. "The New Law had no other external works to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments and those moral precepts which pertain to the nature of virtue, for instance, that one must not kill, or steal, and so forth."²¹⁷

In all other matters we are free to choose, "through the promptings of grace,"²¹⁸ how we shall serve God, determining for ourselves in which way, of the many possible good ways, we shall endeavor to serve Him.

To a certain extent, of course, even in these indifferent matters there are legal determinations, ecclesiastical or civil, which direct our choice. Yet human laws, as we have seen, will not derogate from Christian liberty, since grace and charity give a willing acquiescence to the just demands of all authority. "Spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless, it is an effect of the Holy Ghost that spiritual men are subject to human laws, according to I Peter 2: 13: *Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake.*"²¹⁹

The autonomy of the Christian in the external ordering of his life is apparent from the fact that there are counsels as well as commandments in the doctrine of Christ. In the New Law the use of the Sacraments and the observance of the natural moral law are imposed as obligations; added to these

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 1; a. 2

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 1, corp; ad 2.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 96, a. 5, ad 2. Cf. also q. 108, a. 1.

are counsels which all are at liberty to follow or not, as they choose. This, notes St. Thomas, shows the marked difference between the Old Law and New, for counsels do not belong to a law of bondage as they do to a law of liberty.²²⁰ Orders are given to slaves; advice is for free men.

Christian tradition has always regarded the observance of the Gospel counsels as an increase rather than a loss of liberty, even when the counsels become obligatory by reason of vows to observe them. The very state of life which makes the following of the counsels a necessity is regarded as "the state of freedom," because it is, with the episcopacy, "the state of perfection."²²¹

Those who live thoroughly by the law of the Gospel are expected to do whatever they do because they love what is good, not because they fear punishment. To the extent that they act in the spirit of servile fear they are acting in contrariety to the law of love which should be the supreme norm of all Christian activity. And those Christians for whom threats provide the *only* motive for obedience to law are members of the Church outwardly (*numero*) but are not so in merit (*merito*).²²²

Strictly speaking, the just are not *under* the law of the Gospel or any other law, even the eternal law. "He is under the law who refrains from evil deeds through fear of the punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue," wrote St. Augustine.²²³ Citing this statement, St. Thomas explains that the charity poured into the hearts of the just by the Holy Spirit gives them voluntary fulfillment of law, and it is no burden to them. And he adds another reason: the work done out of love by the just are more the works of the Holy Spirit than the personal human activity of the Christian. To the extent that these are the works of God Himself

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 1; a. 4; q. 185; q. 186.

²²² *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 1, ad 3.

²²³ *De Natura et Gratia*, cap. 57.

they are not done under law, for God is subject to no law.²²⁴ This teaching is an explanation of several notable texts in St. Paul which insist upon the spiritual man's release from the onerousness of law: "Now if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the Law";²²⁵ "the Law is not made for the just, but for the unjust and rebellious, for the ungodly and sinners, for criminals and the defiled, for parricides and matricides, for murderers, for immoral people, for sodomites, for kidnappers, for liars, for perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to sound doctrine."²²⁶

Made one in mind and heart with the Holy Spirit by the infused supernatural life of grace, the just are conformed to Him as the Legislator whose wisdom contains all law in His own eternal law. The more His divine truth penetrates their minds, the fuller becomes their knowledge of the eternal law, though no one can know it as it is in itself except God and those who enjoy the eternal vision of His essence.²²⁷ The more His divine love penetrates their hearts, the more freely and perfectly do they consent to the demands of the eternal law.²²⁸

Though St. Paul made every effort to emphasize the new freedom given the world by the Law of Christ, he could not fail to recognize the dangers inherent in his doctrine. From such warnings as that to the Galatians not to "use liberty as an occasion for sensuality,"²²⁹ it is obvious that misinterpretations and abuses of the idea of Christian liberty did not await later centuries. He found it necessary to remind converted freemen that Christ had not freed them from the moral law, and convert slaves that their spiritual liberation did not mean civil emancipation and disregard of human law.²³⁰ St. Peter too warned against misuse of the new freedom in both

²²⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 93, a. 6, ad 3.

²²⁵ Gal. 5: 18.

²²⁶ I Tim. 1: 9-11. Cf. St. Thomas Commentary on v. 9.

²²⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 93, a. 2.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 6.

²²⁹ Gal. 5: 13.

²³⁰ *In Rom.*, c. 6, lect., 3. Cf. also *Ad Titum*, c. 2, lect. 2.

of his Epistles: in the first, saying: "Live as freemen, yet not using your freedom as a cloak for malice but as servants of God";²³¹ in the second, inveighing against heretics who "by highsounding, empty words . . . entice with sensual allurements of carnal passion those who are just escaping from such as live in error. They promise them freedom, whereas they themselves are the slaves of corruption."²³²

These strictures of the Apostles were repeated by the Church in the Middle Ages and in Reformation times against others who appealed to a false concept of Christian freedom as warrant for rebellion against authority, civil as well as religious. The Council of Constance, for example, condemned the teaching of Wiclif and Huss that civil and ecclesiastical authority could not be held by rulers or prelates who were in mortal sin;²³³ the Council of Trent condemned the Lutheran error that those who were justified by faith in Christ were free from the observance of the commandments of God and the Church.²³⁴

But no misuse of Christian liberty can be a justification for denying it or minimizing its importance. There are perils attached to all God's benefits, natural and supernatural, and the greater and nobler the boon, the more terrible is its profanation. As Father Chenu has written, "Some have abused this great gift, and the more precious a good the more dangerous its abuse—we have only to think of the havoc wrought to Christendom by the 'evangelicalism' of Luther. But the fact that some have misused the liberty of the Gospels is no reason for renouncing it, though I fear that too often we are apt, through a sort of timidity, to treat it as something dangerous. None the less it is the teaching of St. Paul, and with him we are at the heart of the Christian 'mystery.'"²³⁵ Ignoring the inward character of Christian freedom will mean an overemphasis on the externals in Christian life. If a false Christianity has made the liberty of the Spirit suspect, the evil will not be repaired

²³¹ I Peter 2: 16.

²³³ Denz. 638; 639; 641; 595; 656.

²³² II Peter 2: 18-19.

²³⁴ Denz. 804; 830.

²³⁵ M. D. Chenu, O.P., "Christian Liberty and Obligations," *Blackfriars*, XX (April, 1939), 275.

by a tendency to the opposite extreme, which saps of legalism and of the formalism that our Lord Himself found so repellent in His own day.

The abuse of the freedom that is theirs by the grace of the Holy Spirit means for individual Christians a loss of that inward liberty; but for Christians as a body whose soul is the Holy Ghost liberty is a connatural condition which cannot be lost. "The state of the faith of Christ . . . is related to liberty and is liberty itself: and so (St. Paul) says, 'You have been called to liberty, brethren.'"²³⁶

6. *Infused and Acquired Virtues*

Nothing is more glorious than liberty except virtue, that is, if it be right to differentiate liberty from virtue. For to all wise men it is clear that true liberty can proceed from nothing else. So a man is virtuous in so far as he is free, and free in so far as he is virtuous. Vices alone bring men into slavery, to persons, and to things: and though bondage to a person may seem at times the more miserable slavery, the thralldom of vice is by far the worse. What, therefore, is more lovable than liberty? What more favorable to one who has any reverence for virtue? We read that all good princes have promoted it, and that none have ever trampled upon liberty but the manifest enemies of virtue.

Those words are John of Salisbury's famous and often-quoted tribute to liberty.²³⁷ St. Thomas would agree whole-heartedly. But in his more precise way he would not have been satisfied with a general term like "virtue." He would have made it clear that the liberating virtues *par excellence* are the infused theological virtues, charity above all. He would point out too that the moral virtues, infused and acquired, have their own special role, under the dominion of charity, in preserving,

²³⁶ *In Gal.*, c. 5, lect. 3.

"Freedom is not something exterior to religion—in a profound sense *Christianity is freedom*, and the words which have become canonized and set apart as the classical terms of Christian theology—redemption, salvation . . . —possessed for their original hearers the simple and immediate sense of the delivery of a slave and the release of a captive. "C. Dawson, "Christian Freedom," p. 1.

²³⁷ *Polycraticus* or *De Nugis Curialium*, lib. VII, cap. xxv, PL, CXCIX, 706.

protecting, and promoting Christian freedom. In fact, St. Thomas could have said without exaggeration that his whole moral and ascetical doctrine in the Second Part of the *Summa Theologica* might serve as a textbook for true liberty. It is no mere coincidence that his treatment of all the virtues is climaxed by a tract on the *status libertatis*, the state of perfection in which live the bishops of the Church and religious.²³⁸

The intimate relationship between true liberty and the virtues, a relationship which John of Salisbury suggests is an identity, was seen even by pagan moralists. Aristotle linked freedom with virtue,²³⁹ and St. Thomas shows his agreement with that much at least of the Philosopher's doctrine on slavery by citing, in his commentary, a text of the Scriptures: "They that despise Me, shall be despised."²⁴⁰ Epictetus put it bluntly, "No bad man is free."²⁴¹ Seneca held that "to obey God is freedom."²⁴²

Men like these knew nothing of the supernatural life and infused virtue. They regarded freedom as the product of natural efforts, and all virtue as the human development of natural powers and tendencies. But their doctrine gives a glimpse of the type of spiritual liberty preached by the Apostles and bestowed on believers through the grace of Christ. Aristotle even recognized the possibility of a degree of virtue which would emancipate a man from subjection to law. In a passage which recalls St. Paul's *Lex non est justo posita*, he says, "For men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law—they are themselves a law. Any one would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them."²⁴³ A man with such intellectual and moral

²³⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, qq. 183-189.

²³⁹ *I Politica*, 4.

²⁴⁰ *I Kings* 2: 30. Cf. *In I Pol.*, lect. 4: "Liberty and servitude . . . are determined by virtue: so that those who are virtuous are free and noble, but those who are vicious are slaves and despised, as the Lord says in *I Kings* 2: 30: 'They that despise me shall be despised.'" Cf. also *In III Pol.*, lect. 14.

²⁴¹ "The Discourses of Epictetus," Bk. IV, Ch. I. *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers* (N. Y., 1940), p. 406.

²⁴² *De Vita Beata*, xv, 7. Cf. *Seneca: Moral Essays II* (London, 1935), 141.

²⁴³ *III Politica*, 13.

qualities, he says, "may truly be deemed a God among men."²⁴⁴ Moreover, "he ought not to be a subject—that would be as if mankind should claim to rule over Zeus, dividing his officers among them. The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to be the order of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state for life."²⁴⁵

The intellectual virtues, and especially the moral virtues the pagan philosophers knew, play their part in the development, if not the birth, of Christian liberty. Infused moral virtues always accompany the theological virtues and habitual grace in the soul,²⁴⁶ but their presence does not eliminate the usefulness of acquired virtue. For habits of prudence, justice, and the like produced by repeated acts give a facility in operation which the corresponding infused habits do not always bring to the soul. There is no absolute need for acquired virtue for the attainment of Christian freedom of mind and will, since grace liberates the soul from the grip of sin instantaneously. Yet the activation and development of that supernatural freedom will ordinarily demand acquired moral virtues also for the survival of that liberty. Where grace does not find these natural habits ready for use, it will help to produce them. The ease and spontaneity in virtuous action thus achieved by the harmonious interaction of the infused and acquired virtues is a tremendous contribution to the supernatural freedom of the Christian soul.²⁴⁷

It is clear that Catholic teaching, while never conceding the perfection of liberty and of virtue to any natural goodness whatever, is far from denying the usefulness, and *ut in pluribus*, the necessity, of acquired habits of virtue as a condition of a lasting spiritual liberty. Their utility, under the guidance and

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 63, a. 3.

²⁴⁷ For a fuller treatment of the moral virtues and the relationship between those which are infused and those naturally acquired by repeated action, see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., *The Three Ages of the Interior Life* (St. Louis, 1947), pp. 57-66.

impetus of charity, no one can ignore. To admit that however, is not to contradict the more important truth that the solution of the problem of human freedom must always be a supernatural, Christian, and revealed solution. The substance of that solution is that the tension between law and liberty, between the demands of authority and the desire for autonomy, is relieved supernaturally by a union of law and liberty in the infused "law of liberty," which consists primarily in the grace of the Holy Spirit and that faith in Christ which works through charity; secondarily, in the written commands and counsels of the Gospel. There is no other solution; no *via media* between the supernatural order wherein the conflict between law and liberty is solved, and the natural order, wherein it can never be solved completely.

Christian teaching has always insisted that man cannot live successfully on the purely human level; he must either rise above it, or fall below it. So also man cannot be spiritually free on the purely human or natural level; the perfecting of his freedom must come from above, or liberty itself will drop below the human plane into subhuman spiritual bondage. The revealed fact of the matter is that men are born in that bondage. The revealed fact of the matter is that men are born in that bondage, and there is no natural release from it. There are, then, these alternatives: the soul possesses grace and charity, and is free, or it does not, and is unfree. The doctrine of the Church that "grace perfects nature, and does not destroy it," has as its corollary the truth that nature is imperfect without grace.

To attribute to natural virtues, therefore, the power of liberating the souls of men from the bondage of sin and the tyranny of passion is the error of Rationalism and Naturalism, which human experience should long ago have seen through, even without the help of express condemnation in revealed doctrine. Naturalism's denial of original sin leads its supporters to "think that free will is not at all weakened and inclined to evil. On the contrary, exaggerating rather our natural virtue and excellence and placing therein alone the principle and rule

of justice, they cannot even imagine that there is any need at all of a constant struggle and a perfect steadfastness to overcome the violence and rule the passions of our nature."²⁴⁸ In other words, Naturalism conceives the human will as already perfect in its freedom, without need of further liberation. Human history itself should be the first witness against so patent a fable. Is there any clearer lesson from the past and present than that there is something wrong with the race?

The very existence of these natural virtues without the infused life of grace to perfect them and give them direction to man's supernatural destiny, is suspect. Leo XIII has expressed this doubt in *Testem Benevolentiae*:

Even if we admire the sometimes splendid acts of the natural virtues, how rare is the man who really possesses the habit of these natural virtues? Who is there who is not disturbed by passions, sometimes of a violent nature, for the persevering conquest of which, just as for the observance of the whole natural law, man must needs have some divine help? If we scrutinize more closely the particular acts we have above referred to, we shall discover that oftentimes they have more the appearance than the reality of virtue.²⁴⁹

This doctrine of the Church is not to be confused with the profound pessimism of those "reformers" who regarded human nature as totally vitiated and corrupted by original sin. The loss of original justice and the wounding of nature do not imply decay;²⁵⁰ moreover, the wounds suffered in intellect, will, and the lower appetites are curable through the grace of Christ.²⁵¹ The teaching of the Church steers a safe and true course between the extreme optimism of Naturalism and the extreme pessimism of Lutheranism.

²⁴⁸ Leo XIII, *Humanum Genus* (April 20, 1884).

²⁴⁹ Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 4. Note that Leo did not deny moral goodness to individual acts of men who are not in the state of grace. Such a denial is the error, condemned by the Church (Denz. 1025; 1035; 1298; etc.) that all the actions of sinners are sins. Leo raises the question of *habits*, i. e., stable inclinations toward virtuous acts.

²⁵⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 1.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, a. 3.

If human nature could not have preserved its original freedom in grace even in the state of innocence without divine aid, as the Council of Orange taught,²⁵² with how much more reason does it now require supernatural assistance to regain its lost liberty. Its subjection to God, which is of the essence of perfect freedom, was never a natural endowment; "otherwise," says St. Thomas, "it would have remained after sin, for even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin."²⁵³ No matter how perfectly the principles of nature may be developed in a natural way or how helpful acquired virtues may be in the service of charity and the other infused virtues, they cannot be a substitute for the moral freedom only grace can give. Just as no intellectual perfection of the natural man can serve as vicar for faith in the liberation of the mind, so too no moral excellence which is merely natural can take the place of supernatural charity in freeing the will. We can readily grant that mental and moral growth ameliorate the condition of those who do not live by faith and charity, but that condition is spiritual bondage none the less.

Besides insisting upon the indispensability of grace and charity for the perfection and fullness of virtue,²⁵⁴ St. Thomas has pointed out that there are inherent deficiencies in acquired virtues which are not to be found in infused moral virtues, apart from the fact that natural virtues cannot bring a man to supernatural beatitude. He shows that it is entirely possible to possess natural virtues and at the same time commit sinful actions opposed to these virtues, since isolated acts will not directly destroy the habit which has been acquired by many previous acts of virtue.²⁵⁵ The infused moral virtues, on the

²⁵² Denz. 192: can. 19: "*Neminem nisi Deo miserante salvari. Natura humana, etiamsi in illa integritate, in qua est condita, permaneret, nullo modo seipsam, creatore suo non adjuvante, servaret; unde cum sine Dei gratia salutem non possit custodire, quam accepit, quomodo sine gratia poterit reparare, quod perdidit?*"

²⁵³ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 95, a. 1.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 2.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 63, a. 2, ad 2: "Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in

other hand, though they do not of themselves always give that ease in virtuous activity which comes from long practice, are infallibly opposed to every gravely sinful act against the particular virtue. A natural virtue will dispose its possessor against sin *ut in pluribus*, "in the majority of cases"; an infused virtue, against all sins opposed to it.²⁵⁶

When this doctrine is considered in conjunction with St. Thomas's further teaching that if a man be in the state of sin, "it cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin,"²⁵⁷ the so-called spiritual "liberty" possible through natural virtue is seen to be at least very dubious and unstable. A man in the state of grace cannot, short of a special privilege, avoid all venial sin; a man not in the state of grace cannot avoid all mortal sin, and one such sin will lead to another.²⁵⁸

Even though one serious sin against an acquired virtue does not introduce into the soul the opposed evil habit, the undermining of the good habit is started. The virtue is no longer in a stable condition. And the likelihood of the first sin being followed by others is a further threat to the virtue's existence unless there is an infusion of the life of grace to rectify the appetite and restore the will's dominion over sin. Only repeated acts of sin will destroy the acquired virtue, and replace it with a vice. But, as Père Garrigou-Lagrange has pointed out, "before that destruction, it exists *in the state of a more or less stable disposition*. If we do not admit that, we would never be able to say when it does start to become unstable, before being completely destroyed."²⁵⁹ He cites several of St.

us is subject to our will. . . . And one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit."

²⁵⁶ *De Virtutibus in Communi*, a. 10, ad 14: "Infused virtue effects that a man in no way obey the concupiscences of sin; and while this virtue remains, it does this infallibly. Acquired virtue falls short in this respect, although in only a few instances, as other natural inclinations fail in only a minor part."

²⁵⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 8.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., "L'Instabilité dans L'État de Péch  Mortel des Vertus Morales Acquises," *Revue Thomiste*, XLIII (1937), 255-262. (Italics the author's). Cf. also, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life*, pp. 58-59.

Thomas's most noted commentators in support of his opinion.²⁶⁰ And his conclusion is important for a proper understanding of the role of grace in giving the soul its spiritual freedom:

In the state of mortal sin there can be *true acquired moral virtues*, but they are then *in the state of a more or less stable disposition*, from the fact that the subject in which they exist is turned away from even its natural last end; for that reason it is weak for the accomplishing of moral good, even in the natural order. . . . This frailty of the acquired moral virtues in the sinner is consequently altogether unlike that of those same virtues and the infused virtues in the just man. If it is true to say that the Christian in the state of grace has received a precious treasure in a fragile vessel, it is clearly yet more true to speak of the instability of the virtue which is still left in a soul turned away from God.²⁶¹

It is evident then that when everything has been said that can possibly be said in favor of natural virtues independent of sanctifying grace, they still fall far short of man's needs on the natural level. And once the truth of Christian revelation has been accepted concerning man's supernatural destiny, we appreciate the pertinence of the question posed by Pope Leo XIII and his answer to it:

Of what use are the natural virtues unless the gift and strength of divine grace be added? Aptly does St. Augustine say: Great power, and a rapid pace, but out of the course. (*In Ps. 31: 4*). For as the nature of man, because of our common misfortune, fell into vice and dishonor, yet by the assistance of grace is lifted up and borne onward with new honor and strength; so also the virtues which are exercised not by the unaided powers of nature, but by the help of the same grace, are made productive of a supernatural beatitude and become solid and enduring.²⁶²

There can be no true spiritual freedom, then, without grace and supernaturally infused virtues. There may be degrees in the lack of that freedom, degrees proportionate to the strength and stability of natural virtues, just as there are degrees in the

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-262.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 262. (Italics the author's).

²⁶² *Testem Benevolentiae*.

perfection of that liberty, proportionate to the perfection of grace and charity in the soul.

In this correlation between infused virtue and spiritual liberty lies the chief reason why in Christian preaching comparatively little stress is laid upon the independence of the Christian soul and its God-given autonomy, except to emphasize the immense personal responsibility that flows from freedom of choice. The Church has always concentrated her forces on the inculcation of virtue, i. e., on the fulfillment of duty, with God's help; she has done so in the realization that full liberty of soul is the connatural sequel of supernatural virtue, like the bloom of countenance that flows from fullness of health.

As for individual freedom, so also for true freedom in the social order supernatural virtues are essential, especially the theological virtue of charity, in which all the others, infused and acquired, are united and directed toward the supernatural last end of human life. Without charity in society a true spiritual liberty worthy of a Christian order cannot exist. True freedom must always ebb and flow with the decrease or increase of divine love in the members of society. For liberty, as well as for true unity and peace among men, we must look to charity as the supreme principle of individual and social life.

In this connection it is important to note that charity need not be found in each member of society for Christian freedom to flourish in economic and political life.²⁶³ The more men are imbued with the spirit of Christian love, the more surely will liberty prosper. But even those who lack charity may regard it highly and appreciate the gift and its benefits in this world and the next. A proper understanding of and a reverent esteem for charity and the supernatural life is in itself a contribution to liberty and an approach to it in those who have not possessed it or who may have lost it. There are two kinds of knowledge of charity, experimental and speculative; and one without charity can have the second, though not the first.²⁶⁴ It is not

²⁶³ Cf. L. A. Ryan, O.P., "Charity and the Social Order," *The Thomist*, IV (April, 1942), pp. 263-264.

²⁶⁴ *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, 2, al 1.

necessary . . . that all possess charity, but only a number sufficient to affect the tone of the society; the others may speculatively, if not experimentally, appreciate it; and since grace does not destroy nature, they should feel no repugnance to cooperating in the life of a society with charity as its principle of order.²⁶⁵

Not the least of the errors of Naturalism and the humanitarianism it sponsors is to ascribe the origin, growth, and perfection of charity to inborn natural powers. The superstition is epidemic in Christendom, which prizes the ideal of charity without understanding it. For charity is not of nature; it is of God directly, and of God alone. And its effects are from God, liberty included. Mankind can be certain God will give it to those who seek it, for He has commanded men to live by charity and He does not command the impossible or refuse to bestow the means to fulfill His precept.

Therein lies the reason why the Church alone can justly claim to be the true emancipator of mankind, and the mother of liberty. For supernatural life and virtue, and charity above all, the greatest of the virtues, are bred, nourished, and brought to maturity by the Church. If it be true that "charity, as a virtue, belongs to the Church,"²⁶⁶ then true liberty belongs to her also. For liberty and love are inseparable.

Love is the root of liberty. The well-ordered love of charity frees man from the bondage of an evil will and creates the autonomy of which St. Augustine wrote:

Love, and do what thou wilt. Whether thou hold thy peace, of love hold thy peace; whether thou cry out, of love cry out; whether thou correct, of love correct; whether thou spare, through love do thou spare; let the root of love be within, of this root can nothing spring but what is good.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ Ryan, *loc. cit.*

²⁶⁶ Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*.

²⁶⁷ *In ep. I Joann.*, tr. 7, n. 8; *PL*, 35, 2033.

III. DEMOCRACY AND CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

Up to this point we have been examining from the theological viewpoint the character and causes of Christian freedom. In the course of that examination we have considered other freedoms with which it is linked. Though our chief concern was the inner liberty which is specifically Christian, we have also touched upon certain types of freedom which are today, more than ever before, the prime objective of popular political and social movements. In the modern mind these liberties are associated with the democratic form of government. We propose now to study the relationship between the inner Christian freedom already described and the external freedoms of modern democracy, in an effort to demonstrate that without the aid of Christian liberty external freedoms tend to harm both the individual and society; that their good use depends upon Christian faith and charity; that abuse and loss of these freedoms is inevitable without Christianity. In other words, the wide personal freedoms which are essential to a democratic order will do more harm than good to the common weal where Christian freedom does not foster and protect them by sanctifying them and consecrating them to God. Or, to put it another way, external freedoms must be Christianized (or christened) to be truly beneficial to the citizen and the State.

This conclusion is nothing more than an application to the political order of the principle that grace perfects nature, and the correlative principle that nature is very imperfect without grace. The thesis could be strongly bolstered by an investigation of the actual historical relationship between Christianity and democracy. But we must limit ourselves here to purely doctrinal considerations regarding the relevance of Christian liberty to democratic freedoms.

To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, it should be made clear here that we do *not* identify Christianity with democracy. That would be to identify the natural with supernatural order. Nor do we hold that Christianity needs democracy to accomplish her divine mission of saving the human

soul. That would be tantamount to holding that God depends on Caesar, the Church on the State, a position with no evidence at all in at least the first three centuries of Christian history, and also as unorthodox a conclusion as it is unhistorical. What we do hold is this: democracy needs Christianity, and needs it more than other forms of government. As Maritain expresses it, "democracy needs the evangelical leaven to realize itself and to continue to exist."²⁶⁸ It follows that any threat to Christianity is a danger to democracy and "the chances of liberty coincide with those of the evangelical message."²⁶⁹

Thus, there is a real difference between the extreme view which would link Christianity with democracy to the point of identifying the two and the more balanced stand that democracy is nothing more than "a temporal manifestation, sometimes disfigured, of the evangelical inspiration."²⁷⁰ This is the opinion expressed by Leo XIII:

Understood as the Church understands it, the Democratic idea not only accords wonderfully with the dictates of Revelation and with religious beliefs, but it was even born and nurtured by Christianity, and it was the Gospel preaching that diffused it among the nations. Athens and Rome knew it not, until they had heard the divine voice which said to men, 'You are all brothers, and your common father is in Heaven.'²⁷¹

Democracy needs Christianity. The converse of that proposition, however, cannot be defended. The Catholic attitude towards the relationship between the two is excellently summarized in these three statements:

I. There is no essential opposition between Christian principles and the fundamental principles of democracy.

II. Any opposition which may exist between Christianity and democracy has its origin elsewhere than in the antagonism of principles.

²⁶⁸ "Humanism and the Dignity of Man," in *Democracy: Should It Survive?* (Milwaukee, 1943), p. 142.

²⁶⁹ Maritain, *ibid.*, p. 146.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

²⁷¹ Allocution to the Sacred College, December 23, 1902.

III. Only by building on Christian principles will democracy successfully accomplish the generous work it has undertaken.²⁷²

1. *The State and Democracy in Catholic Teaching*

In Catholic teaching the State is looked upon as the perfect society in the natural order; for man's temporal needs it is the counterpart of the Church, the perfect supernatural society which cares for man's eternal and spiritual needs. The State and the Church are perfect in the sense that each has, in its own order and within the scope of its own activity, all the power and all the means necessary for the realization of its purpose. Both have authority from God, with which each may act effectively towards its own specific goal.

The State is made up of smaller, imperfect social units, that is, of families. The family, or the domestic society, is a society prior in nature to the State, and forms the cell of the body politic. What individual families cannot as isolated units procure for themselves to make human life more secure, more peaceful, and generally more livable, they can obtain together in political union under civil authority. Because of the natural interdependence of individuals and families, the State is essential for the attainment of their natural perfection and natural happiness. "Man's natural instinct moves him to live in civil society. Isolated, he cannot provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his mental and moral faculties. It is, therefore, divinely ordained that he should lead his life—be it domestic, social, or civil—with his fellow-men, where alone his several wants can be adequately supplied."²⁷³ By nature man is a social being.

²⁷² Cf. Leon Garriguet, *The Social Value of the Gospel* (London, 1911), pp. 143 ff., where each of the above propositions is explained.

²⁷³ Leo XIII, *Immortale Dei*. For a summary of the Church's doctrine regarding the social nature of man see *Divini Illius Magistri* of Pius XI: "Now, there are three necessary societies distinct from one another and yet harmoniously combined by God, into which man is born: two, namely the family and civil society, belong to the natural order; the third, the Church, to the supernatural order.

"In the first place comes the family, instituted directly by God for its peculiar

The proper end of the State is the common temporal welfare of the citizens.²⁷⁴ Every State, no matter what be the form of government, has of its nature all the legislative, executive, and judicial powers required for the attainment of the common welfare. But its end is not the last end of man. Man's last end is not natural or temporal, but supernatural and eternal. He obtains it not through the State, but through the Church. The State can help man to attain that eternal end by promoting virtue and helping to create the conditions for virtue. Otherwise it is failing to accomplish its own natural purpose.

Nature has not formed society with the intent that man should seek in it his last end, but that in it and through it he should find suitable aids whereby to attain to his own perfection. If, then, a civil government strives after external advantages merely, and the attainment of such objects as adorn life; if in administering public affairs it is wont to put God aside, and show no solicitude for the upholding of moral law, it deflects woefully from its right course and from the injunctions of nature: nor should such a gathering together and association of men accounted as a commonwealth, but only as a deceitful imitation and make-believe of civil organization.²⁷⁵

purpose, the generation and formation of offspring. For this reason it has priority of nature and therefore of rights over civil society. Nevertheless, the family is an imperfect society, since it has not in itself all the means for its own complete development; whereas civil society is a perfect society, having in itself all the means for its peculiar end, which is the temporal well-being of the community; and so, in this respect, that is, in view of the common good, it has pre-eminence over the family, which finds its own suitable temporal perfection precisely in civil society.

"The third society, into which man is born when through Baptism he receives the divine life of grace, is the Church; a society of the supernatural order and of universal extent; a perfect society, because it has in itself all the means required for its own end, which is the eternal salvation of mankind; hence it is supreme in its own domain."

²⁷⁴ "This end and object, the common welfare in the temporal order, consists in that peace and security in which families and individual citizens have the free exercise of their rights, and at the same time enjoy the greatest spiritual and temporal prosperity possible in this life, by the mutual union and coordinaton of the work of all. The function therefore, of the civil authority residing in the State is twofold, to protect and to foster, but by no means to absorb the family and the individual, or to substitute itself for them." *Divini Illius Magistri*.

²⁷⁵ Leo XIII, *Sapientiae Christianae*.

Though both State and Church are self-sufficient within their own spheres of activity, their independence of one another does not mean that they cannot be, or should not be, mutually helpful. The State should, by promoting the true temporal interests of its people, aid them towards a virtuous Christian life; on her part the Church, through her teaching and ministry, will help the State in maintaining due order.

. . . The Founder of the Church willed her sacred power to be distinct from the civil power, and each power to be free and unshackled in its own sphere: with this condition, however,—a condition good alike for both, and of advantage to all men—that union and concord should be maintained between them; and that on those questions which are, though in different ways, of common right and authority, the power to which secular matters have been entrusted should happily and becomingly depend on the other power which has in its charge the interests of heaven. . . . When the civil power is on friendly terms with the sacred authority of the Church, there accrues to both a great increase of usefulness. The dignity of the one is exalted, and so long as religion is its guide it will never rule unjustly; while the other receives help of protection and defence for the public good of the faithful.²⁷⁶

The supremacy of the State in temporal affairs is not meant to preclude its seeking for help from outside itself to attain its proper end. In its exercise of its function as protector of peace and civil order, the government of one State can ally itself with another against a common external enemy, and it must make such alliances if they are necessary to the common welfare. With how much more reason, then, is the State bound to seek for help from religion, without whose aid it must eventually fail and fall. For the internal disorders which spring from vice are a much more serious threat to civil peace and prosperity than any external danger. Moreover, since the State's purpose is subordinate to the end of religion, man's final and eternal destiny, the State can not justly discount or disregard the Church. At the very least the State must give the Church—

²⁷⁶ Leo XIII, *Arcanum* (Feb. 10, 1880).

not as a privilege, but as a divine right—unhampered opportunity for action among the people.²⁷⁷

A relationship of concord and friendship should exist between the Church and the State under any form of government. As far as forms of government are concerned, the Church has no prejudice except for justice; she condemns no type of legitimate regime. "So long as justice be respected, the people are not hindered from choosing for themselves that form of government which suits best either their own disposition, or the institutions and customs of their ancestors."²⁷⁸

Consequently the Church can be equally at home in, and contribute generously to the welfare of, any just government, whether it be monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic. It is only a corruption of any of these which will be inimical to the Church, and it is only a corruption the Church will oppose and condemn.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ Cf. Leo XIII, *Praeclara Gratulationis Publicae*: "Nothing is more foreign to her disposition than to encroach on the rights of civil power; but the civil power in its turn must respect the rights of the Church, and beware of arrogating them in any degree to itself. . . .

"Such a policy is a violation of the most sacred rights of the Church, and it breeds enormous evils to States, for the very reason that it is in open conflict with the purposes of God. When God, in His most wise providence, placed over human society both temporal and spiritual authority, He intended them to remain distinct indeed, but by no means disconnected and at war with each other. On the contrary, both the will of God and the common weal of human society imperatively require that the civil power should be in accord with the ecclesiastical in its rule and administration.

"Hence the State has its own peculiar rights and duties, the Church likewise has hers; but it is necessary that each should be united with the other in the bonds of concord."

²⁷⁸ Leo XIII, *Diuturnum Illud*. (June 29, 1881). Cf. also the Christmas message of Pius XII, 1944: "It is scarcely necessary to recall, that according to the teaching of the Church, 'it is not forbidden to prefer temperate, popular forms of government, without prejudice, however, to the Catholic teaching on the origin and use of authority,' and that 'the Church does not disapprove of any of the various forms of government, provided they be per se capable of securing the good of the citizens' (Leo XIII, Encyclical *Libertas*)."

²⁷⁹ St. Thomas discusses these three types of government and their corresponding corrupt forms in *De Regimine Principum*, I, c.1: ". . . In the government of a

Modifications of these types, such as exist today in the representative democracies and in the English constitutional monarchy, are legitimate, too, when they fulfill the requirements of justice towards their citizens and the Church. In fact, a mixed type of government which combines the best features of monarchy, aristocracy, and pure democracy in order to avoid the dangers peculiar to each, was regarded by St. Thomas as the best and safest in practice, notwithstanding the theoretical superiority, in his opinion, of a kingdom over other forms.

... The best form of government is in a state or kingdom, wherein one is given the power to preside over all, while under him are others having governing powers. And yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in

group there is a right way and a wrong way. . . . If therefore a group of free men is governed by their ruler for the common good of the group, the government will be right and just, as is suitable to free men. If, however, the government is not organized for the common good of the group but for the private interest of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted government. . . . Now, if an unjust government is carried on by one man alone . . . such a ruler is called a tyrant—a word derived from strength—because he oppresses by might instead of ruling by justice. . . . But if the unjust government is carried on, not by one, but by several, especially if they be few, it is called an obligarchy, that is the rule of a few. This occurs when a few, who differ from the tyrant only by the fact that they are more than one, oppress the people by means of their wealth. If, however, the bad government is carried on by the multitude it is called a democracy, that is, control by the populace. This comes about when the plebeian populace by force of numbers oppress the wealthy. In this way the whole people will be as one tyrant.

“In like manner we must divide just governments. . . . If the government is administered by a multitude, it is given the name of a polity. . . . But if it is administered by a few, but virtuous men, this kind of government is called an aristocracy . . . who . . . are called the nobility (*optimates*). . . . But if a just government is in the hands of one man alone he is properly called a king. . . .” N.B. It should be observed that St. Thomas, using the terminology of Aristotle, employs the word “democracy” for the corruption of popular government. A just popular government is called today a “democracy”; St. Thomas and Aristotle called it a “polity.”

authority; partly democracy, i. e., government by the people, in so far as the rules can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers.²⁸⁰

Whether St. Thomas's description of the practical ideal fits most perfectly a limited monarchy or a representative democracy has been mooted by commentators. But in any case the defence of popular government is clear enough. And the democratic ideal can be realized in more ways than one. As Pope Pius XII points out, "... Democracy, taken in the broad sense, admits of various forms, and can be realized in monarchies as well as in republics."²⁸¹

Every definition of democracy includes the idea of self-government by the people, the basic assumption being that every citizen has a share in governing, either directly or through representative, and every citizen is a potential officer of the government. In the formula "of the people, by the people, for the people," so generally used as a popular description of democracy, the second phrase alone is what distinguishes the democratic form from other types, since every just government must be *of* and *for* those governed. Self-government *by* the people, immediately or through elected delegates, is the determined and specific characteristic of democracy.

Liberty is another element which enters into the essence of democracy, an element even more basic than popular rule in as much as popular rule springs from the desire of freedom. "Two principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of the majority and freedom."²⁸²

The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state;—this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn. . . . The will of the majority is supreme. This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another

²⁸⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 105, a. 1. Cf. Alfred O'Rahilly, "The Democracy of St. Thomas," *Studies*, March 1920.

²⁸¹ *Christmas Message*, 1944.

²⁸² *Politica* V, 9.

is that a man should live as he likes. This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turn.²⁸³

The difficulty in Aristotle's time (and today) was to find the true concept of liberty. "In democracies of the more extreme type," he complained, "there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. . . . Men think . . . that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, 'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong; men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their salvation."²⁸⁴

The difference between a good and an evil popular government will be found in the popular attitude toward liberty. Where it is wrongly understood and defined, there cannot be a successful state. And it cannot be rightly defined except in relation to wisdom and virtue; in relation also to law and authority. The balance between freedom and law, between private autonomy and public authority, must be created by virtue; without wisdom and, especially the moral virtues, either the authority of those governing or the autonomy of those governed will be misinterpreted and misused.

The supreme need of every State is wisdom and moral integrity. The good life, which implies mental and moral development, is its purpose; there must be an approach to that goal in the individual lives of both leaders and led, or the State fails entirely. The supreme need of a democracy, then, both for liberty and self-government, is virtue, moral and intellectual. Both are spiritual necessities for even temporal success. Without these requirements a democracy may be established; but without them it will not survive. "The mere establishment of a democracy," wrote Aristotle more than two thousand years ago, "is not the only business of the legislator, or of those who

²⁸³ *Politica* VI, 2.

²⁸⁴ *Politica* V, 9. Cf. *In Pol.* V, lect. 7.

wish to create such a state, for any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it.”²⁸⁵ The character of the leaders is the spiritual preservative of any State. But in democracies the stability of the political order and the quality of its leadership must depend, in large measure, on the intellectual and moral caliber of the people.

2. *The Spritual Needs of the State and of Democracy*

The goodness of any part is considered in its relation with the whole. . . . Since, then, every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that man be good, unless he be well ordered to the common good, nor can the whole be well ordered unless its parts be proportioned to it. Consequently, the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says that *the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a good man*.²⁸⁶

No State can thrive, or survive for long, unless it is governed by men with all the intellectual and moral qualifications summed up in the word “virtue.” Not only must the ruler (or the rulers, if authority be shared) have those essential intellectual and moral qualities which make him good as an individual, but he must also have special qualities fitting him for the direction of others: a type of prudence peculiar to the head of the State, designated *regnative* by St. Thomas;²⁸⁷ an eminence in justice and the other moral virtues which befits his exalted position of responsibility for the souls of others.²⁸⁸ When the governing of the State is in the hands of several or many, there should be in them an intellectual and moral excellence which is proportionate to the degree of their authority

²⁸⁵ *Politica* VI, 5.

²⁸⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 3.

²⁸⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 50, a. 1.

²⁸⁸ Cf. *De Regimine Principum*. I, c. 15.

and responsibility.²⁸⁹ The whole secret of successful government, no matter what be the form of the regime, lies in the wisdom and character of the leaders.²⁹⁰

Every State is made up of those who rule and those who are ruled; every State is also made up of good men and bad, for "the line between virtue and vice is one dividing the whole of mankind."²⁹¹ Goodness is an essential requirement in those who rule; in the other citizens, however, the same excellence in virtue is not, generally speaking, required for a successful State. Those not in authority can be good citizens without being at the same time good men if they submit at least externally to the requirements of civil law. Since the work of human law is to regulate the external rather than the internal life of the citizens, even a reluctant obedience will satisfy the minimum demands of citizenship. If the members of the community are highly virtuous and comply willingly with the law out of love for the common good and not out of fear of penalty, so much the better. The government's work is made easier; there is greater harmony in the commonwealth, a peace that does not lie upon the surface of civil life, but has its roots deep in the souls of the members of the community. But ordinarily the State can struggle along

²⁸⁹ The emphasis which both Aristotle and St. Thomas place upon the virtue required in the leader or leaders of the State hardly needs to be brought to attention here. But note particularly the recurrence of the phrase *secundum virtutem* in St. Thomas's description of the mixed regime, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 105, a. 1: "Optima ordinatio principum est in aliqua civitate, vel regno, in quo unus praeficitur *secundum virtutem*, qui omnibus praesit; et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes *secundum virtutem*. . . ."

It is strange to find that both the older English translation (London, 1915) and the most recent *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*, edited by Anton C. Pegis (New York, 1945), which includes most of the *Prima Secundae* (Volume II) omit the phrase *secundum virtutem*, so important in St. Thomas's mind, in translating the article cited.

²⁹⁰ "Legislation is the work of men invested with power and who, in fact, govern the nation; therefore, it follows that, practically, the quality of the laws depends more on the quality of these men than upon the form of power. The laws will be good or bad accordingly as the minds of the legislators are imbued with good or bad principles, and as they allow themselves to be guided by political prudence or by passion." Leo XIII, *Au Milieu des Sollicitudes* (Feb. 16, 1872).

²⁹¹ Aristotle, *Poetica*, II.

without such moral excellence in all members. It is always free to use its coercive powers against those who will not voluntarily conform to law.

What has been said regarding the morality of the citizens is proportionately true of their intellectual attainments. Generally speaking, a State can accomplish its purpose and benefit its people if there is eminent wisdom in the rulers alone. Illiteracy and ignorance among the people will not be a *per se* obstacle to successful rule and civil prosperity, especially if the citizens be docile to direction by their superiors. Though under some circumstances, especially in modern times, it may be an obligation for the government to establish an educational system for all the members of the State and minimum standards of literacy, formal scholastic education is not of its nature an essential for good citizenship.

Yet in a democracy, since the role of the people in government is greater than under other regimes, the education and character of the private citizen is of vital importance, much more so than in an absolute monarchy or under the rule of hereditary aristocracy. A strong government by one or several who are wise and good can direct civil life to the common welfare by severity and strict justice even where civic virtue is not general among the people. But a democracy will not last long or provide adequately for the common good whenever virtue and respect for law are a rarity. The reason for making this reservation in the case of a democracy is to be found in the very nature of representative or popular government. Every type of regime must have leaders who excel in intellectual and moral virtue; but the democratic state must have and intelligent and virtuous citizenry also, because a democratic people are their own government.²⁹²

In the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas we find that

²⁹² "The intellectual and moral factors are much more important in the disposition of a people to representative government than are the economic and social. . . . Intellectual and moral decay, whatever the material and social conditions, strikes at the very roots of the dispositions for representative government." Walter Farrell, O.P., "The Fate of Representative Government," *The Thomist*, II (April, 1940), p. 200.

when they discuss representative government, they qualify their usual teaching that the virtue of the good citizen and the good man are not necessarily identical. In the *Politics* Aristotle points out that the subject who can become part of the government must be a wise and good man. "Will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man."²⁹³ In a democracy, then, according to this teaching, since every man is potentially a ruler and every voter has an actual share in government through his representatives, every man should be a morally good man to be a good citizen. "In some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and those who have or *may have*, alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs."²⁹⁴ Where every boy "can grow up to be President," the moral quality of the people must be high.

There is a rule . . . which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth—a constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as he would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a general of cavalry. . . . It has been well said that 'he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.' The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues of a citizen.²⁹⁵

Nothing need be added here, with reference to democratic States, to what has been said above concerning the qualities of those who guide the State to its purpose. Virtue is the supreme requirement in this, as in any other regime. "The question of the high moral standards, practical ability and intellectual capacity of their parliamentary representatives is *for every people living under a democratic regime a question*

²⁹³ *Politica* III, 4.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 5. (Italics ours). Cf. St. Thomas, *in loco*, lect. 4.

²⁹⁵ Aristotle, *ibid.*, 4.

*of life or death, of prosperity or decadence, of soundness or perpetual unrest."*²⁹⁶

In a democracy the problem of providing such leadership lies with the people themselves. Unless they recognize virtue where it exists, and appreciate it, they are not likely to choose qualified delegates to rule them. And the moral tone of the ruling body is not likely to be higher than the prevailing moral condition of the people. Pope Pius XII has pointed out that leaders who are characterized by "clear views, kindly interest, impartial and sympathetic justice and a devotion to national unity and concord in a sincere spirit of brotherhood," will emerge from nations "whose spiritual and moral temperament is sufficiently sound and fecund." Such men "are able to produce the heralds and agencies of democracy, for they live in those dispositions and know how to put them into practice effectively."²⁹⁷

It is clear then that in democracies a special emphasis must be laid on the need of intellectual and moral development in the people. It is only such development that can prepare a people for democratic government; it is only the continuation of those qualities that will preserve a truly popular government.

It must be admitted that the intellectual needs of a self-governing society are generally recognized, and efforts are made to provide for them. The development of educational systems under government supervision in modern times is a result of the political theory that a literate and well-informed electorate is one of the surest safeguards of a real democracy. Schools, it is rightly held, must include instruction in the duties of citizenship, in the history and the ideals of the nation, and in other matters which pertain to so-called "civic education."

The chief flaw in this attitude towards education in democracies is that instruction rarely goes far enough. The truths which legislation requires to be taught are seldom basic enough to preserve democratic institutions. The concept of human

²⁹⁶ Pius XII. *Christmas Message*, 1944. (Italics ours).

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

nature upon which real democracy is founded is not stressed; often it is not taught at all. In fact, it is usually concepts of man most opposed to democratic theory which are expounded to youth. The most basic liberty of all, the freedom of choice in the human will, can be publicly denied in the schools of lands dedicated to freedom. In our own country, for example, the theories associated with the name of John Dewey, of Columbia University, have gained a dominant place in education. When the source and end of human freedom are eliminated by the denial of God; when the very subject of freedom is destroyed by the distortion of man; when the measure and guide of freedom is annihilated by the disavowal of the moral law, all our liberties are imperilled.²⁹⁸

"A democracy without spiritual unity at least in its basic principles . . . relative to the law of God and to the dignity of human beings . . . would be insecure and defective."²⁹⁹ Where is the democracy today where this spiritual unity is fostered in education? Moreover, this deficient training of the mind has been, and still is, regarded almost worshipfully, as the panacea for political and social problems in democratic countries. The truth of the matter is that even if education were complete and fundamental from the intellectual standpoint, it would still be insufficient protection for the survival of democratic institutions. Moral training is even more necessary.

Moral education is minimized today, and, in many quarters,

²⁹⁸ For a fully documented account of these dangers in the United States, see Geoffrey O'Connell, *Naturalism in American Education* (New York, 1938). Cf. also Thomas F. Woodlock, *The Real Threat to American Liberties* (pamphlet published by National Council of Catholic Women, Washington, 1939); Raoul E. Desvernine, "The Attack on Freedom," *Columbia*, October, 1944, pp. 9-10.

There is ample reason in America for the protest of Pius XII: "We raise our voice in strong, albeit paternal, complaint that in so many schools of your land Christ often is despised or ignored, the explanation of the universe and mankind is forced within the narrow limits of materialism or of rationalism, and new educational systems are sought after which cannot but produce a sorrowful harvest in the intellectual moral life of the nation." *Encyclical Sertum Laetitiae* (Nov. 1, 1939) to the Church in the United States.

²⁹⁹ Pius XII, in a speech to the Roman Rota, as reported in the *Catholic News* (New York, Oct. 20, 1945).

derided. We have been reaping in recent years the full-grown fruits of an amoral educational system which has ignored God, become ignorant of man, and despised the moral law.³⁰⁰ The American hierarchy wrote:

This war came largely from bad education. It was not brought on by primitives or unlettered peoples. The contemporary philosophy which asserts the right of aggression is the creation of scholars. Discarding moral principles and crowding God out of human life, scholars produced the monstrous philosophies which, embodied in political and social system, enslaves human reason and destroy the consciousness of innate human rights and duties.³⁰¹

The moral needs of democratic peoples are far more important than their intellectual needs, themselves so vital. Yet in practice it is moral education and development that is the more neglected. Without virtue in the citizens, at least to the extent of external obedience, no State can flourish, least of all a democracy.

Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites; in proportion as their love of justice is above their rapacity; in proportion as their soundness and sobriety of understanding is above their vanity and presumption; in proportion as they are more disposed to listen to the counsels of the wise and good, in preference to the flattery of knaves. Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.³⁰²

In a regime where the citizens have the widest possible

³⁰⁰ "And all the time—such is the tragi-comedy of our situation—we continue to clamor for those very qualities we are rendering impossible. You can hardly open a periodical without coming across the statement that what our civilization needs is more "drive," or dynamism, or self-sacrifice, or "creativity." In a sort of ghastly simplicity, we remove the organ and demand the function. . . . We laugh at honor and are shocked to find traitors in our midst." C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man* (New York, 1947), p. 16.

³⁰¹ *Bishops' Statement on International Order*, Nov. 16, 1944 (N. C. W. C. edition), p. 4.

³⁰² *The Works of Edmund Burke* (New York, 1837), I, 583.

liberty to follow their own inclinations, the lessening of government control of their activity will naturally increase the need of virtuous self-control. Licentiousness in a people civilly and politically free must result either in the complete degeneration of their republican institutions, or at best an abnormal increase in the coercive activity of the State.

Virtue is essential to the liberty of self-governing people.

If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the choice devolves to a few good men.³⁰³

The Popes of modern times have been unanimous in stressing the special need of virtue in citizens of a democracy. "In a free State" wrote Leo XIII to the American people, "unless justice be generally cultivated, unless the people be repeatedly and diligently urged to observe the precepts and laws of the Gospel, liberty itself may be pernicious."³⁰⁴ The same thought on the nature of free democracy was expressed by Pius XII, for he emphasized "the exalted claims that this form of government makes on the moral maturity of the individual citizen."³⁰⁵

Even more than the truth which liberates the human mind and guides men and society safely in the direction of real, rather than apparent good, goodness is required for the temporal salvation of a free people. If it be true (and history has never provided evidence to the contrary) that "sin maketh nations miserable,"³⁰⁶ democracies cannot expect to escape the ruinous outcome of freedom misunderstood and misused. But the truth needed for the self-guidance of a free people and the

³⁰³ St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, I, 6, cited by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 97, a. 1, corp.

³⁰⁴ Encyclical *Longinqua Oceani*.

³⁰⁵ *Christmas Message*, 1944.

³⁰⁶ Prov. 14: 34.

virtue needed for self-control are not accessible to human nature without divine assistance.

3. *Christian Liberty and Democratic Citizenship*

A. The Problem

A wide personal freedom of action is an essential feature of citizenship under the democratic form of government. That liberty finds its social and civil expression in freedom of worship, freedom of speech of assembly, etc. Politically, the chief expression of freedom is in the elective power of the people. The right of a free people to choose their own lawmakers and rulers is generally regarded as the fundamental safeguard of democratic rights. In democratic theory it is looked upon as the source of the extension or limitation of civil freedoms. So intrinsic an element is this power of the ballot that it is the last formality of popular rule to be discarded by decadent republics, and the chief disguise used by tyranny to conceal undemocratic processes. An election may be the brightest proof of a living freedom, or the grim death-mask of buried liberties. But the hypocrisy of gestures towards popular franchise is the tribute of political vice to the innate virtue of this basic democratic freedom.

Yet like other liberties this power of the ballot too can be misused. There is a freedom more fundamental still, which cannot be so deflected from its true purpose; it is the sole surety for the survival of a true elective system and all the other free institutions of representative government. The basic liberty for the continuance of true popular rule must be the interior Christian freedom of the human soul. Though the creation of democracy may not be due, in particular instances, to Christian liberty, Christian liberty alone can preserve it and direct the use of external freedoms to the common good. If it is true that only Christian principles can safeguard nations under any regime, it is still more true that Christianity alone can protect the democratic governments of free men. Christi-

anity alone can generate and nourish the inner liberty without which external freedoms become a bane to society. The Christian spirit must inform and permeate the minds and wills of the leaders of a democracy, and of the people as well.

Without minimizing the need of Christian virtue in the leaders of popular governments, we must stress here the need of like character in the electorate.³⁰⁷ This necessity of Christian life in the rank and file lies in the fact that "in these days more than ever it is on the people that the salvation of States largely rests."³⁰⁸ The individual citizens are so important because "instead of being the object, merely passive elements, as it were, in the social order, they are in fact, and must continue to be, its subject, its foundation, and its end."³⁰⁹

Only where the freedom of the New Law of charity flourishes in the minds and hearts of the citizens will true democracy live. Democratic government demands of the individual a "consciousness of his personality, of his duties and rights and of his own freedom along with the freedom and dignity of others";³¹⁰ it demands also a large measure of self-discipline.³¹¹ These are

³⁰⁷ In his Christmas Message of 1944 Pius XII has given in some detail the qualities demanded of leaders in a true democracy. He calls for legislators who are "a group of select men . . . spiritually eminent and of strong character. These men will look upon themselves as the representatives of the entire people, and not as the mandatories of a mob, whose interests are often unfortunately preferred to what is really required for the general welfare. . . . They should be chosen because of their solidly Christian convictions, their straight and steady judgment, and their grasp of what is practical as well as equitable. True to themselves in all circumstances, they should have clear and sound principles, healthy and definite policies. Above all, they should have that authority which springs from unblemished consciences and inspires confidence, an authority which will make them capable of leadership and guidance, particularly in crises which unduly excite the people and make it likely that they will be led astray and lose their way."

³⁰⁸ Leo XIII, to the Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor, Nov. 25, 1898.

³⁰⁹ Pius XII, *loc. cit.*

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³¹¹ Cf. The Pastoral Letter of the American Hierarchy, Sept. 26, 1919 in Guilday, *op. cit.*, p. 332: "We must emphasize the need of laying a sure foundation in the individual mind and conscience. Upon the integrity of each, upon his personal observance of justice and charity, depends the efficacy of legislation and of all endeavor for the common good. Our aim, therefore, should be, not to multiply laws and restrictions, but to develop such a spirit as will enable us to live in harmony under

requisites unattainable on the scale needed in a democracy without Christian liberty for the minds and hearts of the people. As a consequence, democratic freedoms must rest squarely on the base of Christianity, or collapse.

The very least we may say of the inner freedom given by the grace and the Gospel of Christ is that it does nothing to interfere with or impede the broadening of legitimate external liberties. Christian teaching has no enmity for these freedoms; Christian life does not make men less fitted for them. There is at least this negative contribution to true democracy from Christian liberty. But the truth and the grace of Christ which are the soul of spiritual freedom do far more than that for democratic freedoms; they make essential positive contributions to the life of a democracy by creating through the Christian virtues the temporal conditions under which alone democracy can prosper.

Always and everywhere man has been, and is, a creature whose destiny is supernatural. Whether he is the free citizen of a modern republic or the slave laborer of a modern despotism, the individual human being is ever in need of supernatural help to preserve his humanity intact, to rescue him from the saddest of human disasters, error and sin. Without constant supernatural aid man cannot but stray from truth and justice. Not every conclusion of his reason will be false, and not every choice of his free will will be evil; yet without special supernatural help he must inevitably fail at times intellectually and morally. Without divine support to lean upon man must limp spiritually through life and frequently fall from the way of truth and of goodness.

To the extent that these intellectual and moral lapses affect the well-being of the natural social order, to that extent is society in need of supernatural aid. The State, made up as it is of individuals neither infallible nor impeccable, cannot of

the simplest possible form, and only the necessary amount, of external regulation. Democracy, understood as self-government, implies that the people as a whole shall rule themselves. But if they are to rule wisely, each must begin by governing himself, by performing his duty no less than by maintaining his right."

itself remedy the spiritual condition of its members; it cannot of itself rectify the souls of its subjects so that civil order will not be disturbed by their native deficiencies. The State's sphere is external action; it cannot touch the souls of men and heal the spiritual wounds which cripple the individual intellectually and morally, and enfeeble society. The more intimate the contact of society with its Creator, who alone can purge the mind and purify the heart of man, the more successful, the more ordered and peaceful the State will be, the more limited will be its need of employing in defence of the common good the coercive power it wields against evildoers.

Now the one Way to that contact with the Creator is Jesus Christ.

The case of governments is much the same as that of the individual; they also must run into fatal issues if they depart from *the way*. The Creator and Redeemer of human nature, the Son of God, is King and Lord of the world; and holds absolute sovereignty over men, both as individuals and as members of society. . . . Therefore, the law of Christ ought to hold sway in human society, and in communities so far as to be the teacher and guide of public no less than private life. This being divinely appointed and provided, no one may resist with impunity, and it fares ill with any commonwealth in which Christian institutions are not allowed their proper place.³¹²

Surely no one would dare to say today that these words of warning are mere theory. We have only to glance at the recent history of modern man for factual corroboration. Where the ideal of Christian liberty is discarded or outlawed, all true freedoms perish.

B. Two Solutions: Liberalism and Totalitarianism

Christian political theory represents an ideal in which the claims of personal autonomy are reconciled and harmonized with the rights of public authority by the New Law of charity, "the perfect law of liberty."³¹³ It is true that in the past

³¹² Leo XIII, Letter *Tametsi*.

³¹³ Cf. Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris*.

nations which looked to the Church for inspiration fell far short of the ideal at times. But with Christianity completely eliminated as a guide for public life, the decay of liberty is inevitable. The State must then veer far from the true ideal of freedom either by excess or defect: by allowing an excessive individual liberty which rapidly deteriorates into licence or by lessening personal freedom, even to the extent of enslavement.

In the former case we have the error of false Liberalism, which in the name of personal freedom had, until recently, all but dethroned the power of public authority; in the latter case, we have the still worse error of Totalitarianism, which in the name of authority eliminated liberty. In both cases the root of error lies in a defection from supernatural truth, which left human reason unprotected, and from divine grace, which left the human will unassisted. When God is banished as the source and guide of complete human freedom, the individual or the State must take over the role of Liberator, and begin to usurp the place of the Holy Spirit in human life.

The evil of Totalitarianism is the far-from-unexpected reaction to the harm done public and private morality by Liberalism. It is another case of a cure worse than the disease. For in Liberalism we find a political order attempting to progress *without grace*; but in Totalitarianism we find a struggle for progress even *without nature*. The liberals' chief flaw was neglect of the New Law; the totalitarians' worse error is denial of the natural law.

Only the Christian conciliation of the rival demands of the State and the individual gives *both grace and nature* due emphasis, to harmonize authority and freedom. The New Law and the natural law together give men the fulness of liberty. Liberalism regards personal liberty in all its perfection as *innate and natural*; Totalitarianism considers it as *imposed and unnatural*; Christianity alone holds it to be *infused and supernatural*.

Both Liberalism and Totalitarianism are enslaving doctrines.

Liberalism plunges towards spiritual and temporal bondage by the road of individual error and personal unrestraint; Totalitarianism impels mankind in the same direction by public deception and wholesale intimidation of the entire people. The liberal's path to slavery is only less direct; it is not less sure than the totalitarian's. For the liberal opens the door wide for the enslavement of the intellect by giving error equal rights with the truth; he chains the will in the dungeon of its own self-centredness by attributing to its limited strength and damaged liberty the power of self-salvation. Making man his own lawgiver and his own redeemer, Liberalism deifies the individual, who thus becomes for himself the measure of all truth and his own *summum bonum*. By undermining authority's foundations, it frees the individual from the duty of subjection; at the same time it readies the way for enslavement of the State by private individuals or groups, whose abuse of freedom is climaxed by usurpation of public power.

The logical outcome of Liberalism is theory no longer. It is history.

A musty liberalism strove to create, without the Church or in opposition to her, a unity built on lay culture and secularized humanism. Here and there—at once the result of its destructive force and the hostile reaction to it—totalitarianism supplanted it. In a word, what was the net result after a little more than a century of those strivings without—and often against—the Church? *Human liberty buried*; forced organizations; a world which for brutality and barbarity for its achievement of destruction and ruin, but above all for its tragic disunity and insecurity has never known an equal.⁸¹⁴

If Liberalism is the application of Naturalism and Rationalism to the political order, the extreme reaction to it is characterized by what can well be termed Unnaturalism and Irrationalism.⁸¹⁵ Whatever respect false Liberalism had for human

⁸¹⁴ Pius XII *Christmas Message*, 1945 (Italics ours).

⁸¹⁵ Pius XII, in *Summi Pontificatus*, points out that in modern times "the drift toward chaos" includes "forgetfulness of the natural law itself . . . wherever incredulity, blind and proud of itself, has succeeded in excluding Christ from modern

nature, human dignity, and individual freedom, is completely missing from the illiberalism of the totalitarian philosophy. Whereas Liberalism laid the human mind open to slavery by giving error equal rights with truth, Totalitarianism enslaves the mind directly, with malice aforethought, by giving the truth no rights whatever. The totalitarian State, in practice as well as in principle, subjugates the intellect by deliberate fraud through every possible organ of education and information.³¹⁶ State control dominates and directs the curriculum from kindergarten to university. It regulates the flow of information through radio, press, and screen so as to permit the masses to know exactly what it desires them to know, and nothing more. Ruthless suppression is the lot of any person or institution which dares to challenge civil control of the mass-mind. In no sense of the term, either good or evil, is there freedom of thought in such a regime. Propaganda debases public opinion, fetters it, and the most careful kind of supervision checks any rash attempt to filter the truth into public channels of information.³¹⁷ Eventually there is substituted a complete government control for rational self-direction in the life of the citizens.

The slavery that fraud creates for the mind is accompanied by a real bondage for the will through force and fear. All the *hostes voluntarii*, State-planned ignorance, State-inspired fear, State-controlled violence, are used as influences to checkmate

life, especially from public life, and has undermined faith in God as well as faith in Christ."

³¹⁶ ". . . Another explanation for the rapid diffusion of the Communistic ideas now seeping into every nation, great and small, advanced and backward, so that no corner of the earth is free from them . . . is to be found in a propaganda so truly diabolical that the world has perhaps never witnessed its like before. It is directed from one common center. It is shrewdly adapted to the varying conditions of diverse peoples. It has at its disposal great financial resources, gigantic organizations, international congresses, and countless trained workers. It makes use of pamphlets and reviews, of cinema, theater and radio, of schools and even universities. Little by little it penetrates into all classes of the people and even reaches the better-minded groups of the community, with the result that few are aware of the poison which increasingly pervades their minds and hearts." Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris*.

³¹⁷ Cf. L. Sturzo, "Totalitarianism and the Dignity of Man," in *Democracy: Should It Survive*, pp. 36, 39.

revolt at its source in the free human will. Liberalism at least would leave the individual will absolutely free, theoretically at any rate; each man is left as a law unto himself. But Statism so dehumanizes and brutalizes the human mind and heart that it leaves no one individual free except the dictator who dominates every life without check or balance. As the personification of the State who incarnates in himself its absolute autonomy, he alone has liberty to do precisely as he wills with all he controls. And through falsehood and violence the enslaved masses are moved in whatever direction he determines.

Liberalism deified the individual and his liberty, to such an extent that in some instances at least, the liberal State became the slave of powerful private interests.³¹⁸ But Totalitarianism defies the State and make the individual a slave in the fullest sense of that term, an animate tool, the *instrumentum animatum* described by Aristotle. For the totalitarian State "tends to attribute to itself that absolute autonomy which belongs exclusively to the Supreme Maker. It puts itself in the place of the Almighty and elevates the State or group into the last end of life, the supreme criterion of the moral and juridical order, and therefore forbids every appeal to the principles of natural reason and of the Christian conscience."³¹⁹

Without supernatural assistance every State faces the impossible task of creating the dispositions, intellectual and moral, for the proper use of whatever freedom the citizens may possess. In the totalitarian system of our day we have an object lesson in what happens to a regime where Christian freedom is openly or insidiously uprooted. In the absolute State the government

³¹⁸ Cf. Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*: "You assuredly know . . . the ultimate consequences of this Individualistic spirit in economic affairs. Free competition has killed itself. Economic domination has taken the place of untrammelled trade.

"Unbridled ambition for domination has succeeded the desire for gain. . . . Furthermore, the intermingling and scandalous confusing of the duties and offices of civil authority and of economics have produced crying evils and have gone so far as to degrade the majesty of the state. The state which should be the supreme arbiter, ruling in kingly fashion far above all party contention, intent only upon justice and the common good, has become instead *a slave, bound over to the service of human passion and greed.*" (Italics ours).

³¹⁹ *Summi Pontificatus*.

takes the place of God, taking possession of the minds and hearts of the people.

For the most characteristic feature of the totalitarian system . . . is its claim to control men's minds as well as their bodies, and in order to enforce this claim it mobilizes all the resources of the new black arts of mass suggestion and propaganda. It wages war not only by military and economic means, but by spiritual weapons that are directed against the mind and will of the peoples who oppose it—and not of them alone, but of all peoples whose sympathies may affect the issue of the struggle; that is to say, every people in the world.³²⁰

Thus the totalitarian State becomes in actuality a diabolical parody of the divine plan for the liberation of men, a well-plotted travesty of "the absolute order of beings and ends."³²¹ Having usurped God's place as the last end of the citizen, the State becomes also man's first mover. Established as the first efficient cause of all law and civil order, it culminates its blasphemy by attempting to assume in all human affairs the role which belongs to the Holy Spirit, for whose indwelling in the hearts of the just it would substitute an all-pervading influence and interference in the minutest details of everyday life.

Under the totalitarian system the divinized State becomes the measure of "truth" and the creator of "virtue." For it possesses Satanic substitutes for divine revelation and grace in the deceit of its incessant propaganda and in the coercive power of its omnipresent police. Its "truth" is a variable like the laws which the caprice of the dictator promulgates; the "virtue" of its citizens is a veneer kept fresh by fear and regimentation. Thus it imposes, restricting or extending at will, a participation of what it dares to term "freedom" upon a servile population.³²² Compulsion takes the place of a volun-

³²⁰ Dawson, *The Judgment of the Nations*, p. 16.

³²¹ Cf. Pius XII, *Christmas Message*, 1944.

³²² Cf. the description by J. B. McAllister, of Fichte's idea of freedom in "The Influence of Immanuel Kant's Concept of Liberty," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XVI (1940), 49.

tariness which only nature and grace in cooperation can bring to the observance of law.

The "ersatz" freedom doled out by this fictitious divinity is channeled through a profane messiah who incarnates absolutism. He is supreme teacher, ruler, and priest of the materialist cult of the State. From cradle to grave the citizen is forced to deem him the impeccable, infallible model and director of public and private life.

The absolutisms of modern times are the *reductio ad absurdum* of the original folly of spurning the supernatural order and Christ's mediatorship between God and men. Men are now to receive, in place of the New Law and its infused freedom of the spirit, a law and liberty whose origin and aim are purely external. They must live by a law which is in no way supernatural; not even natural, at times; not instilled in the mind and heart. What "freedom" they may possess is in no sense interior. The observance of law is far less a choice than a predetermined result of coercion and fear. Thus, from the supernatural principle *Ubi Spiritus, ibi libertas* mankind drifts downwards to the unnatural, irrational *Ubi Status, ibi libertas*. And just as the Holy Spirit penetrates all of the just man's life and activity to effect his full liberty, so the State, in its attempt to maintain its role as pseudo-deity, stretches its influence deeper into men's most intimate and sacred concerns to create its own spurious brand of "liberty."

In this deceitful parody of the true divine order there is a perverse testimony to man's need of God, Christ, and Christian liberty. Counterfeits must be created in any social order which repudiates the supernatural essentials. Especially is this true among men whose traditional ways of thought are Christian, no matter how secularized the concepts have become. The totalitarian exploitation of Christian ideals is proof of the power they possess to attract the mind and the heart of man.³²³

³²³ Note the warning of Pius XI (Mit brennender Sorge) to the Church in Germany concerning Nazi "looting of the sanctuary": "You must be especially alert . . . when fundamental religious conceptions are robbed of their intrinsic content and made to mean something else in a profane sense. . . . If they do not

Even Communism, most outspokenly anti-Christian of the totalitarian systems, appeals to the ideals of liberty and brotherhood to win adherents. For modern man can be enslaved only in the name of liberty. No such pretext was needed before Christianity to camouflage slave ideologies. The new approach to the spread of tyranny is a witness to the effectiveness of Christian teaching, and in its way, a compliment to Christianity. The modern despot must "irrationalize" a *Christian* mind and demoralize a *Christian* will, before he can enslave.³²⁴

The slavery of paganism differed from modern servitude in being primarily external; there was no effort to win internal consent, principally because it was unnecessary. But today the master must aim at an internal assent to the external bondage. He must win that approval by creating chains for the mind and the heart; he must make the ex-Christian or post-Christian man desire the despiritualization and brutalization the absolute State produces in its victims. Only such derangement can today insure the success of a servile order.

C. The Christian Solution

A well-instructed, intelligent people is vital to representative government. The democratic mind must be free from error above all on essential matters like the rights and obligations of the individual and the family, and the nature and purpose of civil society. To be really free, the citizen must be capable

want to be Christians, at least they should forego enriching the vocabulary of their unbelief from the Christian treasure of ideas."

³²⁴ "All really intelligent communists know that success for them depends finally on their being able to alter radically the nature of Western man. Communism being a garment that does not fit him, they will cut him to fit the garment. . . . They have the good sense to recognize and attack fiercely what is their major enemy: the chief tradition of our society: that Christian Faith which, above all else, has determined the kind of man who is most characteristic of our society. They know well that whoever would make a new kind of man must change the accepted purpose of human life, must fashion man toward a different end; must give him, that is, a new religion. That they seek to do, and were they to succeed in effacing the Christian tradition with their faith of Godless materialism they could undoubtedly produce the kind of human being who would fit their chosen pattern of social life." R. Hoffman, *The Will to Freedom* (New York, 1936), p. 45.

of more than prattle about human dignity and the rights of man; he must know and value the true bases of his dignity and his rights, which are founded on what Pius XII repeatedly terms "the absolute order of beings and purposes." That order is anterior to any regime, and no government can be just which is out of harmony with it. "Since they are established on this one identical foundation, the person, the State and the Government, with their respective rights, are so united that they stand or fall together. . . . No form of State can avoid taking cognizance of this intimate and indissoluble connection between itself and the divine order—least of all a democracy."³²⁵

The only firm intellectual support for a democracy is the truth of the Christian revelation, without which "human reason is left without its greatest protection and illumination; the very notion is easily lost of the end for which God created human society."³²⁶ There will be no soundness and certainty in the principles of any popular government which ignores or outlaws the Gospel.³²⁷

Without the liberating truth of Christian teaching the

³²⁵ *Christmas Message*, 1944.

³²⁶ Leo XIII, *Tametsi*.

³²⁷ There is a notable emphasis on the need of the Gospel and of Christian faith in Pius XII's 1944 message on the nature of democracy. Nowhere do we find the Holy Father conceding to reason sufficient resources to establish and maintain full democracy, except when assisted by the directives and safeguards of divine revelation. Note, e.g., the following: ". . . that absolute order, as right reason and particularly our Christian faith testify, cannot have any other origin than a personal God, our Creator . . ."; a sound democracy, based on the immutable principles of the natural law and *revealed truth*, will resolutely turn its back on such corruption as gives to the State legislature an unchecked and unlimited power; "the absolute order set up by the Creator . . . *set forth in a new light by the Gospel revelation*"; "We are anxious . . . to point out along what lines a democracy befitting human dignity can secure happy results in harmony with the law of nature and *with the designs of God as manifested in revelation*"; "Thank God, one may believe the time has passed when the claim that moral and *Gospel principles* should guide the life of States and peoples was disdainfully thrust aside as unreal." (Italics ours).

This recurrent stress on the indispensability of the Gospel for the guidance of the State can be found in the pronouncements of all the Pontiffs of recent years.

citizens of modern States become the masses, "inert of themselves . . . and moved from outside . . . an easy plaything in the hands of anyone who seeks to exploit their instincts and impressions . . . ready to follow, in turn, today this flag, tomorrow another . . . reduced to the minimum status of a mere machine."³²⁸ It is no long step from the spiritual servitude of error to political oppression and enslavement.

But citizens who believe in Christ's teaching are sure of themselves. They know the limits of their liberty and the restraints on authority. They are not "children, tossed to and fro and carried about by every wind of doctrine."³²⁹ They are men, men of free minds, intellectually fitted in the best possible way for democratic citizenship. In their faith they have the principles whereby to judge to judge the legitimacy of whatever may be required of them. If the people of a democracy are men "with full freedom to set forth their own views of the duties and sacrifices imposed upon them," men who "will not be compelled to obey without being heard,"³³⁰ Christians are well equipped. The teachings they accept place them "in the position to hold their own opinions, to voice them, and make them effective in promoting their general welfare."³³¹

Democratic liberties demand in the individual citizen a high degree of self-mastery if they are not to be misused. The moral tone of a free people must be exemplary if their freedom is to survive: that is a truism of political theory as well as of Christian theology.³³² The practical problem of representative government is how to create this needed self-discipline in the citizens. Education can only begin the work; it cannot complete

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ Ephesians 4: 14.

³³⁰ Pius XII, *Christmas Message*, 1944.

³³¹ *Ibid.*

³³² "Social righteousness depends upon individual morality. . . . There is no such thing as collective virtue which can be practiced by a community whose individual members do not possess it in any manner or degree. For this very reason, the attempt to develop the qualities of citizenship without regard for personal virtue, or to make civic utility the one standard of moral excellence, is doomed to failure. Integrity of life in each citizen is the only sure guarantee of worthy citizenship. . . ." Bishops' Pastoral of 1919, in Guilday, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

it, no matter how expert and full the instruction may be, or how ample and effective the educational facilities. Legislation cannot do it, though it may promote self-control if there is strict enforcement of the law.

But democratic self-mastery will not really exist in citizens whose main motive for abstaining from evil is fear of sanctions. Excessive legislation, moreover, tends to defeat the whole aim of a regime whose chief features are a maximum of government restraint and interference. When the force of police power becomes the *chief* instrument of the State, democracy has disappeared. For the whole theory of democratic institutions rests on the assumption that the ordinary citizen can be trusted with freedom; that the majority of the people share a sense of responsibility and a reverence for the rights of others which will curb misuse of their liberties.

If education and legislation can do little more than coerce in order to engender the democratic spirit of willing cooperation for the common good, what is there capable of producing such a spirit? In view of the deficiencies of all the natural moral resources of society, it is evident that there can be no durability to democracy anywhere without the life-giving and life-sustaining influence of Christian liberty in the body politic. Only the Christian freedom of the human will by charity (or the supernatural "freedom of autonomy," to use Maritain's term) can protect democracy from ruinous abuse of external liberties and preserve civil and political freedom.³³³

The self-mastery demanded of a free people³³⁴ will not be

³³³ "Wherever prevails a religion other than ours, slavery is the rule and wherever that religion is weakened, the nation becomes, in exact proportion, less jealous of the general liberty. . . . Government alone cannot govern; it requires either slavery, which diminishes the number of wills operative within the State, or divine energy, which, by a kind of spiritual grafting process, destroys the natural violence of those wills and enables them to act together without harming each other." J. DeMaistre, *Du Pape*, III, c. 2, quoted by Maritain, *Ransoming the Time* (New York, 1941), p. 31.

³³⁴ "Freedom cannot be saved except by actually displaying the self-restraint, self-control and self-sacrifice which are needed to make freedom socially tolerable. We must demonstrate in the present what our forebears demonstrated in the past—

had without grace and charity. As a rule men will fail not only interiorly but outwardly to live according to the natural law without special divine assistance. Once a man is in mortal sin, he will sooner or later fall again unless he is blessed with the gift of habitual grace. By every abuse of free choice he will injure himself at least. This in itself is already a loss to the State, which can thrive only through the virtue of its citizens. What is more, he is very likely to harm others also, in one way or another, by the scandal of his evil example at least, if not by deliberate violation of the social virtue of justice. Such a man is only a danger to the State until his evil will is interiorly rectified. That rectification the State cannot accomplish. It can produce literate, even highly-educated citizens; or men whose deportment is legally irreproachable. But good men it cannot of itself bring into being. Men of good will are a divine achievement.

Until his human will is freed by the supernatural infusion of the life of grace and charity, the citizen, no matter how free externally, is spiritually a slave whose life must be orientated from evil self-love towards justice by fear. For, as St. Thomas says, "by sinning a man . . . falls in some fashion into the servitude of beasts."³²⁵ This is a bondage from which neither the State nor the individual can release the soul. If that freedom is divinely given, it is Christian freedom; and the State thus received from God in this member of society an additional safeguard of the common good.

Though it is true that there are degrees in this hidden spiritual slavery and every sinner does not attack the common welfare directly in his social relations by scandalous or unjust activity,

that individual human freedom can gloriously serve mankind. Education in this country has largely broken with the great teachings of the moral law and our people have more and more come to assume that a little group of officeholders decide on what is right and spell it out in statute law, and that, as long as they do not violate such manmade laws, they are free to do whatever they please. Under these conditions freedom becomes licence and it rapidly evaporates." John Foster Dulles, in a commencement address reported in the *N. Y. Times*, June 20, 1947.

³²⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 64, a. 3, ad 2.

nevertheless, the citizen in the state of sin is a potential peril to external civil order, and to the extent that he is immersed in sinful living he is an actual liability rather than an asset to the State. The deeper he slips into sinful ways and the more external sins he commits, the more serious is the damage to the common good. Since the opportunities for external sin will be wider in a democracy than elsewhere, sin offers more of a threat to democratic institutions than to other social and political orders.

It has often been very justly observed, that of all forms of government, a democracy is that which demands the largest number of virtues, and consequently the largest measure of Christianity. We have never asserted that no civic or moral virtue can exist outside the Catholic religion; but this religion is better fitted than any other to teach the self-regarding and social virtues, to lift man above coarse sensuality and narrow selfishness.³³⁶

The just man alone can be trusted to be a law unto himself." Though the aim of every law and lawgiver is, or should be, to make men good not merely as citizens but as men,³³⁷ human legislation can only prepare for and promote such goodness; it cannot produce it. Only God can, and He does so through Christ and the Church.

The more leeway the State allows individual citizens over and above those liberties which are of natural right, the more need will there be of Christ and the Church to provide truth and grace for the people. If "the most urgent need of our time is the man who can control himself and his lusts, who is compassionate to his fellow men, who can see and seek for the eternal values of culture and society, and who deeply feels his unique responsibility in this universe,"³³⁸ then the most urgent need of our time is the truth and grace of Christ.

No man can be a doer of the word as well as a hearer without

³³⁶ Leon Garriguet, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

³³⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 92, a. 1.

³³⁸ P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, III (New York, 1937), p. 358. Sorokin adds, "this control is impossible without a system of absolute values." (p. 359).

divine help. And Christian teaching can do little for a State where God's grace is not used and sought. Here, it may be added, is the basic flaw in modern democracies, whose ideals, despite secularization, are fundamentally Christian: they aim at Christian purposes without Christian resources. Men cannot live a social life which accords with Christian norms without making use of Christian means. Without use of the Christian's tools—especially the Sacraments, the Mass, and persevering prayer—a Christian State cannot be fashioned. When for want of means the ideals of Christian life are seen to be unattainable in practice, abandonment of the ideals is inevitable, though lip-service may remain. No people can continue to live politically on a Christian plane, no matter how noble its intentions, without the Christian helps only God can give.

Only through grace can a free people remain free; where divine love is lacking, true liberty dies. Slavery of soul is the accompaniment of the self-love and sensual attachment to material goods which reign where charity is dethroned. That inner servitude is the first and longest stride in the direction of exterior bondage. And the surest symptom of rotting democracy is the increase of coercion; force and regimentation are the political eruption of moral decay in the citizens.

Thus every democracy has to choose between these alternatives: *grace or force*. If it embraces the first, depending for temporal success on seeking first the kingdom of God and His justice, it will live and grow; if the second, it must die. That is substantially what Pope Leo XIII told a group of French workers over fifty years ago:

If democracy is inspired with the teachings of reason enlightened by faith; . . . if in a word, democracy means to be Christian, it will give to your country a future of peace, prosperity and happiness. If, on the contrary, . . . misled by wild illusions, it gives itself up to claims destructive of the fundamental laws on which the whole civil order rests, the immediate effect will be, in regard to the working classes themselves, servitude, misery and ruin.³³⁹

³³⁹ Allocution, Oct. 8, 1898.

To the Catholics of another republic Pius XII wrote some forty years later:

Not with the conquest of material space does one approach to God . . . but under the guidance of Christ with the fullness of sincere faith, with unsullied conscience and upright will, with holy works, with the achievement and the employment of *that genuine liberty whose sacred rules are found proclaimed in the Gospel*. If, instead, the Commandments of God are spurned . . . the very basis upon which rests true civilization is shaken and naught is to be expected but ruins over which belated tears must be shed. How, in fact, can the public weal and the glory of civilized life have any guarantee of stability when right is subverted and virtue despised and decried? ³⁴⁰

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Modern democracy owes what is best in it to Christian inspiration. Is that debt of democracy to the Gospel so great that there is a necessary connection between the decline of representative government and the abandonment of Christian principles? Our analysis from a Catholic standpoint of one of democracy's cardinal elements, individual liberty, has tried to show that there must be in popular States a specifically Christian personal freedom or else democracy cannot survive, in a word, (1) the theology of Christian freedom and (2) its importance and necessity for the preservation of other lesser, external liberties in a democracy.

It has been made evident that the Christian liberty of divine grace is an inner spiritual freedom which alone enables its possessor to recognize his true worth and his real limitations; which alone can lead him to discipline and dominate his anti-social tendencies and spontaneously to follow the moral law. The Holy Spirit communicates it to the soul through Christ and His Church by imparting through grace and the infused virtues an habitual inclination to the observance of the New Law of perfect liberty. This infused freedom is the freedom of the sons of God, which can be stripped of its earthly imperfections only in the next life in the blessed plenitude of the

³⁴⁰ *Sertum Laetitiae*, to the Church in the United States. (Italics ours).

Vision of God. A closer and closer approximation to that fulness of liberty is attained here by growth in grace and the Christian virtues.

This inner supernatural liberty cannot exist among men without producing its effects in the social and political orders. For society must recognize the rights and duties of the free Christian soul, but it must also feel the external benefits that result from the infusion of the supernatural into the natural life of men. Thus, democratic self-government and personal liberty need the protection of Christian life and freedom. The only real assurance that external freedoms will not be abused and thus do harm to the community, comes from Christian truth and charity, the prime elements in Christian freedom. For only that liberty can guarantee that measure of individual responsibility and self-mastery required where government control is at a minimum. The history of Liberalism and Totalitarianism have given us concrete evidence that Christian liberty alone can protect and guarantee external freedoms.

The general conclusion from all that has said above can be summarized in no better way than in these words of Pius XII:

If the future is to belong to democracy, an essential part in that achievement will have to belong to the religion of Christ and to the Church. She is the mouthpiece of our Redeemer and the institution which carries on His mission of saving men. She teaches and defends supernatural truths and communicates to men the supernatural helps of grace in order to actuate the divinely established order of beings and ends which is the ultimate foundation and directive norm of every democracy.³⁴¹

The Christian liberty of which we have been treating in these pages is nothing more or less than the fruit of the supernatural truths and supernatural helps of grace which the Holy Father regards as essentials for democracy. Whatever we have said concerning Christian freedom and its necessity in our time is implicit in the Holy Father's statement.

There are, however, some other specific conclusions to be

³⁴¹ *Christmas Message, 1944.*

drawn: (1) Without the inward freedom of the grace of the New Law, popular governments will be driven more and more to the use of coercion in maintaining public order. Events have already given tragic point to a warning from Leo XIII, written some sixty years ago:

Upon the lapsing of Christian institutions and morality, the main foundation of human society must necessarily be uprooted. Force alone will remain to preserve public tranquillity and order; force, however, is very feeble when the bulwark of religion has been removed; and being more apt to beget slavery than obedience, it bears within itself the germs of ever-increasing troubles. The present century has encountered notable disasters, nor is it clear that some equally terrible are not impending.³⁴²

Pope Leo was a far more accurate prophet than he would have wished to be. He continues:

The very times in which we live are warning us to seek remedies there where alone they are to be found—namely, by reestablishing in the family circle and throughout the whole range of society the doctrines and practices of the Christian religion. In this lies the sole means of forestalling the dangers now threatening the world.³⁴³

The remedy offered is still available; it is still the *only* alternative to force. The urgency of the Christian alternative is yet more evident when force is seen to be impotent to fulfill the purpose for which it is invoked.³⁴⁴

A practical recognition of the need of divine aid for the

³⁴² *Sapientiae Christianae*.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ Cf. Leo XIII, *Diuturnum Illud*: "Rulers . . . think to coerce, by the severity of their punishment, those who disturb their governments. They are right to a certain extent, but yet should seriously consider that no power of punishment can be so great that it alone can preserve the State. For fear, as St. Thomas so admirably teaches, 'is a weak foundation; for those who are subdued by fear would, should an occasion arise in which they might hope for immunity, rise more eagerly against their rulers, in proportion to the previous extent of their restraint through fear.' And besides, 'from too great fear many fall into despair; and despair drives men to attempt boldly to gain what they desire.' That these things are so we see from experience. It is therefore necessary to seek a higher and more reliable reason for obedience, and to say explicitly that legal severity cannot be efficacious unless men are led on by duty, and moved by the salutary fear of God."

State is essential to correct political theory. The clearest example of the incapacity of human authority and purely human means to secure civil happiness is to be found in the history of the Jewish race before Christ. Surely if any society could have endured of itself by reason of the perfection of its constitution and organization, this theocracy could have done so. Its form was divinely revealed. The Chosen People had only to fit themselves into the divine pattern for their social, political, and economic life. Yet the system failed, because the Law, in which the nation put its trust, gave them no power to fulfill its precepts.

The history of Israel is manifest proof that no regime can survive without virtue. "As anyone can see who reads carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common condition of the people prospered under the Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law, they were overtaken by many calamities."³⁴⁵ And that prosperity was due more to grace than to the Old Law, which could not be borne except with divine helps it did not confer.³⁴⁶

Israel's history contains a profound lesson for democracy. If this State, whose charter was framed by divine wisdom, if such a regime as this did not survive but rather fell into the most abject slavery because of sin, what fate awaits any government whose constitution, no matter how wise and just, is only human, and whose resources are only human because it ignores the need of divine help? St. Thomas was pointed out the salutary character of this lesson, which is for nations as well as individuals:

God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give such a Law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find themselves to be sinners, and being humbled, might have recourse to the help of grace.³⁴⁷

(2) It follows that the freedom of the human soul must be the

³⁴⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 99, a. 6, ad 3.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 98, a. 1, ad 3.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 98, a. 2, ad 3.

chief interest of a democratic regime; without that liberty external liberties must be a liability rather than an asset to the commonwealth. That aim of government—liberation of the mind and the heart—is implied in the very purpose nature has assigned to the State, that is, the promotion of the good life, or the life of virtue, among the citizens. Virtue is the guarantee and guardian of interior liberty; it is likewise the only effective source of true economic, social, and political freedom.

In the concrete this means that modern democracy must cease to be neutral concerning religion, and begin actively to foster the life of the spirit in every way possible. The State can, it is true, act in a neutral manner toward particular religions, in order to avoid greater evils.³⁴⁸ But it cannot be indifferent to the virtue of its citizens, and the practice of religion is essential to virtuous living. Consequently, even at the risk of alienating irreligious and atheistic elements in the populations, democracy must abandon secularism and encourage religious activity by every legitimate means. For to ignore religion in education, politics, commerce, or in any other phase of public life is to concede victory no less to the enemies of the State than to the enemies of the Creator.

Among the enemies of freedom must be reckoned not only the domestic evil of sin but also our ancient adversary the devil. Since the fall of the race, deliverance from his tyranny has always been the desperate need of mankind. Collectively as well as individually men become the instruments of the devil unless they are rescued by divine grace.³⁴⁹ An intellectual creature who possesses by nature powers far superior to man's, he can dominate the whole earth to any extent God may permit. Were it not for the restraint to which he is subjected (even he does not evade the inescapable subordination of all things to the Providence of God), all mankind would be phy-

³⁴⁸ "The Church . . . does . . . not condemn those rulers who for the sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, tolerate in practice that these various forms of religion have a place in the State." Leo XIII, *Immortale Dei*.

³⁴⁹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 7; a. 8.

sically, and to some degree even morally, at his mercy—and having no charity, he has no mercy.

Not only the person but the family and the State as well will serve diabolical ends to the extent that they are not delivered by Christ from oppression by his evil power. Without grace and other spiritual aid, men must of necessity be bested in a most unequal struggle.³⁵⁰

Such aid, however, is not likely to be forthcoming in abundance to any society which will not invoke it. When an individual or a group ignore or deny the existence of malevolent spiritual powers, the devil can tyrannize, unsuspected, over their activity. It has been very justly said that “the Devil’s cleverest wile is to convince us that he does not exist.”³⁵¹ Communities which are materialistic, either in principle or in practice, must live unguarded from their greatest, invisible enemy. As persons become slaves in the tempter’s service by their sins, so also whole societies may easily become his tools when they ignore their God, and, perhaps even as an official policy, refuse to serve Him.³⁵²

The invisibility of the devil’s activity and his subtlety lead men too easily to discount his influence and interference in human affairs. With regard to the age-old efforts of the human race for wider freedom, it is important to note that Satan always baits his snares for men with a promise of liberty.³⁵³ With the same deceit he beguiles men from God through human

³⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 114, a. 1, ad 2.

³⁵¹ Baudelaire, quoted by de Rougement, *Devil’s Share*, p. 17.

³⁵² In this connection, it is noteworthy that Leo XIII, in 1888, treating of false Liberalism, spoke of its adherents as follows “in the footsteps of Lucifer” who “adopt as their own his rebellious cry, ‘I will not serve.’ For true liberty they consequently substitute what is sheer and most foolish licence.” *Libertas*.

Pius XI also, in 1937, used similar language concerning the antithesis of Liberalism when he termed Communism an evil to be conquered only by prayer and fasting like the demon in Matthew 7: 20; labelled its propaganda “truly diabolical”; called the battle of our times one “joined by the powers of darkness against the very idea of divinity”; and declared that the evil is “at its origin primarily an evil of the spiritual order” whence “the monstrous emanations of the Communistic system flow with satanic logic.” *Divini Redemptoris*.

³⁵³ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 7, corp.

agents, who will "promise . . . freedom, whereas they themselves are the slaves of corruption."³⁵⁴ Consequently, whenever freedom becomes a rallying cry, then especially must men beware of error and satanic craft. The democracy which, in its vigilance for the preservation of liberty, takes no note of such a foe is already captive. (3) The State must, then, cease to regard secular education and human legislation as its fundamental safeguard, and seek deeper sources of national survival and progress. For the root of our social disorders belongs

. . . to the sphere of religious belief and moral convictions which have been perverted by the progressive alienation of the peoples from that unity of doctrine, faith, customs and morals which once was promoted by the trielless and beneficent work of the Church. If it is to have any effect, the re-education of mankind must be, above all things, spiritual and religious. Hence, it must proceed from Christ as from its indispensable foundation; must be actuated by justice and crowned by charity.³⁵⁵

Education and legislation do not create freedom; they can only create conditions to favor it. Truth and charity alone produce it. When spiritual and religious truth replace propaganda, and the vitality of charity replaces the mechanics of force in the State, freedom will prosper; in no other way is freedom of the spirit possible. Those nations which stress liberty as an ideal without insisting on the indispensability of truth and virtue as its conditions aim at a harvest they do not sow. There can be no fruits of freedom without deep roots in human souls.

Ultimately, the best hope for all just freedoms rests today in the souls of believers whose life of virtue infuses into the veins of society the freedom of the Spirit. They are the truest lovers of liberty because they seek it with the love of charity, and not for themselves only but for all men. They are the ablest spokesmen for liberty because they view it with the wisdom of faith. They are the bravest champions of liberty because their love of God is greater than fear of tyrants.

³⁵⁴ II Peter 2: 19.

³⁵⁵ Pius XII, *Summi Pontificatus*.

If Christians free in the liberty of divine grace do not rescue the world from slavery, there is no salvation for democracy. For in the mind of Christ divine truth and the charity of the New Law are not *a* solution of the problem of human liberty; they are *the* solution. There is no other. Freedom is not found in its fulness as something inborn in men, nor is it acquired; it is infused by divine power. Christ's New Law of love alone is the true principle of personal and of social freedom.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Love of God and The Cross of Jesus. By R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O. P.
(trans. by Sr. J. MARIE) St. Louis: Herder, 1951. Vol. II. Pp. 466
with index. \$6.00.

The scope of this new book of the eminent theologian R. Garrigou-Lagrange, is to show how the principles of mystical life have been laid down by St. Thomas, and how the writings of the great Doctor substantially agree with those of St. John of the Cross and with those of St. Theresa.

A whole chapter is dedicated to St. Alphonsus' thought on the relationship between the ascetical and the mystical life. Several further chapters deal with perfect and transforming union of the soul with God as considered in the Apostolic life, in Christ himself, in his Blessed Mother and in St. Joseph. The last chapter deals with the Holy sacrifice of Mass as the greatest of all means to attain the perfection of mystical life.

Mystical life, or life of perfect union with God, is prepared for by what are commonly called the passive purifications of the senses and of the soul. Active purification consists in the mortifications we voluntarily impose upon our own selves in order to make reparation for our sins, to correct our inordinate tendencies, and to prevent an overdevelopment of our natural activity.

Passive purification on the contrary is caused independently of our will by the events and circumstances of life, and especially by direct intervention of God, who allows the senses and the soul to be plunged into what St. John of the Cross calls the dark night.

Passive purification of the senses consists in a complete sensible aridity in prayer, sometimes accompanied by disgust for spiritual things (p. 10). This state is not due to sloth or negligence; it has a positive aspect, namely a strong desire for God and perfection, which is a sign of the profound working of God within the soul, and of its great progress during this period. This marks the beginning of infused contemplation. Grace starts to take on a new and purely spiritual form, superior to that of the senses and to discursive reasoning.

God then gives to the soul far more than he takes away from it. He especially gives it a more abundant fullness of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, those in particular of knowledge, fear, fortitude, understanding and piety. Knowledge makes the soul realize the gravity of sin and the nothingness of creatures. Filial fear of sinning gradually takes the place of servile fear of being punished, and makes the soul resist temptations against chastity and patience which often accompany this passive purification. Fortitude makes

it ardently desire to serve God in spite of dryness, temptations and every other possible difficulty. The gifts of understanding and of piety become principles of newly infused contemplation which takes the place of discursive meditation, nearly impossible to perform at this period (p. 22).

Difficulties in interior prayer arise because of the withdrawal of sensible graces, of the quasi-impossibility of meditating, and because of accompanying temptations against chastity and patience. Beginners may get the impression that they have been abandoned, and may turn back and retreat. The author shows how necessary it is at this stage to have recourse to a learned and experienced director. The soul must not be discouraged, but must make generous acts of faith, trust and love. Sensible fervor is lost, but substantial devotion greatly increases, and the will's readiness to serve God is left untouched. The illuminative way is dawning. They must remain in peace and quiet in prayer, only very occasionally have recourse to reasoning and ordinary meditation, and not desire any sensible consolation (p. 31).

The effect of passive purification of the senses is to make the soul no longer enjoy any taste or relish of a sensible kind. The soul begins to realize that it can do nothing of itself, that it is nothing. The gift of knowledge makes it realize the gravity of sin, and the contrasting and infinite greatness of God. "Then shall thy light rise up in darkness" (Is. 58. 10).

Thus faith is greatly strengthened, and also humility, hope and charity. This period marks the passage of the soul from affective to effective charity (p. 48), which strengthens its spirit of sacrifice, makes it triumph completely over its three enemies, the world, the flesh and the devil, and increases its love for its neighbor.

In relatively few souls the afflictions which are commonly associated with the passive purification of the senses take an accentuated form; in others they occur only in a tempered form. They usually consist in temptations against chastity and patience, to which are sometimes joined the loss of temporal goods, of fortune, of honors, and of too tender friendships; sometimes too, sickness is added to these trials.

Temptation is allowed that we may make more energetic acts of the virtues, even heroic acts, which deepen the virtues and obtain an immediate and proportionate increase of the infused virtues. Temptation is not useful in itself, as a means to an end, but only accidentally, as an occasion for more earnest prayer and more generous efforts. If the three signs of the night of the senses, mentioned below, are found in a strongly tempted soul, that soul is beyond doubt beginning to live a higher spiritual life. But to keep it humble, God may allow it not only to be tempted, but sometimes even to commit mortal sin (p. 59).

Temptations against patience consist in vexations, misfortunes, contradictions, and sometimes persecutions. To bear up under these trials demands

great endurance and constancy, and belongs to heroism. Patience makes us endure like Christians the sadness those trials cause, especially when they come from good people, such as friends, superiors, and those we have loved and helped.

It is however to be noted that in many instances, especially with souls not called to a purely contemplative life, these passive purgations are more hidden, and coincide with the ordinary sufferings and trials of the apostolic life (p. 72). Such souls encounter contradictions and crosses in almost everything they undertake; they are tempted by the world, calumniated and despised, abandoned and betrayed. The lives of many saints provide examples of this.

The passive purgation ordinarily takes place at the end of the purgative way, and is the normal transition to the illuminative way. That is why St. John of the Cross calls souls undergoing passive purgation of the senses, beginners. Between this night of the senses and that of the soul, there is generally a period of relative calm, in which dominate the gifts of counsel and of piety (p. 80), and which corresponds to the second phase of what St. Theresa calls the fourth mansion, and to the whole of the fifth.

The purification of the soul is an immediate preparation for the intimacy of divine union. After the night of the senses, the soul may spend a long time, even years, exercising itself in the way of proficients. It still has, however, many imperfections; it may be distracted at prayer, given to natural affections and pouring itself out on external things. It may still be impatient at times or too attached to spiritual goods or may sin by presumption, jealousy, secret ambition, intellectual pride, in one word by all the capital sins transposed into the spiritual life. Hence, a further purification is needed, that of the soul (p. 101).

In this state, the soul seems to lose whatever it had gained by the night of the senses, but in reality it is drawing nearer to God. The immense realization of its unworthiness and of God's holiness produces in the soul an agony even worse than death. It is strongly tempted against faith, hope and charity. The severity and length of this purgation depends on the degree of holiness to which the soul will later be raised.

It is a real purgatory on earth, not only because of its sufferings, but because, after this spiritual fire, the soul has no need to make expiation in the next life. The fullness of the gift of understanding takes the place of faith, and the soul is filled with a simple and obscure, but more penetrating, intuition of God (p. 115).

The spiritual afflictions of this second purgation must not be confused with sufferings in some way analogous to them but of a very different character. They must not be taken for morbid states, such as profound melancholia, neurasthenia, or psychasthenia, in other words for nervous exhaustion and its reverberations on moral life, which often develop into a

persecution mania. Nor are temptations of themselves a sign that the soul has entered into the night of the soul (p. 176). Sometimes it is even necessary to distinguish between passive purification sent as a trial, from that willed by God as a punishment for past sins (p. 179).

There are three signs that the soul is undergoing a real passive purification which is to lead it to a life of union with God. These signs are not always quite so clearly apparent in concrete reality as they are in treatises, but they are, however, very often recognizable.

The first sign is that the soul has no consciousness of having recently committed any materially grave sin and has on the other hand passed from a state of consolation or spiritual sweetness into aridity.

The second sign is a long-term avoidance of all fully deliberate sin, whether mortal or venial, together with disinterest in exterior things, an almost continual consciousness of the soul's own miseries, and an ardent desire for perfection.

The third sign is an almost continual contemplation of the divine goodness despite the soul's extreme aridity (p. 192).

These signs, if found together, clearly indicate that the soul is being drawn to a more intimate union with God.

Chapter XI is a theological explanation of the Indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul, and chapter XII is a comparison between the views of St. Alphonsus with the thought of St. Thomas and of St. John of the Cross on mystical life.

In chapter XIII, the author examines the nature of the apostolic life as being the fruit of the union of the purified soul with God. Some authors express the view that the apostolic soul must tend toward two principal and immediate ends, contemplation and action *ex aequo*. Others that the primary and principal end of an apostolic soul is action, although it must also tend toward some sort of contemplation as a means necessary to action.

But others, and this is the view of St. Thomas, maintain that the apostolic soul must tend primarily and principally to contemplation of God and to union with him, and secondarily to action as an effect of the apostle's contemplation and a means of disposing his hearers in their turn for contemplation and union with God.

The last six chapters provide sound spiritual reading for the soul engaged in passive purification. Christ as Priest is set as an example of zeal and apostolic life, Christ as King as an enticement to profound adoration and reparation, which should be the soul of interior life. The notion of human free-will and merit is examined as being compatible with God's special action on the soul in the higher phases of its interior life. Our Blessed Lady and St. Joseph are given as true examples of life of union and reparation. And finally, in chapter XIX, the Holy Sacrifice of Mass is dealt with as

being the most powerful means of living a life of union with God, united as we are through the Mass to the mystical Body of Christ.

This new work of Father Garrigou-Lagrange certainly deserves the effort of an attentive study. It contains nothing that a priest with charge of souls ought not to be thoroughly acquainted with. It will help him to unravel the difficulties with which he is bound to be faced in directing those souls whom God has called to a more perfect life and who have a right to expect from him guidance and enlightenment.

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Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951, 2 vols. Pp. 585, and 510.

The reprinting of Professor Paton's *Commentary* again makes available one of the finest of all Kantian studies, and the only true, detailed and complete commentary (Vaihinger's work is unfinished). Few are so well qualified for such a work as this author, whose works on Kant's moral philosophy are classics in their field, and it is rare to find one who can expose another's thought with the understanding, precision and lucidity of Paton. It is not an easy task to write a commentary to Kant's *Kritik*, but rather a very difficult one. There is the problem of a very complex doctrine, to which may be added the difficulty of a language and expression sometimes not merely ambiguous but, at times, simply misleading and equivocal. These difficulties are complicated by the important problem of the historical interpretation of the doctrine of Kant, on which there are many and varied theories. Nevertheless, Paton seems to have handled these problems with success, due to his adhering to a determination to write a commentary and just that, as well as to his own undoubted ability. Paton's work is not, and is not meant to be, a justification of Kant's doctrine any more than is it an attack on this teaching. The aim of these volumes is to explain in as faithful and intelligible a manner as possible the first half of the monumental *Kritik*.

It is impossible, and likewise needless, to try to give a full account of this work, for this would involve a complete exposition of the Kantian theory of knowledge. Instead it seems preferable to explain what was meant by saying that Paton's *Commentary* is a faithful and intelligible guide to Kant's thought. It is *faithful* inasmuch as the author explains the doctrine of Kant himself, and not the doctrine which might be derived, and has been

derived, from it. It is unnecessary to mention that the name "Kantian idealism" applies to a large number of different tendencies in interpreting Kant, all of which, as one might presume, claim to be the only proper understanding of the common master. It is not easy to abstract from these various interpretations—past and present—but Paton, as a Kantian scholar, knew them well enough to avoid their influence. His work is based directly on the text of the *Kritik*.

To this fidelity goes the credit for the excellent remarks on the nature of the critical problem according to Kant (Vol. I, chaps. II and III), on the principle of solution of this problem (Chap. XXXV, especially § 4-6), and on the importance of the "thing in itself" (*Ding an sich*) in the philosophy of Kant (chaps. LV-LVI). With regard to this latter point, it seems quite certain, in spite of some rather tendentious interpretations of several obscure passages, that Kant never questioned the existence of the thing-in-itself. He did not question it at the beginning of his work, for the very critical problem in his formulation (Are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?) supposes the existence of the thing-in-itself, or of transcendent reality, and this belief he never relinquished, so that Paton's words are quite correct: "In Kant's whole discussion of phenomena and noumena I can see no suggestion that he gave up for a moment his belief in things-in-themselves. . . . Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that without the presupposition of things-in-themselves—whether we regard it as justified or not—the whole of the Critical Philosophy falls to pieces" (II, pp. 461-462). The reason is simple: the belief in the existence or reality of things-in-themselves is the "presupposition both of common sense and of realism" (I, p. 70). The critical problem for Kant, as for all others, is whether or not "realistic" common sense knowledge is justifiable; it is the question of the relation of subject and object, the problem of the "transcendence of the reality" or the "immanence of the object." With regard to the thing-in-itself, Kant's problem "is whether the thing-in-itself can, or can not, be known" (I, p. 71). As a consequence of his Critique, Kant denies the cognoscibility but not the existence of the "ding an sich." In scholastic terms: the autonomy of the subject does not concern the "esse physicum" but the "esse obiektivum"—i.e. the spontaneity of the subject is affirmed in regard to the object *as such* and not in regard to the thing-in-itself (*res secundum esse physicum*). The "esse physicum" remains the great unknown, X. With the disappearance of the thing-in-itself, in the post-Kantian idealists, the critical problem also vanishes. It is important to see, as Paton points out, that the thing-in-itself must have its place at the very positing of the critical problem, for without it there is no such problem.

The explanatory remarks of Professor Paton on the "forms of intuition" are also very enlightening (chap. IV, § 5-6). Just as the question of the thing-in-itself is necessary at the posing of the critical problem, so this

matter of the forms of intuition must enter into a discussion of the *Kantian* solution to that problem. Kant formulated the difficulty thus: "How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?" Every attribution needs justification, but to justify the synthetic *a priori* judgment, one cannot appeal to the principle of identity (which justifies analytic judgments), nor to experience (justifying only synthetic *a posteriori* judgments). The critical problem then ends by being a search for this "third thing" which will justify synthetic *a priori* judgments. Kant finds this in the "possibility of experience," which comprehends all "the necessary conditions without which no experience is possible" (II, p. 90), that is, all the *a priori* elements required to perform the synthesis of the manifold at different degrees or levels, beginning with the *a priori* forms of sensibility (space and time) all the way up to the transcendental subject. The forms of sensibility, being the formal elements of receptivity of sense experience in its first synthesis, are the very "conditions of possibility" of further synthesis (unification in a higher degree, by pure concepts, etc.). For this reason, it is extremely important to determine exactly the meaning of the different expressions which Kant uses to denote these same *a priori* (pure) elements of sensibility. Paton's careful and painstaking analysis aids greatly in such an evaluation: e. g. determining the meaning of the "form of appearances," "form of sensibility," "form of intuition" or "pure intuition" (cf. I, pp. 101 ff.). These forms are only partially the "third thing" required by Kant, which is the possibility of experience embracing all the necessary conditions of an actual experience. It goes without saying that we are not here concerned with the truth of Kant's position, but it is to be emphasized that these and other points of Kantian doctrine must be clearly seen in their proper setting—it is for this that Paton is to be commended.

To Paton's desire to render the text *intelligible*, by careful analysis and patient comparison of parallel texts, is due the credit for many judicious and well-founded remarks on dubious and controversial points. On the basis of this strict scientific method, one may justifiably tend to accept Paton's opinions, even against such scholars as Professors H. A. Prichard and Kemp Smith. The few controversial remarks are closely related to the text, and it is to the author's credit that dispute never becomes an end in itself.

Any deficiencies seem to be due to the very nature of a commentary than to any other cause. A commentary, following the text closely, can hardly be fully synthetic, and thus there results some displacement of perspective in regard to the doctrine as a whole. So it happens, for example, that Kant's teaching on the "Transcendental Subject" loses some of its importance, from the synthetic standpoint, in Paton's work. Without this teaching, transcendental Idealism remains mutilated, if not completely unintelligible. The doctrine on the "transcendental subject" is not absent from this commentary, nor is it misunderstood by the author, but without a synthetic

resumé, the function of the transcendental subject might appear less important than it is for the understanding of Kantian idealism. However, little is left to be said on this point after the classical studies by R. Kroner (*Von Kant bis Hegel*, Tübingen, 1921) and P. Lachèze-Rey (*L'Idéalisme Kantien*). One might find Paton's mathematical information somewhat insufficient in dealing with Kant's treatment of mathematical judgments, but this remark ought not to detract from the solid value of Paton's *Commentary*.

This work is exact and extremely useful to anyone hoping to understand the thought of the philosopher of Königsberg. One may express the hope that it will have a well-deserved welcome, not only among Kantians, but also among scholastics, for it gives the latter less excuse for their notorious ignorance or misunderstanding of Kant's theory of knowledge.

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Cosmology; Elements of a Critique of the Sciences and of Cosmology. By FERNAND RENOIRTE, Sc. D., Ph. D.; translated by JAMES T. COFFEY, Ph. D., S. T. D.; New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1950. Pp. 267 with index. \$3.50.

The recent healthy reinterest of scholasticism in the relations between philosophy and the sciences has taken a twofold bent: (1) an attempt to integrate the sciences with cosmology and to investigate the problems proper to both; and (2) an attempt to define the proper material and formal objects of the sciences and of the philosophy of nature. The latter procedure is, of course, fundamentally necessary before any fruitful correlation can occur.

In order to afford a clue as to the proper procedure in any attempted correlation, Canon Fernand Renoirte, Sc. D., Ph. D., of Louvain University, has written the work: *Critique des Sciences et de Cosmologie*. The English title is: *Cosmology; Elements of a Critique of the Sciences and of Cosmology*. The importance of this translation of the title will be seen later.

This work, in keeping with the author's intent, is more an indication of the direction of definition and criticism, than a complete evaluation of the relations of the sciences to the philosophy of nature. Perhaps of prime importance in the work is that the author shows the necessarily progressive and schematic character of the logic of the sciences, as opposed to the analytically abstractive method necessary to any philosophical discipline.

To do this, Professor Renoirte divides his work into three sections: (1) an investigation and critique of some scientific problems; (2) a critique of the method and contents of the sciences; (3) an investigation and critique of the main problems in cosmology.

The *first section* begins with the outmoded concept, of a century ago, that chemistry was the science of essential properties and transformations of matter. The former point gave rise to the discovery of new elements. The latter problem, faced as it was with the fact of evidently preferential tendencies in the combinations of elements and transformations of compounds, gave rise to the definition of the elements by properties, and the attribution of characteristics to atoms and molecules. Weaknesses in classification by properties—such properties as isotopy, radiation, variations of weight in a constancy of mass (and *vice versa*)—led, in turn, to (1) the valancy theory, or classification by atomic weight; (2) classification by atomic number; (3) the attribution of definite particles and properties to an extremely complex atom; and (4) the suggested possibility that all atoms might be synthesis from hydrogen.

This section is not deep science. However, it is valuable insofar as it presents, clearly and interestingly, a good example of the logic of the sciences: how phenomena suggest answers, which, in turn, open up other problems.

The *second section*, on the other hand, is a critique of the method itself. It shows the importance of measurement, mathematical associations, and definition by instruments. It shows the necessity of schematic correlation and attribution of properties, which factor automatically differentiates the sciences from the intensive insight of the discipline of philosophy. This is the most valuable part of the work, because it demonstrates how philosophy and sciences must be different disciplines operating on different levels; definitely not two branches of the same science, each perfecting or weakening the other. It concludes with a consideration of laws as generalizations of facts, of theories as developments of a logical scheme.

The *third section* investigates and evaluates some of the problems in cosmology. The problems considered are mechanism, dynamism, and hylo-morphism. In each case, Dr. Renoirte gives the classical expressions, arguments, and refutations involved in these three explanations, and then criticizes them in the light of later evidence. Thus, his brief but pithy dismissal of mechanism is not only that it is based upon an outmoded science, but that it fails to explain differentiation. This is the classical refutation, but the author goes on to show that the evidence for it is very real, not to be overlooked. The dismissal of dynamism is likewise brief. Dynamism postulates points of non-passive activity. However, as Dr. Renoirte points out, these points must neither act on nothing nor on them-

selves. Consequently, they act upon one another, and, to the extent that they are acted upon, they are to that extent passive.

The composition of bodies is Canon Renoirte's valid proof for hylomorphism. He argues, and quite rightly, of course, that by the very fact that a material entity is limited, and limitable, it is composed, and consequently composed of matter and form. He hesitates over the usual expression of the proof from substantial change because he maintains that below the organic order, it is difficult to recognize substantial changes. That, of course, is true. Many of the things that Aristotle thought were substantial changes were not so. For substantial changes, the author would prefer to prove hylomorphism from the fact that material things do not exist necessarily, but rather, are "fluidly determined," consequently determinable. This is, we realize, only a variation on the Aristotelian proof, and it is the dynamic expression of composition. We may note here that it will be a comfort to the extremely science-minded, those whose acceptance of scholasticism rises or falls with the pronouncements of the scientists, that Dr. Renoirte, the scientist as well as the philosopher, almost takes for granted that hylomorphism is the only sound philosophical explanation for material composition and change.

This book is not particularly deep, nor is it intended to be so. It is not intended to exhaust the relationships between science and philosophy, but rather to point out the direction of such investigation. It is not a "philosophy of science," nor is it a textbook in cosmology. We have the author's own words for that: "The purpose of this study is not to give positive instruction; this is assumed to have been already acquired" (p. 1). For that reason, it is unfortunate that in English it is entitled *Cosmology*, and that the translator should give the indication, in his preface, that it is a textbook (cf. p. iii). Were it used as a textbook, instead of as a reference book, it could lead to the woeful conclusion, despite the author's protestations, that cosmology is elevated science. If it is used as it should be, as a critique, then it suggests a clear and adequate presentation of problems to be investigated in the relations between the physical sciences and the philosophy of nature.

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Karl Barth. By JEROME HAMER, O. P. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1949.
Pp. 297 with index. 165 B. fr.

While the importance of Karl Barth is waning, he still exercises a considerable influence on Protestant theology. Though he has formidable opponents among Protestant theologians, an understanding of his position

is necessary for a complete view of the theological scene today. The work of Jerome Hamer, O. P. should be most helpful for Catholic theologians, since he combines scrupulous care in presenting the Barthian position with illuminating criticisms from the Catholic viewpoint.

Most striking is the clarity with which the author has laid open the fundamentals of Barth's theology, which is primarily dogmatic. It is with the Barthian notion of "dogmatic" that Hamer begins his exposition.

Barth distinguishes between three great categories of theology (using the term in a very broad sense): the activities of believers within the Church; the diverse functions of the collectivity, which is the Church; theological science itself. This last is likewise threefold: biblical theology, practical theology, and dogmatic theology. The task assigned to dogmatic by Barth is to confront the Church's preaching of yesterday with the "Word of God" in order to prepare the Christian message that the Church is to proclaim tomorrow. Dogmatic theology, therefore, is situated between the preaching of the Church and the "Word of God." To an analysis of these notions, Fr. Hamer devotes most of his work.

The author feels that the key to Barthianism is the notion of the "Word of God"; chapters II-VII are devoted to its exposition and criticism. Barth was faced with two divergent Protestant positions on the "Word of God." The spiritualist or illuminist trend divorced the inner revelation of the Spirit of God to each individual soul from the Bible; the more fundamental Protestant position tended to identify the "Word of God" with the Bible. Barth refuses to choose either of these positions; he seeks an intermediary one. "*Aux présomptions de la lettre, il oppose la liberté de la Parole de Dieu et la souveraineté de l'Esprit. Au spiritualisme effréné il rappelle que Dieu s'est conditionné lui-même en donnant un témoignage de sa Parole dans le texte sacré*" (p. 24).

For Barth the "Word of God" is simply God, the second Person of the Blessed Trinity, Christ. This "Word of God" is all-powerfully creative, it is free, since it is identical with the act of God, it is God-Who-is-acting; lastly, it is actual, for the "Word" exists only while God speaks and man hears, and only in this situation does the "Word" exist, at least, for men.

There is no question of an enduring created effect that could be known as the "Word of God" in Barthianism; grace and revelation do not exist, they become. The divine action never produces an effect; it is an uncreated energy, which is applied momentarily and in a given instance. The "Word of God" *happens* to a man, it is never *given* him.

While Barth admits that Christ is divine, he insists that the humanity of Christ is in no way a revelation of the divine. "In history," says Barth, "Jesus Christ does not appear as specifically different from other religious founders . . . he is a typical rabbi from Nazareth." What is said of Christ is even more applicable to the Bible, the Church, preaching. Moreover, sin

has totally destroyed the image of God in man; there is no "point of insertion" for the supernatural in the nature of man.

The logical conclusion of the Barthian principles on the "Word of God" would be agnosticism; but this is not Barth's conclusion, for he insists that despite everything so far posited there is an authentic knowledge of God, although it is an indirect knowledge. Fr. Hamer has entitled his fifth chapter, "The Contact with the Word of God in Faith," and explains that no other expresses quite so precisely what Barth means by "knowledge," which falls under none of the categories of knowledge we are acquainted with. The author first recalls the opposition of Schleiermacher on this question, for it is in reaction against this influential Protestant theorist that Barth formulated his own position. Schleiermacher started the fad of the experimental basis for our knowledge of God. Barth will have none of it.

How, then, according to Barth, is God known? By faith. And what is faith? It is the occurrence (*événement, Ereignis*) of the "Word of God." Now we have previously seen that the occurrence of the Word is free and ever actual, it is an act of God Himself, it is a Divine Person—and it totally escapes man because of sin. Therefore, Barth's knowledge is no knowledge at all, or, to be more accurate, it is God knowing man at the instant of contact, which passes unheeded by man himself. Nevertheless, "faith" implies one other aspect, which is why the knowledge of God by faith is called indirect. For "faith" dictates a certain attitude of a man in expectation of this "occurrence of the Word of God," an attitude of prayer and waiting, joined with a real uncertainty that is never dissipated. This notion of faith, *fiducia*, as the author points out, is notably different from that of Luther and the other Reformers.

This position of Barth on the inaccessibility of the "Word of God" gives rise to a question about the value of the Bible. Fr. Hamer devotes the second part of his work to a thorough analysis of the Barthian attitude toward Sacred Scripture. His fundamental tenet is a logical consequence of his previous views—the letter of Sacred Scripture is totally opaque, revelation does not shine through it. The letter is only the occasion for the occurrence, the "intervention" of the Spirit. The sacred writers were inspired, but their works are not; their works become, as it were, re-inspired only when they are read, preached, understood by a new "coming" of the Holy Ghost. This is a literal interpretation of "the Spirit breatheth where He will." But why should this "occurrence" of the Spirit be connected with the Bible? Here Barth has no answer, except—"It is."

The third part of Hamer's work is devoted to the Ecclesiology of Barth. Chapter VIII gives an outline of the positions of Luther, Calvin, and Schleiermacher on the nature of the Church. Chapter IX is concerned with Barth's thought on the Church, which, though it is based on that of his predecessor's, has marked differences. The Church is not the assembly of

the predestined, for faith, since it is God's act and He is free, may be lost. Nevertheless, the Church is a visible society; according to Barth, the *fiducia* of the believer assures him *a priori* that the invisible Church realizes itself only within the social reality of a visible Church. What, then, of the multiplicity of the Churches? They are owing to our sins; yet it is the will of Christ that His Church be one and all His followers must seek for unity. Barth admits that the Congregationalist set-up best suits his idea of the visible Church.

The function of the Church is to preach the "Word of God." This preaching fits logically into its place in the Barthian system. It is twofold—oral and visible, sermon and sacrament. The preacher, like the believer, hopes that there will be an "occurrence" of the Spirit while he preaches or administers the sacrament.

The theologian also finds his place in the Church explained by Barth at this point. It is his task to judge the preaching of the Church in the light of the norm contained in Sacred Scripture in order to prepare the preaching of the future. Fr. Hamer, though he is not explicit on the point, leads one to the conclusion that the theologian is the supreme arbiter in the actual working out of the Church's mission. True, his role is supreme in a rather unimportant process, since the basic Barthian positions explained above have reduced the human activity to a mere occasionalism. In fact, this is Fr. Hamer's ultimate judgment on Barthianism: It is a system of theological occasionism (cf. p. 170).

Actually, the author's work is completed in Chapter XI, where he summarizes the fundamentals of Barthianism. However, he has happily added an excellent discussion of the sources of Barth's theology, especially, Kierkegaard, whom, strangely enough, the later Barth tends to disown. Fr. Hamer convincingly shows that Barth still owes much to Kierkegaard.

In a final chapter, the author gives a brief summary of the Catholic position on revelation and man's knowledge of God.

The work of Fr. Hamer has a value over and above the immediate aim of presenting Barthianism in its fundamental aspects. The author has most skillfully blended an objective analysis of Barth's thought with a criticism that flows naturally from that thought. At times, he has utilized the criticisms of E. Brunner; he constantly compares Barth with the early Reformers. Finally, he gives the Catholic viewpoint on all the important points of his analysis. In other words, Fr. Hamer has produced a work that might well serve as a model for other Catholic scholars in their presentation of the thought of those outside the Church.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Jesus Christ, His Life, His Teaching, and His Work. By F. PRAT, S. J.
(trans. by J. J. HEENAN, S. J.). Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co.,
1950. Vol. I—pp. 574 with index; Vol. II—pp. 570 with index. \$12.00.

In discussing any translated work, two questions come to mind: 1) Was the original worth translating? 2) Is it a worthy translation? For an answer to the first question we may turn confidently to the words of the great Fr. Lagrange, O. P., concerning the original work: "Elle se distingue . . . par une heureuse disposition du sujet, une information étendue, un exposé très clair des doctrines et des faits" (*Revue Biblique*, XLIII, p. 299). No Catholic exegete is likely to dispute seriously that opinion although he may, like Fr. Lagrange himself, not be in entire accord with all of Fr. Prat's interpretations.

The second of the proposed questions may also be answered with a hearty affirmative. This translation is as successful as was that of Riciotti's "Life of Christ" (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1948), and it adds another work of excellence concerning the Savior to a lengthening list.

Possibly, the usefulness of these volumes would be enhanced by the adoption of a few suggestions. Maps, such as could be adapted from the "Atlas Historique" of L. Tellier, S. J., would help the reader better visualize the journeys of our Lord. Bibliographies at the end of each chapter, as in Dr. Patrick Temple's delightful "Divine Pattern" (St. Louis: Herder, 1950), would be a boon to the average reader seeking information on further reading. Then too, if at all possible in these days of inflation, a cheaper edition would benefit the many who cannot afford the present price. Even for the latter, however, the present writer strongly recommends that they make the effort to obtain a copy for reading, for through it they will obtain a much clearer understanding of the Gospel story.

Dominations and Powers. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. Pp. 496 with index. \$4.50.

The most recent work to flow from the facile pen of George Santayana is a ponderous volume comprising three books of one hundred and fifteen essays or chapters. To entitle his work Santayana borrowed terms from Scriptural sources, but divorced them from their traditional meaning. This is a habit of Santayana's and one which contributes largely to his obscurity. As he employs the terms *Dominations and Powers* they are, he tells us, distinct morally, not physically, and relative to the persons or societies affected

by them. A thing, therefore, can be a Domination and a Power at the same time, dependent upon the different viewpoint of the persons experiencing it. Whatever is "fatal, frustrating and inconvenient" (p. 1), Santayana dubs a Domination, while a Power is something "neutral and favorable" (*ibid.*).

The sub-title of the work, *Reflections on Liberty, Society and Government*, appears to be more aptly chosen since the thread of unity knitting together the numerous essays is frail and loosely drawn. Reflections and imaginative musings over a period of more than thirty years are precisely what this effort is. Those who hoped to find in it suggestions for solving the weighty problems that beset the modern world will be sadly disappointed. Indeed, the book might even be described as a retrospect of Santayana's philosophy, compressed into literary miniatures of obscure beauty, any one of which might be lifted from the context without harm or hurt to either the part or the whole. *Dominations and Powers* is but another vehicle to reveal the forthright naturalism of its author and his utter devotion to Platonic essences. Santayana has not swerved in any respect from his original position as set forth in his earliest writings.

In the first book, *The Generative Order of Society*, Santayana reflects imaginatively on the naturalistic origin of society from chaos, and the evolution and growth of customs and religion. Herein he takes opportunity to re-introduce his notions of person, psyche, spirit, will and numerous others, all of which have a typical Santayana connotation. He also gives expression to some of his personal antagonisms toward clericalism and Protestantism. Government, he asserts, is but a modification of war and when it loses its ability to exercise force, it ceases to be government.

The *Militant Order of Society* discusses war, crime, propaganda and enterprise; all those social forces which give rise to conflict in society. In this book morality is defined as an economic discipline by which men transform the conditions of life to their own advantage. On the other hand, commerce is designated as the agent which imposes morality on men and changes industry from a fine art to a money making process.

In book three, *The Rational Order of Society*, Santayana considers the place of reason and the rational order, the nature and function of government, democracy and finally world order. Here he has an opportunity to express himself on a wide scale, and he does so magnificently. However, again we find him make rapier thrusts at those institutions toward which he entertains neither tolerance nor sympathy. He does draw a remarkable number of true conclusions of the sort to which any thinking man would willingly give his assent, for example, ". . . what is now called communism is more than militant, more than a doctrine, and a party bent on universal domination; it is a conspiracy. It is ferociously egotistical and claims authority for the primal will of a class, or rather a group of conspirators professing to be the leaders of that class" (p. 320).

In spite of the length of this work and the evident labor in bringing it to birth, one is forced to remark that Santayana has again fallen short of his promise as a philosopher. Nature has endowed him richly with the potentialities to become a fine, if not a great philosopher. But these potencies have never been realized in Santayana in spite of his long life and prolific pen. In childhood he learned the art of withdrawing into his imagination away from the grim realities of life and the hardships it entailed, to revel in illusion; in his adult life he has continued to indulge this habit: "To me from childhood up, the intuition that life is a dream has been familiar and congenial" (p. 7). All of Santayana's works hint at power, and suggest a wisdom that is never brought to light, and in this respect *Dominations and Powers* is no different from his earlier works.

Essay on Human Love. By JEAN GUITTON (trans. by MELVILLE CHANING-PEARCE). New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 254 with index. \$4.50.

This volume is one of the most remarkable and provocative of modern studies of human love and was written by the French theologian Jean Guittton as the result of his thoughts and experiences during five years of wartime captivity. The nature of human love, protesting against rational analysis, and the author's somewhat difficult style at times combine to produce rather puzzling passages, which do not, however, really detract from the general worth of the book.

The author seeks to present human love on a loftier level of generalization than is usually attained, and his main concern, it would seem, is with the relations of flesh and spirit, sexuality and love, and human and divine love.

After an introductory chapter on the problem of human love in general and on the advantages and disadvantages of the various "languages" used to describe it (poetic, ascetic-pastoral, erotic, and biological-psychiatric), Guittton divides his volumes generally into a section on the history of various conceptions of love, one on its manifestation and development, and finally, on the meaning of love. No strict method is followed, but psychological examination, rational analysis, theological comprehension, and human "intuition" and observation are all resorted to.

Three themes of love are discussed in the next chapter: the Platonic, in which by Eros, the person loved is but a means to spiritual ascent, detaching man from the world by ecstasy, in his desire for the Idea; The Biblical (*Song of Songs*) in which a main point is a true love for the other person, in which the "love of man and woman is not so very different from the love of God and man" (p. 25). Agape is here found in germ. Christian

love combines, corrects and elevates these two forms of love. Finally, there is the theme of Tristan—the romantic or “romanesque” love of passion, in which the sense of sin is lost, and the feeling of love, separated from its vital context, is exalted in itself in a “passionism.”

Then love is discussed as a disturbing element, in so far as it is united to sin. Christianity did not cause this fact, but sharpened human realization of it. An exaggerated dichotomy of flesh and spirit, in some way connected with St. Augustine, causes man to fluctuate between despair and license; while, on the other hand, modern man's analysis explains away all sin. The true problem here is that of pride and obedience, and a solution is only found in the proper subordination of flesh to spirit.

There follows the section on love itself: there is a discussion of the “incarnation” of spirit in flesh, and of man's tendency to dissociate love from sexuality and vice versa. Next comes a long treatment of the “mechanisms” of love: 1) a projection of what one lacks on another, so that the other “unifies and fulfils” the lover, 2) the reception from the other of an image of one's own perfection, enabling one to surpass self; the first involves self-love, the second transcends it. There is then given a fine description of “inversion”—the changing of love into hate, jealousy, etc. The “mechanisms” manifest the essence of love, though, in a way, making the essence dependent on them for its expression. True love is a gift, of what one is, and not of what one has, to another (p. 74), and analysis can go no further. Such a gift demands sacrifice, but one in which the self is “lost” only to re-find itself. There is a discussion of “exchange” in love, with God as the “third” term, and also of the child as the “third term.” This occasions some excellent remarks on the child's education (p. 84), the dangers of divorce, and other points. Generation can never be merely physical, and marriage must involve true love; sexuality places at the disposition of all the treasures of love. Sexuality is to love more or less as language is to thought. The next chapter treats of the development of love in three phases—the nuptial, the critical (after some years of married life), and that of old age.

The chapter on “Love as Oblation” deals with virginity and continence, seen as of no value if done only through fear of the flesh. Of importance is the author's insistence on the fact that continence does not equal castration—one living the life of virginity or continence does not lose the characteristics of masculinity or femininity. The role of the hormonal factors is stressed. Consecration to something higher is the element to be emphasized. The author adds some very apt remarks on the psychological weaknesses often found in celibates, but which weaknesses are not due to the state itself. There is a need for a true sublimation, in which the higher assumes the lower into its own life, and the lower, thus assumed, lends dynamism to the spirit. Instinct, merely repressed, can lead to psychic ills in which the

instinct continues to manifest itself, but under disguises. This point could well be the subject of serious reflexion by priests and religious. Finally, virginity is seen as an initiation into the mystical life, and here, the author with true insight, mentions the possible "overflow" of the higher activities into the lower, and discusses, with rare penetration, the relations of the physical and mental (pp. 143 ff.).

The book's final section deals with the "why" of love—Guitton wonders why it is that nature has "linked love to sex by such subtle bonds" (p. 155). Sexual reproduction assures both the permanence of the species and the variability of the individual. The all-pervading influences of human sexuality are contrasted with the restricted sexuality of the animal (pp. 163, 165 ff.) and sex is seen as having more than a merely generative function, for it involves the union of two human persons. The next pages deal with the upsetting of the natural balance between flesh and spirit, and there are illuminating remarks on the relations of "vitality to spirituality." The senses, in a fine phrase, are seen as the "blind messengers of the spirit" (p. 177). Stressing the dignity of sex and marriage, the author states that generative love leads to personal love, and these are elevated in Christian Agape in which self (the disordered self) must be renounced to give full play to grace (cf. p. 196).

The final chapter deals with the future. The author trusts that as hope is allied to love, modern man will find a solution to the particular problems of his age: the relation of liberty and love (p. 208), the manipulation of sex by science (p. 212), the new position of woman (esp. p. 230). Divine love (Agape) is to be inflamed with the fire of human love (Eros), and the latter will submit to and be assumed by the former.

While exception may be taken to some rhetorical exaggerations, and to several minor points, the author has made a real contribution to the appreciation of human love. The author's rather difficult French has been rendered into good, readable English.

Selectae et Breviores Philosophiae ac Theologiae Controversiae. By P. FRANCISCUS SPEDALIERI, S.J. Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1950. Pp. 122.

P. Spedalieri has collected in this volume articles on various subjects, most of which have appeared at different times in the *Gregorianum*. The first two, and the most interesting, deal with the Anselmian argument for the existence of God. The author wishes to show that the common interpretation of this argument is not correct, and that, if rightly understood, the argument is valid. He believes that the usual criticism of the argument—viz. that it implies an illegitimate passing from the ideal to the

real order—is unfounded, and he insists that the argument is based on a true judgment and does not proceed from a mere concept (p. 23), and that the “maximum cogitabile” implies a necessary relation to being (*esse*). Because this concept of the greatest being is truly understood (*intelligitur*), it must be understood as necessarily existing (pp. 23, 28, *passim*). He denies that St. Anselm ever considered the existence of God to be knowable in itself for man (*per se notum quoad nos*), and St. Thomas, due to his unawareness of the *Liber Apologeticus*, misunderstood the argumentation. The author stresses this, that once the “maximum cogitabile” is truly understood, and understood as existing, there is a true judgment, which is based on a knowledge of creatures (p. 30), and therefore, he says the necessity of the judgment arises from the object and not from the mind (p. 35).

The main point, as P. Spedalieri states, is the “ordo ad esse” in this judgment, and he bases his position on the conformity to reality of the truth of knowledge (*veritas cognitionis*). God is not made the immediate object of every judgment, but rather that being (*esse*) which is the object of the judgment, is, above all, proper to God (pp. 43-44); and “esse” is affirmed of God in a process somewhat similar to the “Quarta Via” in which the necessary existence of the “maximum cogitabile” is asserted immediately in virtue of the conformity to reality of the human intellect.

P. Spedalieri has shown that St. Anselm was aware of the distinction of “orders,” and of the difficulty of “ontologism.” The crux of the whole matter is in the determination of just exactly what is the judgment expressing the argument: is it synthetic or analytic? and what is the “esse” which is properly affirmed in the judgment? As the form of the judgment is the copula “est,” so that the value of the assertion depends on the “esse” in virtue of which it is made, it is unfortunate that the author has never really considered this matter. Nor has he given attention to the role of the judgment of existence in enabling a nominal definition to become a real one. He has not mentioned that simple apprehension can be expressed logically in the form of a judgment, but remains in the ideal order, until the logical copula is made a real one. This is to say that the problem is not solved by saying that St. Anselm expressed his argument in the form of a judgment, but in determining what sort of judgment is involved. The author does not demonstrate sufficiently that the “esse” affirmed in this argument is real being and not logical being.

The volume contains an article showing that St. Anselm, as reflected in the writing of Eadmer, held the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, though he did not wish to express his belief explicitly due to a lack of evidence of its revealed character.

The last two articles deal with the note of “apostolicity” as applied to the Church. The first seeks to correct what the author believes to be a

misunderstanding in the work of Gustav Thils, while the second examines P. deLubac's notion of apostolicity, and also criticizes that author's view on the development of dogma, pointing out its inconsistencies and lack of real theological foundation.

Triple City. By WM. J. GRACE. New York: Anno Domini Press, 1951.
Pp. 56.

Mr. Grace is ultramodernistic in his conception of poetry. He has neither meter nor rime in his poems, and gives free rein to his thought, fancy, and expression. As a result he is without clarity in his writing. Such verse is necessarily wearisome to the intelligent reader, who looks for an orderly and balanced development in what he reads. Nor will it have any chance of survival, for no person can possibly cherish a poem whose meaning he is unable to grasp even with much labor.

Due to this lack of clarity in Mr. Grace, we cannot make a just appraisal of his poetic powers. It is certain, however, that such lines as the following can nowise be called poetry:

And nobly he stands
In an intellectual blackout.
He is streamlined with unexploded bombshells . . .
Politics are out
The Daemon means final business.
His rigidity is publicized.
Briefly let us say that the man is dead.
The man is dead and a dog stares at him.
This is the photographic fact.

At times we also find a bizarre use of words. For example Mr. Grace says that the Divine Presence in the Eucharist is

Furiously alive
And
Curiously hid.

Other examples are as follows:

. . . in that communion
time will sleep in love, the *unravelling* of God.
. . . the engine, the hum of life
that deadens us to the *fire-wild, water-wild* God.
and *whispering* stray tints of the coming sun.
Love's universal *width*.

The *Introduction*, written by E. S. B. has to a high degree the same faults as the poems. This may be seen from the final paragraph:

These poems seem like a beginning, a beginning that will not spend itself, because they possess the power "to make all things new." Their sense of joy is deeper than the optimism of didactic verse. It is much more hidden and unapproachable, a joy within anguish, within rejection unbearable, and through the tears and heaviness of all things.

Which comes close to sheer nonsense.

Fils de Dieu par grâce. By S. I. Dockx, O.P. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1948. Pp. 147 with index. 80 fr.

One of the problems facing the modern Thomist is the problem of imitating commentators of St. Thomas' works like Cajetan or John of St. Thomas, rather than reading St. Thomas *through* the commentators. The commentators are apt masters inasmuch as they teach one to coordinate Thomistic texts. When one accepts the terminology of the commentator as though it were the scientific terminology of the Angelic Doctor himself, one risks the confusion of scientific theology and philosophy with dialectical responses to practical Renaissance difficulties. One risks the danger, too, of judging that the Thomistic commentators have exhausted all problems to be solved by the consideration of quasi-parallel passages in the works of the Angelic Doctor.

Many modern Thomists, recognizing the "Renaissance" character of much that is contained in the commonly recognized commentaries on St. Thomas, have imitated the procedure of the commentators rather than make slavish citations of the commentators. Among those who are outstanding in this regard are the Dominicans, Father Paul Philippe and Father Isnard Dockx, both of whom are eminent in the field of mystical theology. The present book shows the latter's devotion to learning the truth about the nature of supernatural contemplation. For his context, Father Dockx has chosen the traditional teaching about "spiritual adoptive sonship in relation to the heavenly inheritance" (p. 21). That this aspect of our spiritual adoption has been sacrificed to an overemphasis upon the juridical aspect is evidenced both by the predominance of casuistry and by the tremendous difficulty involved in an attempt to furnish scientific analyses about Christian contemplation.

What is this inheritance? How do we become the sons of God by spiritual adoption? Indeed, what is this spiritual adoption? To answer these questions, one must consider the problem about deification through grace—in general, in the state of heavenly beatitude, and as it is imitated here on earth. Father Dockx clarifies the second consideration by examining first how deification is initiated here on earth. This examination involves an investigation into the nature of mystical contemplation, wherein God is

attained by charity working through the gift of wisdom: "By reason of the finalization through the thing loved, the created will is transformed, as regards its power and its acts, into the object loved" (p. 96). That is why, in mystical contemplation, "the divine essence, attained in itself, is attained not as an intelligible form, but as the reality of love" (p. 99). Thus the heavenly inheritance consists in the fact that "God is possessed not only objectively as a specifying object, but really as substantial form, or, in better terms, as an immanent object, that is, as a substantial form which does not enter into composition with the ultimate disposition. Only such a possession makes us deiform, that is, in an objective sense, what enables us to have the form of God (*Dei forma*) in us really, as something belonging to us; or, in a subjective sense, what affords us *conformity* to God" (p. 103).

With this fundamental problem solved at least in most of its principles, the author logically goes on to consider "Our Deification and the Trinitarian Relations" and summarizes his thesis in the last chapter, entitled "Our Supernatural Filiation"—according to grace, according to charity, and according to the Holy Spirit.

In his investigation into the nature of mystical contemplation, Father Dockx tries to resolve a problem to which the famous theologians, Fathers Froget, Gardeil, and Maréchal have given apt attention. His correction of the opinions of Fathers Gardeil and Maréchal is the best commonly available to date, although his solution seems not to be in perfect accord with St. Thomas' teaching. In the mimeograph edition of his *De Vita et contemplatione mystica*, III (Rome: 1949-150), Father Paul Philippe notes that Father Dockx errs in holding that mystical contemplation has a greater analogy in comparison with sensitive cognition than in comparison with reflexive cognition. To support his contention, Father Philippe cites St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 4. We might add that the first part of the fourth chapter in Father Dockx' work lacks sufficient citation of sources regarding his teaching.

One should not conclude that the work of Father Dockx is not worthy of consideration. The defects in the work are of decidedly minor moment in comparison with the wealth of theological thought brought to bear upon the most difficult question of our spiritual adoptive sonship. One will do well to consult this work before attempting progress towards a definitive solution.

Plotinus' Search for the Truth. By JOSEPH KATZ. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1950. Pp. 115 with index. \$2.50.

Professor Katz to whom we already owe *The Philosophy of Plotinus. Representative Books from the Enneads* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), now presents a new volume on *Plotinus' Search for the Good*.

Dr. Katz was particularly well prepared and he successfully studies in these five chapters the following points: *The Preparation for Plotinus in Greek Philosophy*, *The Nature of Plotinus' "Mysticism," Levels of Reality*, *The Flight to the Alone*, *Science*, *Magic and Politics*.

This interesting little book will surely be received with pleasure by all scholars interested in the philosophy of Plotinus. The volume may be read throughout with the assurance that one is penetrating into the thought of Plotinus. The first chapter appeared to us to be very suggestive and instructive. The relations of Plotinus to Hellenism are not often studied, and Dr. Katz must be thanked for this essay.

As we have already noted elsewhere (*New Scholasticism*, 26 (1952), 120-121) we feel that the author belittles Plotinus' Mysticism. We would rather follow Raissa Maritain in her appreciation of Plotinus on that particular count (p. 18). We are not too much impressed by the statement given on page 17: "Undoubtedly the fear that such enthusiasm constitutes the core of Plotinus' work has deterred many a philosophic reader from further enquiry."

It is absolutely true that mystics speak "in terms of sense image": "Whenever they try to convey an intimation of the nature of such experience, they do best when they resort to the language of metaphor, that is, to speaking in terms of sense images." And this is true because our language is unfit to express these superior realities or the experience itself, and it proves nothing against the reality of the experience. The fact also that no special experience is usually assumed for Parmenide's motionless One is no presumption in the case of Plotinus. His description of the One is much more complete than that of Parmenides in his Poem of the Truth.

We admit that the negative theology of Plotinus is not without difficulties, but all theologians use the negative and positive theologies, and negative theology is of great importance in our knowledge of God, since we know much better what God is not, than what He is. This however does not hamper us from grasping His nature and His attributes. Plotinus' fault lies in the fact that God is so high above all things and above being that the doctrine of analogy loses much of its value.

In order to judge Plotinus' mysticism we must also take into account the religious trend of his time, as Emile Bréhier has done.

Notwithstanding this disagreement with Dr. Katz, it is only justice to congratulate the author on his book filled with thoughts and incentives to reflection on many a problem of the philosophy of Plotinus.

L'Habitus principe de simplicité et d'unité dans la vie spirituelle. By Dr. C. SCHARFF, O. E. S. A. Utrecht: N. V. Dekker & Van de Vegt, 1950. Pp. 202 with index. fl. 7.90.

In the detail of descriptions concerning the stages of the ascetical and mystical life, one can lose sight of the purpose and unity of ascetical and mystical theology. Moreover, the detailed description of these stages frequently entails lack of occasion and space to include a scientific analysis of what is being considered.

Dr. Scharff has furnished a strictly scientific analysis of the Christian life. Beginning with the metaphysical definitions of "unity" and "simplicity," he goes on to apply these definitions to show how virtue enables the Christian to imitate God's simplicity by a more or less perfect unity of order in operation. What makes the work most commendable is the strict logical order and the strict scientific analysis, both of which enable the author to solve even rather subtle difficulties.

This is especially true of his solution concerning the "simple goodness" of the supernatural moral virtues in contrast to the natural, acquired moral virtues (pp. 140-141). Having afforded an adequate definition of "simplicity" and an adequate analysis of the nature of the supernatural moral virtues, he logically concludes: "The moral virtues are true virtues in the sense that they make man simply good, and man is simply good when he is ordered to the ultimate aim of his life" (p. 140). Indicating that the acquired moral virtues grant an extrinsic facility to the infused by removing impediments, he goes on to show how each infused virtue contributes to this "simple goodness."

A glance at the bibliography suffices to bring out the fact that, although Dr. Scharff does not cite all the Doctors of the Church who have made contributions to his subject, yet he is acquainted with the common teaching. His procedure corroborates the traditional character of what he proposes for our acceptance.

Great Catholic Festivals. By J. L. MONKS, S.J. New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1951. Pp. 110 with index. \$2.50.

This book is one of the "Great Festivals Series," concerned with a popular explanation of the great religious celebrations of all faiths. The festivals here discussed are six in number: Christmas, Epiphany, Easter, Pentecost, Corpus Christi, and the Assumption. The author, a graduate of the Pontifical Oriental University in Rome, fulfills the purpose of the series by the simple clarity of his explanations and by his unobtrusive scholarship. He discusses with concise accuracy the origin and meaning of each feast and presents many colorful highlights on the customs, past and present, asso-

ciated with the celebration of these various festivals in various lands. This is a handy volume to which Catholics or non-Catholics seeking information on the subject may be referred with confidence.

Catholic Social Principles. By Rev. JOHN F. CRONIN, S.S., Ph.D. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1950. Pp. 83 with index. \$6.00.

In general, literature about the social teachings of the Church is now easily attainable. However, one can not so readily find a clear, precise statement of Catholic social principles as applied to specifically American problems. On this score alone, then, Father Cronin's work is of value because it is his express purpose to explain Catholic social principles in the light of American economic life. Throughout the volume he adheres closely to his objective and presents a well-balanced picture of the intricate and complicated workings of our social order.

Foregoing an historical development of the principles that should govern society, the author divides his work into three main sections: (1) the Christian Social Order; (2) Social Principles in Economic Life; (3) American Catholic Social Thought. Thus, there is a gradual development from general principles to areas of practical application. Each chapter is prefaced with a series of pertinent quotations from the social writing of Popes Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XV, Pius XI and Pius XII. This technique, which should be welcomed by students of the social order, reflects the painstaking efforts of the writer to stress, first of all, the official teaching of the Church; and to indicate, secondly, the Church's continued interest in and concern with social problems.

Briefly, the first division of the book includes a study of the relationship of the Church to the social problem, the place of man in the economic order, the attempts of false philosophies to gain the minds of men, and the ideal order visualized by successive Popes. Perhaps the most interesting of the subjects treated here is that which pertains to the "Ideal Social Order." In this part of his analysis Father Cronin describes the structure and functions of Industry Councils in American life and points out the manner in which subjects as wages, hours and working conditions might possibly be handled by such industry councils. Also considered is the ticklish problem of price fixing and controls as governed by industry councils (p. 237). Admittedly going beyond the general implications of the encyclicals here, the writer does not propose a complete plan for the guidance of these industry councils but rather intends to present subject matter for discussion and reflection among American businessmen.

Father Cronin's next step, after showing the Christian concept of good order in society, is to analyze social principles and their relationship to the

economic order. The focus here is narrowed to particular areas of capital, its rights and duties; the problems of labor; the concept of the living wage, seen especially in its moral aspects; the labor unions, with a special discussion of the worker's right and duty to organize; and the role of the Church in bringing about social reform. Again following a well-balanced plan, the author carefully notices differences of opinion that might be permissible in these areas of study and observes that, with more intense training of clergy and laity, the "flowering of the social apostolate" in the United States can be reasonably expected in the not too distant future (p. 596). Of special interest, also, is his presentation of the worker's duties in regard to unions and to the public and his analysis of the policies of the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. in regard to collective bargaining.

Up to this point in his work, Father Cronin faithfully and closely follows the Papal Encyclicals. In the third and final aspect of his study, however, he gives his own appraisal of the major schools of social thought that have appeared among American Catholics. Moreover, he makes it clear at the outset that he is to deal with trends that represent, in some instances, the formal teachings of the bishops, which are authoritative pronouncements; and, in other instances, the extreme views of individual authors who are only remotely associated with Catholic teachings. In the following order, he considers authoritative and influential interpretations of the social order as found in the statements of the American hierarchy and in the social theories of Monsignor John A. Ryan; the contributions of the Distributive and Co-operative Movements, though these are not, strictly speaking, "Catholic" movements; the philosophy behind the Catholic Rural Movement in America and the special problems that have given rise to this movement; the particular "approaches" of certain schools among Catholics; and, finally, a summation of the aims of the Church and a reference to the need for proper training of both clergy and laity, if the Church's social program is to flourish in America. From the point of view of the student who is not acquainted with the differences that might arise even among Catholic groups in regard to the proper approach to social problems and their alleviation, the chapter entitled: "Specialized Approaches by Catholics" is recommended.

For a difficult task done well and prudently Father Cronin merits our praise. With a good measure of success, he has "bridged the gap" between Christian social principles and their applications in everyday life. Following the mind of the Church, he seeks a revolutionary change in society, but a change brought about moderately, orderly, and gradually. Some readers will undoubtedly contest his observations concerning certain Catholic trends in the United States. Nonetheless, all will agree that the author has made a clear and straightforward declaration of the principles that should guide American Catholics in their roles as active, interested members of modern society.

Opera Theologica. By N. STENONIS. Copenhagen: Skt. Annae Skole, 1948.

Vol. I, pp. 526; Vol. II, pp. 584 with indexes and notes. \$20.00.

This is a second edition, made necessary by the destruction of the greatest part of the first when Copenhagen was bombed in 1943. It is a beautifully printed, carefully edited work in two large folio volumes. The *Opera philosophica Stenonis* have been edited by V. Maar in 1910; here we have at hand the many larger and smaller writings of this man on theological and religious problems. Niels Stenson was born in 1638; although his name is usually given as Steno, he wrote it himself Stenonis, a literal rendering of his Danish name. Raised a Protestant, he became a convert to the Faith during his stay in Italy at the court of Cosimo, Grandduke of Tuscany. At this time, he was already famous for his work in natural science, especially in anatomy; he is remembered in the older anatomical nomenclature by the ductus Stenonianus which he was the first to describe. He also wrote a famous work on the muscles of the body. It was the spectacle of an eucharistic procession, the faith of many people, some of whom he admired because of their intellectual and moral qualities which set him thinking on the problem of the true Christian faith. With the thoroughness characteristic of the scholar he began to study the writings of the Fathers and older theologians, for which the library at Florence offered a wonderful opportunity by its wealth in manuscripts and editions. Converted, he studied for the priesthood, was ordained and became finally Bishop and Apostolic Vicar at Hannover, later Auxiliary to the Bishop of Münster. A large part of his literary activity is devoted to the controversies between Catholics and Protestants; he also had many discussions with his opponents or such persons as endeavored to bring about a reunion of the Christian world; thus he was also in touch with Leibniz and his circle.

The works contained in these two volumes deal either with Stenonis' own conversion which he explains and justifies or with the polemics against various Protestant writers. Each work is introduced by a summary—in German, supplied by the editors, who also report on the originals used, the state of the text and other pertinent matters. These introductions give, incidentally, a good picture of these religious controversies. Stenonis' own writings compare favorably by their moderation, urbanity, and scholarly spirit with those of his opponents of whose writings many examples are given in the introductions. The author's main arguments are based on a study of the Fathers and attempt to convince others of the Catholicity of these works; he repeatedly points out that his opponents did not correctly understand the authorities they quote. The same holds for the use the Protestant writers made of certain passages in Bellarmine.

The second volume contains writings of a different kind. Some of them, written in fluent Italian, comprised as *Opere spirituali*, and others, with the

title *Opuscula*, in Latin, were written mostly for the general use of the author. Others are sermons, 45 in all. Of particular interest is a treatise of some fifty pages, entitled *Parochorum Hoc Age*, containing instructions and exhortations to the parish priests and obviously based on the experience Stenonis had gathered by his visitations in the diocese of Münster. From the points the author stresses one may gather what the state of the clergy was in these years and appreciate even more the achievements of the "Counter-Reformation."

This splendid publication is a most valuable contribution to our knowledge of the seventeenth century in Germany and, partly, also in Italy and makes us acquainted with a highly fascinating personality.

Christus' Plaats in S. Thomas' Moraalsysteem. By ALPH. VAN KOL, S. J.
I. Roermond: Maaseik, 1947. Pp. 143.

In this thesis for the theological faculty of the Jesuit Fathers in Maas-tricht, Father A. van Kol tries to meet the demand for placing the figure of Christ more in the center of the stage. To achieve this, he studies the Second Part of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, and he argues that we must not overlook this Part in our efforts for Christological renewal, especially because of its doctrine of the New Law and the Beatitudes.

In his opinion, however, St. Thomas himself was not quite successful, because "theology essentially must draw on the Christological aspect in all its speculations" (p. 36) and "St. Thomas did not succeed in thinking out his Christology to the end" (p. 39).

We believe that the author too easily supposes what he has to prove and that his argumentation has not been thought out to the end. The principle that the Christological aspect must be expressed in every single treatise, does not seem to us to hold good, for scientific analysis makes it necessary to treat the subject in parts. Construction has to start at the bottom. After the end of human activity has been determined—and this is the "gloria apud Patrem" for Christ as well as for us—this activity is reduced to its essence, elements, and source. The speculations on Christ do not constitute the foundation but the completion.

Misunderstanding on this point must probably be attributed among other things to the excessive splitting of the Second and the Third Parts. When we consider the Third Part as the crowning of the entire theology, including the Second Part (Morals), it becomes quite clear how central is the figure of the Saviour as seen by St. Thomas. The question as to how far part-treatises could have been illustrated with the example of Christ seems to us an accidental one. A scientific analysis is not primarily a devout meditation. When preaching we must indeed put Christ always and everywhere in the

center of the stage as the Mediator who leads us to the Father. Theology, however, is the science about God and His Mercy.

Notwithstanding our basic objections we commend this thesis as an honest attempt to explain a modern problem. It contains valuable data and observations which call for further study. The technical side of the book is well constructed.

The Philosophy of Evil. By PAUL SIWEK, S. J. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1951. Pp. 235 with index. \$3.50.

This volume is intended to give college students some appreciation of the philosophy of the problem of evil. After a brief historical introduction dealing chiefly with the early Greek philosophers, there is an explanation of evil as a privation of being. This is explained, above all, in the light of the immanent finality of beings—a concept which is applied in turn to organic and inorganic beings. Evil is seen as opposed not to all finality but to the intrinsic finality of a being. The author gives in separate chapters a discussion of the forms of evil found in the organic world, in the realm of plants, in that of animals and in man. In the discussion of plants, various theories (Psychovitalism, Neovitalism) are examined. This is followed by a section on the finality of evil, in which, again in separate chapters, the author points out the purposes served by evil with regard to each of the various classes of beings—plants undergo corruption to serve animals; animals feel pain to warn them of dangers, and in turn, serve man; evil has its purpose in man to remind him of his eternal destiny, etc. Evil is seen as reaching its apogee in man. The volume closes with a chapter each on Pessimism and Optimism. The former is reprinted from the *New Scholasticism* (XXII, 249-297, 417-439) and deals with Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. The latter treats especially Leibniz and Malebranche and discusses the question of the "most perfect" world.

For one acquainted with the Scholastic doctrine on evil, there is little new in this work; one's knowledge is extended materially (*quoad extensionem*) but not formally (*quoad comprehensionem*). One would wish to see a greater realization of evil as a necessary concomitant of created being and as contributory to the beauty and goodness of the universe. One would expect to find an examination of moral evil, and also of God's part in the causation of evil, instead of so lengthy a treatment of the immanent finality of plants. One may notice that on pp. 94, 95, the author seems to imply that the formal object of the human will is God, the Good in itself; there seems to be, that is, a confusion of the *bonum universale in essendo* (God) with the *bonum universale in informando* (*in subiciendo*—the metaphysical universal, the *ratio boni*). At least, there is a lack of clarity, for on p. 94,

it is stated that the "Good in itself" is God, and then, on p. 95, the formal object of the will is said to be the Good in itself (capitalized), without any explanation. On p. 136 it is stated that only the Good in Itself can determine man's free will, then: "But that good resides in the sphere of the ideal and man lives in the real world." Now, the Good in Itself is evidently God (and seen face to face—*clare visum*). But how does this good reside in the ideal world?

This volume may provide a suitable introduction to the problem of evil, though not a complete introduction. One may recommend rather the little volume of Th. Deman, O.P., *Le Mal et Dieu* (Paris, Aubier, 1943), as giving a much more satisfactory treatment of the subject as a whole.

With the recent appearance of the second volume of Sertillanges' study of the Problem of Evil (Part I, History, Part II, Theory, Paris, Aubier), a work characterized by the author's usual excellence in style and content, the volume of Siwek has become much less valuable.

Essai sur le Problème et les Conditions de la Sincérité. By RÉGIS JOLIVET.

Paris: E. Vitte, 1950. Pp. 200 with index.

The latest volume by P. Jolivet deals with the problem of self-knowledge and with the question of the communication with self and others which it demands. The author searches for a means of coming to an immediate, non-cognitive, non-conceptual appreciation of the innermost self; he seeks a method for "grasping" one's own subjectivity in that which formally constitutes it as such (p. 44). Such an appreciation is sincerity, and consists in an "identity in myself of the external and internal" (p. 184). Ordinary cognitive means ("la voie de connaissance"—p. 18, and *passim*), as well as introspective analysis, definition or "explanation" (pp. 24, 27, 28, *passim*) are ruled out. Knowledge is not the means, for it sets up an opposition of subject and the same subject as object, and thus escapes what is most truly self, the subjectivity in its individual concreteness as such (*reduplicative*). Sincerity is to be lived; it is a mode of existence, and it is in and through action and sentiment that one is to grasp ("s'éprouver") one's subjectivity (p. 29). One might say it is a non-conceptual appreciation or awareness of self *in actu exercito*. It is the function of an idea of value which one chooses to pursue and realize (p. 183). A true presence of "self to self" is had in the dynamism of action (p. 186), and this presence deals with a value which is being pursued, and thus reveals the true figure of self (p. 189). It is in action that one is aware by sentiment (cf. the "coeur" of Pascal) of the direction of one's self (p. 126). This is not a process of knowledge, but such an awareness is given in the silent recollection of an affective experience in which the values one serves are seen in relation to

God, Absolute Value (pp. 130-131). It is by the same method that one is to attain true communication with the "subjectivities" of others (p. 139—and all of Part II). The central means for arriving at sincerity is, then, a certain awareness of the values one serves, that is, of the finality of the person revealed in action, and "grasped" by sentiment.

We cannot deny the importance and interest of the problem here discussed, nor the value of many psychological insights given in the course of the discussion. Furthermore, we may certainly agree with Jolivet that if the person is to be "grasped" or "appreciated," it will be by awareness of the personal finality of the individual. One is reminded, in a way, of the adage "*finis et forma coincident in moralibus*." The difficulty arises by trying to understand the method to be used. It might be said that the method of immediate affective "awareness" is not to be comprehended so much as "grasped" by sentiment, but such a solution is unsatisfactory. One problem is whether or not the affective experience itself can be a source of what must be called understanding. It is hard to see how one is to appreciate self by being affectively aware of the values one serves without any cognitive process being involved. We may fully admit that the intellect, operating by the processes of separation and abstraction, cannot grasp the concrete individuality of the "subjectivity" in itself, but Jolivet's method seems also somewhat dubious. If we say that it is in the accomplished free act that the person reveals himself, is not some intellectual judgment needed to compare the act with the values it serves?

Even, however, in the case of the free act and its intimate finality, we are aware of the constant ambivalence of our motives, and there are many psychological devices or mechanisms (rationalization, projection, etc.) which effectively hamper a true appreciation of the ends which are served *de facto* in many of our free acts. That insight we often have into the true finality of the actions of others is often lacking to us, partly because of emotional "blocks" and partly to the natural tendency of the intellect and other faculties to external objects.

The book may be recommended for those wishing to understand, if possible, the existentialist's burning desire to grasp reality in its concreteness. The problems of self-appreciation, however, are not fully solved.

Aux Origines de la Théologie Morale. By THOMAS DEMAN, O. P. Montreal: Institute d'Études Médiévales, 1951. Pp. 115.

This little volume gives us a lecture by the eminent Thomas Deman, O. P. on the origins of moral theology. Those who know the other writings of this noted theologian will see again here his clear style and lucid analysis of the central points of a problem. It is only to be regretted that the necessities

of oral presentation have limited his treatment of this subject to its present size. Father Deman deals with the development of scientific moral theology as an integral part of theology.

Considering first the outlook of the Fathers, Deman notes that their attention was given above all to dogmatic matters and that moral questions were treated from a "pastoral" point of view. Origen was the first to give a special moral "treatise." Three of the four great Latin Doctors are then discussed—Ambrose, Augustine and Gregory. The African Doctor, called the *Doctor of Grace*, was, at first, not clear on the need of a theology of moral action, but such a conviction grew, as is evident in some of his later writings (e.g. *de Catechizandis Rudibus*, *de Fide et Operibus*, and the *Enchiridion*). A great contribution to moral thought was his distinction of the "res quibus fruimur" and the "res quibus utimur," which set the essential structure of moral theology. Moreover, beatitude is established in its fundamental place, and moral acts were to be judged in relation to it. This was the first great step forward to the constitution of a true moral theology.

With the early Scholastics Deman notes the general methodological contributions of St. Anselm and remarks that neither Abelard and his school nor Hugh of St. Victor and his followers were able to set up a real theological science of morality. With Peter Lombard we find the Augustinian distinction of the "res fruendae vel utendae," but moral topics are discussed under Christology; the order of the *Sentences* discouraged a separate and special treatment of moral activity. Since for Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure the whole of theology was affective and designed to lead to practice, a distinct consideration of "practical" or moral matters is not to be found. St. Albert the Great also saw theology as a "scientia secundum pietatem," and, while seeing the need for a specifically Christian treatment of morals, he did not himself develop such a treatment.

The construction of a true moral theology is the work of St. Thomas, who held that the subject of theology was God considered under the aspects of "principium" and "finis." Man's specifically Christian beatitude was taken as the basis of the moral thought and the first principle of moral theology, and furthermore, the theological dignity of moral science was assured by the doctrine of man's being an image of God. Thus was the unity of the subject of theology preserved. The Augustinian distinction of the "res fruendae vel utendae" supplies the division of the moral science into a part dealing with the end, and a part dealing with the means (*ea ad finem*)—the division of the latter into a general and a special section is also noteworthy, for thus the scientific character of moral theology is maintained without sacrificing regard for the contingency and relativity of moral activity. The author tells us that the *Secunda Pars* is St. Thomas' most original contribution to the science of theology.

This little volume may be warmly recommended to any one interested in the nature or history of moral theology as well as to all who would consider the nature and development of scientific theology as a whole. It would have been good to give more consideration to the essential doctrine of the subject of the theological science. For further consideration of this point, the reader is referred to the works of Alex. Horvath, O. P. (articles in the *Divus Thomas*, Fribourg, 1946, 29-44; 209-310), as well as to the first chapters of the volume *Synthesis Theologiae Fundamentalis*, Budapest, 1947). For the often discouraging later history of moral theology and for an illuminating discussion of the specific nature of that science a reference may be made to J.-M. Ramirez, O. P. (*De Hominis Beatitudine*, I, Madrid, 1942, Ch. I-II). We may be allowed to disagree on one point. The author calls analytic that scientific method passing from the particular to the universal, and synthetic the opposite method. While this is true in the order of the "secunda intentio" it is just the opposite in that of the "prima intentio," and there are advantages in basing a division of method on the latter. (cf. Horvath, O. P., *La Sintesi Scientifica di S. Tomaso d'Aquino*, Marietti, 1931, pp. 333-351).

Georges Sorel, Prophet Without Honor, A Study in Anti-Intellectualism.

By RICHARD HUMPHREY, Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. LIX. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. Pp. 246 with index. \$4.00.

Georges Sorel is a somewhat vague figure among modern political thinkers, who is usually seen as a complete anarchist by readers of his best-known work: *Reflections on Violence*. The author of this essay, Richard Humphrey, sets out to correct this notion and to present a summary of Sorel's thought.

Sorel, we are told, was above all a "moraliste"; he sought "some new ethical principle that might bring about a rejuvenation of modern society" (p. 9). Sorel rejected "intellectualism," as rational analysis, often of real value, did not give a complete picture of reality. The intellectualism here attacked, Humphrey explains, is that which is the product of Cartesianism. It is the chapter on "The Moral Criterion" which should be of greatest interest; but, actually, it is by no means easy to grasp. Perhaps, too much should not be expected from one whose outlook is pragmatic and whose philosophical background is so varied. Humphrey explains that Sorel "like Freud, recognized the dominance of unconscious forces in most human decisions, and the dominance of sexual desires in the unconscious" (p. 72). Mind had a large place in controlling these forces but was not wholly in control. The influence of such drives is the "focal point of Sorel's anti-intellectualism" (p. 75). An individual is mature when his superego permits an "expression of the libido along socially acceptable lines" (p. 78). The

author passes on to mention Sorel's admiration for the heroic ages presented in Homer—it was to a more heroic age in our day that Sorel looked. Sorel's hope for the future was in a free society made so by individuals who are truly free, and mature enough to satisfy their needs in accord with "the framework of reality around them" (p. 93). This vague definition of Sorel's notion of freedom is given: "Real freedom is a feeling that ensues on the effort of expressing a need; it is not a consequence of passive acceptance" (p. 93). It would seem that Sorel's principal moral criterion or ideal was a recognition for and respect of the true dignity of the human person in self and others (p. 94).

It is, however, in his theories of "revolutionary syndicalism," of the dynamism of the social myth, and of the "syndicalist general strike" that Sorel has been known best, and in which he present his own contributions to social thought (cf. p. 171). The myth is a dynamic social idea, and the myth of the general strike was to lead to a revolutionary reversal of all present social structure (cf. pp. 189, 190, and especially p. 199). Violence served to emphasize the true ideals of such a strike (p. 202), and violence was then seen by Sorel as "a very beautiful and heroic thing" (p. 183). Sorel recognized the role of violence in history and the place it was to have in the future (p. 200). The myth of the syndicalist general strike was to offer an inspiration to the proletariat, who by means of such a strike would bring about a syndicalist state (cf. p. 209). "Sorel was completely indifferent to all attempts to prove that the general strike was impractical and unscientific" (p. 188). Humphrey is in the same position, it would seem, by his fully sympathetic treatment of Sorel on this point. The mission to be fulfilled by the strike was a moral one "in the sense that it concerned the relations of man with his fellows . . ." (p. 201). Violence is endorsed only with this end in view, and Sorel is not a mere anarchist (p. 200). The final ideal of Sorel is seen to be that: "cooperation and constructiveness and love are the products of assurance in the use of power" (p. 223).

Humphrey's book is of value in pointing out Sorel's sincere quest for a social order founded on an ideal of justice, and, yet, the author, blinded it appears by sympathy, makes no criticisms of Sorel's positive doctrines or suggestions. Sorel's teachings are presented in somewhat of a vacuum—showing no relation to events that have actually transpired in the world. Compared to these events, Sorel's ideas of the general strike appear as dreams. The criticisms of Christianity are the result of misunderstanding and a purely natural view-point. Humphrey is to be commended for a complete and evidently sincere portrayal of a figure little known at present, a portrayal, however, so sympathetic as to fail to give a real appraisal of its subject.

Tendances Nouvelles dans la Psychologie Contemporaine. By JOSEPH NUTTIN. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1951. Pp. 60. \$0.60.

This brochure reproduces a lecture given in Rome in February, 1951, on the general trends of modern psychology. Above all, the author notes a great emphasis on the affective and dynamic aspects of human life, due largely to the influence of Freud. Psychology concerns itself with a consideration of the affective aspects of man's intellectual, moral, religious and esthetic life, and the author sees such an attitude demanded by the complexity of modern life with all of its specialization. A great deal of psychic tension, he notes, is caused by the constant effort required to adapt one's self to the specialized demands of modern living. Nuttin points out that Catholic thought always tends to an "objective" view of life, its problems, obligations and needs, and that this has been the source of some prejudice and scepticism with regard to the modern "subjective" approach. He discusses various influences on modern psychology: that of animal psychology has led to a study of the "learning processes" of man; that of psychopathology to a realization of the importance of affective and dynamic factors in human conduct; and that of psychoanalysis in leading experimental psychology to a closer consideration of the emotional life of man. All of this has resulted in a real concern for, and interest in, the "whole person" and his daily experience, and psychotherapy has been led to take notice of the spiritual needs and conflicts of the human being. Furthermore, much more attention has been paid to social behaviour and to man's social nature. The greatest danger the author feels to be the development of an image of man based not on normal but on pathological behaviour. His deprecatory judgment of psychoanalysis on this basis is not fully justified. For the psychoanalytic theory has given very important insight into the normal psychic life of man by the concept of a dynamic "unconscious," of the importance of the emotions, and by study of the chronological and "topological" development of psychic life. Stating that the "classical" notion of man is too unilaterally spiritualistic (p. 39), thus losing contact with the concrete, Nuttin stresses, however, the danger of a reduction of all human needs and ideals to the level of the biological or physiological. The lecture concludes with a few remarks on the author's own conceptions, for which the reader is to be referred to his volume: *Psychanalyse et Conception Spiritualiste de l'Homme* (Louvain, 1950).

Needless to say, this little volume offers by no means a complete view of modern psychology, and one is surprised to see no mention of many important developments: e.g., that of psychosomatic medicine and psychology. It could present the general reader with some very broad notions of the direction of modern psychology. We may note a very inadequate bibliography especially in psychiatry and psychotherapy.

Introduccion a la Metafisica. By ANGEL GONZALEZ ALVAREZ. Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1951. Pp. 393 with index.

In this volume, the author wishes to present an introduction, at once historical and systematic, which will avoid the two extremes of excessive dogmatism and complete lack of system. It is intended for university students. The work is divided into four sections: Object of Metaphysics, its Possibility, its Methods, and its Sources. As the author proposes to divide Metaphysics into the following classes: Introduction, Ontology, Natural Theology, and Criteriology, this volume would cover the first division.

It is not possible in a brief notice to treat all of the points of this volume which need discussion. The only real difference between this and similar manuals is the inclusion of historical background at the beginning of each of the four sections of the book. One may wonder if this is of real value, due to the sketchy nature of such surveys. The treatment of Kant, as in most manuals, leave much to be desired, for it is a rather contorted notion that is given of Kant's doctrines. There are serious bibliographical deficiencies: there is no mention of the works of Lachîèze-Rey, of Kroner, of Horvâth, and no mention is made of any of the important English Kantian scholars.

The volume adds nothing to our knowledge of the science of metaphysics, and is no worse than the ordinary treatment, but the occasion may be taken to regret the author's failure to see the weaknesses of the usual manual presentation. While it is manifestly impossible to discuss this matter in any detail, a few points may be indicated.

In dealing with the nature of scholastic metaphysics, it is imperative to have a clear notion of what is meant by the *objectum formale quo* (*ratio formalis sub qua*, etc.). John of St. Thomas is aware of the diversity of opinions and confusion on this subject (*Cursus Theologicus*, in Iam P., disp. 2, a. 7, n. 5, ed. Solesm. I, 373 f.). Later Scholastics, either not understanding or neglecting the profound teaching of St. Thomas on the "subject" of a science, have made of the *objectum formale quo* something wholly "unintelligible or rather fruitless" (Horvath, *Synthesis Theologiae Fundamental*, Budapest, 1947, p. 7). Horvath also mentions that those who ignore or make little of the doctrine on the "subject" of a science thereby destroy the unifying and vivifying principle of the science (ibid.). The way indicated by the great Commentators is thus lost (e. g. Capreolus, In Prolog. *Sentent.* q. IV, ed. Paban-Pegues, I, 46; Cajetan, in I, q. 1, a. 7; John of St. Thomas, in I, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 11), to say nothing of the neglect of the doctrine of S. Thomas (cf. S. Th. I, q. 1; *Proem. in Metaph. Arist.* and in *IV Metaph.*, lect. 1, nn. 529, 533; and elsewhere). The above-mentioned remarks of P. Horvâth, O. P. certainly apply to the volume under

discussion. The doctrine on the material and formal objects is presented without sufficient explanation and penetration. Without a knowledge of the function of the "subject" of a science, and misunderstanding, therefore, the *objectum formale quo*, there seems to be little hope of achieving a truly unified science. No information is given on the important distinction of the *objectum formale quo* of a science, considered as a *habitus* and considered objectively. The "subject" of a science is that which is known, and also the *ratio* by which is known all else in that science, while the *objectum formale quo* is the formative power of the subject in relation to the material objects of the science. The various articles of P. Horváth in the *Divus Thomas* (Fribourg) of 1946 may be consulted on this matter.

A further question for discussion is the immateriality of the object of metaphysics. The author gives the doctrine, often found (vid. especially, pp. 249-259), that the immateriality of metaphysics is obtained by some progressive dematerialization, as if the intellect gradually stripped some primitive datum (of experience) of its matter, so that, at last, is obtained a wholly spiritual and immaterial notion. The various sciences are then distinguished as their objects are placed in different degrees of immateriality obtained by the "grades" of abstraction. St. Thomas, in defending the reality of metaphysics, invokes, not the process of abstraction, but that of separation by which is obtained a negative immateriality, which is based on an independence of matter "in rerum natura." Abstraction, on the other hand, is based on an independence of matter in the order of *intelligibility*, for abstraction is the consideration of one notion (*ratio*) without others, which do not effect its being understood apart, but which in reality (*secundum rem*) are joined with it. (Even in the matter of the objects of Physics and Mathematics, the object of the latter is not obtained by a stripping of the object of Physics of matter, but rather each of these sciences is given its proper object by two different intellectual processes—formal and total abstraction—beginning from the same original datum). There is an immense difference between the *negative* immateriality of metaphysics which is obtained by the judgment (the second operation of the intellect) of "separation" and that immateriality in the logical order obtained through the third degree of abstraction (in the first operation of the mind—cf. St. Thomas, in *Boet. de Trin.* q. 5, a. 3). The degree of immateriality obtained by abstraction (i.e., a simple neglecting, or non-consideration of matter, actually present in reality, as is demanded by the very nature of the process of abstraction) says nothing of an immateriality *in rerum natura*, but is rather the immateriality of the *concept* representing a form stripped of all matter. A metaphysics founded on such an immateriality could not be called a *real* science (*realis scientia*). St. Thomas considered the negative judgment of separation as constituting the object of metaphysics, and thus founded a science of reality. (cf. P. Geiger, O.P.,

La Participation etc., p. 318, n. 1; and St. Thomas, in *Boet. de Trin.* q. 5, aa. 3 and 4; and the articles of P. Geiger, "L'Abstraction et Séparation d'après S. Thomas," *Rev. des Sc. Phil. et Théol.*, 1947, pp. 3 ff., and of P. Robert, O. P., "La métaphysique, science distincte de toute autre discipline philosophique, selon S. Thomas d'Aquin," in *Divus Thomas*, Piacenza, 1947, pp. 206 ff.) Furthermore, the concept of being cannot, properly speaking, be abstracted from material or immaterial reality, for both of these are forms of being.

It seems a needless compounding of confusion to continue to produce this doctrine on the constitution of the sciences on the basis of the three "grades" of abstraction. In addition to the immediate difficulties of this teaching, there is the resulting misunderstanding of what is meant exactly by the phrase "ens in quantum ens" as the object of metaphysics, and of the phrase "ens in communi" (cf. especially pp. 168, 179 of this volume).

A final remark may be made about the section of this volume devoted to methodology (pp. 270-279). While it is good to see an interest in scientific methodology, there is little of value here; the method of metaphysics is simply said to be both inductive and deductive. It would seem that, for clarity and true understanding, a full treatment should be given of the nature of an Aristotelian science, in its two-fold division—analytic and synthetic—with a discussion of the method proper to each. This is fully developed by P. Horváth, O. P., in his *La Sintesi Scientifica di S. Tomaso d'Aquino*, Turin, 1932. The author of this present volume would also have profited by the excellent discussion of the nature of Aristotelian science given by S. Mansion (*Le Jugement d'Existence chez Aristote*, Louvain, 1946).

Needless to say, this reviewer feels that the value of this work is much diminished by the weaknesses mentioned above.

The Psychology of Love according to St. Bonaventure. By ROBERT P.

PRENTICE, O. F. M., Ph. D. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1951.

Pp. 150 with index. \$2.00.

In this volume Father Prentice proposes to give as complete as possible a presentation of St. Bonaventure's psychology of purely human love. There is first a section on the existence and nature of the affective potency, and then, in Part II, a treatment of love, discussing the object (good) and the act (affection) of the affective potency, and passing on to a consideration of love in its primary concept, and in some of its forms, especially ego-centric and "altero-centric," to each of which a full chapter is devoted.

For the teaching of St. Bonaventure on the affective potency the author

claims a definite Aristotelian background (p. x of Introduction, and p. 128) and mentions that St. Bonaventure, usually classified as more Augustinian than Aristotelian, is here, at least, more indebted to the Stagyrte than to the Bishop of Hippo. However, in the text the reader will find no adequate discussion of this nor any solid substantiation for it. On one point of some import to a Thomist the author admits St. Bonaventure's originality—the Seraphic Doctor states that the faculties of the soul, while distinct from it, are not qualities, but what are called “co-substances” (a new “quasi-category”—pp. 12, 13), or “consubstantiales.” For this there is no possible Aristotelian basis. In the next section (pp. 15-21) the distinction of the sense and rational appetites is not always too clear, and especially is there some question on the unity of the will, fulfilling the functions of both the concupiscible and irascible appetites (cf. *Summa*, I, q. 82, a. 5).

In the section on the object of the appetitive faculty it is stated that this is the good “qua good,” that is, the appetible, for “Goodness can be called willableness or appetibility.” This is satisfactory, except that there is place here to define exactly what is meant by “good,” “appetible” and “the end”—all of which are seemingly equated (p. 35). In fact, there is a different formal aspect revealed in each of these terms which is not discussed. The precise questions of the formal object of the will and the role of final causality for the will are never discussed properly. It would seem desirable to say something of final causality especially with regard to the rational will acting in view of an end known as such (“voluntas est ipse finis ut quo”).

In the discussion of the primary concept of love, the author notes that this is: “affectus adhaesio respectu obiecti”—thus, the union of affection between the affective potency and the good. However, no full treatment of this is given either in itself or in its proximate causes which would be at all comparable with the study by P. Simonin of the Thomistic doctrine (*Arch. d'hist. Doct. et Litt. du Moyen Age*, VI, 1931, pp. 174-277). This is a definite lack in the work of Fr. Prentice.

The final two chapters deal with egocentric and “altero-centric” love. The question of interest here is not so much the fact of these two forms of love as their mutual relation and the possibility of their co-existence with regard to the same object whether it be God or a human friend. This matter is not discussed, and thus we are not told anything of St. Bonaventure's position in either the “physical” or the “ecstatic” schools of love, as described by Rousselot. The author mentions that he does not discuss this as it has already been done (p. 68, n. 3); yet some consideration of this question would be necessary in a book claiming to be a full discussion of St. Bonaventure's psychology of love.

A final point is the “cognitive” of altero-centric love (pp. 100-106). The object of this love is the “essential properness” (p. 100) of the beloved, without awareness of the good (or bad) qualities of the beloved. We are

not told anything of the relation of this to the object of the will—the good. Then, in explaining how this love is “immediately basic (sic) and directly unitive” (p. 101), the author goes on to say that this love *itself* gives a knowledge of the person loved, stating: “It (love) is in itself an emotional (not voluntary?) act which immediately penetrates into the very core of the other’s being. . . . Thus it gives a *vision* deeper and more penetrating than any merely intellectual knowledge can even hope for” (p. 106). Furthermore, the “understanding of the non-cognitional knowledge(!) derived from selfless love” is called one of St. Bonaventure’s original contributions to the psychology of love. The question then is: Does *love itself* reveal or give us a knowledge of the beloved object independent of normal cognitive processes? The author, agreeing with what he states to be St. Bonaventure’s doctrine, gives an affirmative answer. Such a response could not be given by a Thomist, unless under certain conditions with regard to the love of God (cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., “La Connaissance Affective,” in *Rév. des Sc. Phil. et Théol.*, XXVII, 1938, pp. 5-27). In this matter, as in others, the author clearly reveals the influence of Scheler, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, and others, who are often quoted for their psychological (phenomenological) observations, compared to those of St. Bonaventure. One may wonder what service these references have in this volume, for there is no real comparison of the entire doctrine of, say, Scheler, with that of St. Bonaventure, but only occasional references, so that the reader receives snatches of Scheler completing some observation of the Seraphic Doctor (e.g., p. 114 ff.) which do not seem to contribute much to the unity or scientific character of the whole study and really offer no light on the teaching of the Franciscan Doctor.

In concluding, we may note that the author have given us no bibliography as such. There are few references to works dealing with St. Bonaventure on this or allied subjects (and there are such works), and just a brief mention is made of the valuable and thorough work of Fr. Z. Alszeghy, S. J., *Grundformen der Liebe* (Analecta Gregoriana, Series Theologica, XXXVIII, Romae, 1946). This work Fr. Prentice believes to be on “quite independent” lines from his own, while, as a matter of fact, the volume of the Hungarian Jesuit, especially in Chapters Two and Four, does treat of love and its forms, so that references to it should be made. On the whole, even though Alszeghy deals above all with the love of God, his work remains somewhat more authoritative and informative than that of Fr. Prentice.

In spite of these criticisms, the book may be recommended to those who would like to have some introduction to St. Bonaventure’s teaching on love. We may hope that the author will continue his researches in this field. Students of St. Thomas will welcome any study giving the teaching of St. Bonaventure, contemporary and friend of their master. As a final regretful note, readers will find their interest distracted by quite a number of typographical errors, both of omission and commission.

Natural Law, An Introduction to Legal Philosophy. By A. P. D'ENTRÈVES.
 London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1951. Pp. 126 with index.
 7s. 6d. or \$2.00 (Longmans, Green).

Professor D'Entrèves' volume on the Natural Law is not intended to be a complete study of the subject but a review of the history and development of the idea of natural law and its importance in the fields of ethics, politics, and legal thought. The author brings to his task a background of great scholarship, a power for clear analysis, and a dynamic and pungent literary style.

The first three chapters examine the function of natural law rather than its content. It is noted that the Roman "ius naturale," as found in the "Institutes" of Justinian, was not a philosophical doctrine, nor was it seen as a definite type of law, overruling and superior to positive law (p. 30), rather "what the Roman jurists were striving after was to find the rule corresponding to the nature of things, to a concrete situation of facts and of life" (p. 29). The notion of natural law contributed to the universality of the "Institutes," and Roman law became the vehicle by which this concept passed to the Middle Ages. Its role in Canon Law is mentioned, with reference to the "Decretum Gratiani," and the source of natural law is found in God. Natural law assumes in medieval thought, especially with St. Thomas Aquinas, the function of being the cornerstone of natural ethics (p. 38)—it was an expression of natural reason, it allowed the acceptance of Aristotle's political thought, it became the foundation of social and political institutions, and it was a standard by which these were to be appraised (p. 42).

The role of natural law is studied as found in the French and American Revolutions. The author stresses the rationalism of these movements—natural law for the Romans had been linked to common experience, for Aquinas it was a gift of God, for the political revolutionaries it was the product of a self-sufficient reason. The work of Grotius, Pufendorf and others is examined, and in general, the author concludes: "The self-evidence of natural law has made the existence of God perfectly superfluous" (p. 53). Individualism enters in and leads to the theory of social contract, while Radicalism led to the natural law being considered as a theory of rights in an active political sense. In general, the author would not seem to agree with those who seek to make from the doctrine of natural law a system of "political rights."

It is not possible to discuss in detail the final chapters, in which Professor D'Entrèves discusses the nature of law, the relation of law and morality, and the modern legal positivism. The treatment of the nature of law deals with the central problem of "ius quia iustum, vel quia iussum"—the intellectualist and voluntarist theories of law, as well as the Hegelian posi-

tion are all examined. The author is in full agreement with S. Thomas, and notes that the Anglican, Hooker, is more Thomistic than is the Jesuit Suarez (p. 77). He concludes that "the primary function of natural law is not to commend but to qualify"—by which he wishes to emphasize its normative rather than its coactive element—natural law becomes "a plea for reasonableness in action" (p. 78).

The author treats then of the delicate question which is the crux of all natural law theories—the problem of content, not of form: the relation of law to morals. Natural law "provides a name for the point of intersection of law and morals" (p. 116), and "the doctrine of natural law is in fact nothing but an assertion that law is a part of ethics" (ibid.). On p. 83 he makes some fine remarks on a "legalistic" approach to morals which could well be considered by moralists involved in the casuistry of the "systems" of conscience. The author's last chapter on legal positivism and on Kelsen's "pure theory" shows that the lack of an ultimate foundation for the legal order leaves legal thought "entirely powerless when a vital issue is involved," and presents the "dilemma of either blind force or blind faith" (p. 108).

The only criticisms that may be offered are the following: a somewhat ambiguous statement regarding addition to, and subtraction from, the natural law in St. Thomas (p. 43); a slight lack of emphasis on or of recognition for the obligatory force of the natural law. For so brief a treatment, however, it is an admirable work, and one which can certainly be recommended to Thomists interested in these problems. The reading of this volume would be of special value in obtaining a more comprehensive view of the doctrine on natural law than is usually presented in courses in ethics.

Bartolomé de Las Casas. By LEWIS HANKE. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952. Pp. 133 with index. \$3.50.

For the fourth centenary of the printing of the *Brevissima Relacion* of Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, Doctor Lewis Hanke, one of the world's leading authorities on the great Dominican, attempts a new evaluation of the man who is a devil incarnate to those to whom he is not an angel of light. There is no question as to where Doctor Hanke stands upon the question. He is uncompromisingly upon the side of Las Casas. And this represents, it seems to me, a change of opinion. Time was, in the days when Doctor Hanke was fresh out of Harvard and continuing along the line of his doctoral research which was on the Dominican crusade for social justice in early America, that he was inclined to play down the work of Las Casas, whom he considered small potatoes compared to his brother Dominican, Bernadino de Minaya, whom he felt had been unjustly overshadowed by the more vocal Las Casas.

Although it is true that in this work Doctor Hanke does not consider Las Casas as a missionary, but rather as a writer and scholar, he seems to incline to the opinion that a greater man of any kind never trod our shores. Hanke thinks him worthy of all praise not only as an historian and theologian but as a man. He is surprised that the Church has not seen fit to canonize him. In spite of his great admiration for the controversial friar, Hanke is not blind to his faults which he believes have been exaggerated by partisan passion. He thinks the time has come, now that all the writings of the man are in the process of being published, for a new evaluation, based upon objective study. Doctor Hanke has contributed a solid work to start it.

The Life of The Virgin Mary. By R. M. RILKE (trans. Stephen Spender). New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 49. \$2.75.

In 1900 the artist Heinrich Vogeler showed Rilke two sketches on the life of the Blessed Virgin Mary, namely, the Annunciation and the Flight into Egypt. These inspired the poet to write the poems on the same subjects, which are found in this volume, and also gave him the idea of an illustrated work with poems by himself and drawings by Vogeler. But it was not until 1912, when Vogeler reminded him of this—although he no longer was interested in the artist's paintings—that his inspiration was renewed, and he wrote the remaining poems. Thus they were written in the period of his poetic maturity.

In the poems Rilke never forgets the idea of paintings, and indeed they are alike meditations on subjects by artists. This is so true that the reader instinctively feels that a picture should be placed before each poem. The themes of the various poems are as follows: *The Birth of Mary*; *The Presentation of Mary in the Temple*; *The Annunciation to Mary*; *The Visitation of the Virgin*; *Joseph's Suspicion*; *The Annunciation over the Shepherds*; *The Birth of Christ*; *Rest on the Flight into Egypt*; *Of the Marriage at Cana*; *Before the Passion*; *Pietà*; *Consolation of Mary with the Risen Christ*; *Of the Death of Mary*. These themes, moreover, bring in other incidents in the life of Mary, so that in a manner her whole life is portrayed. For instance, in the *Birth of Christ* we find mention of the Wise Men and their gifts; in the *Marriage at Cana* and *Before the Passion* the childhood of Christ is touched upon; and the *Death of Mary* includes her Assumption into heaven, her glorification, and the Apostle Thomas at her empty tomb.

From this we see that Rilke follows Catholic thought in general, and he does this with the utmost reverence. This is especially apparent in the *Birth of Mary*, where the Immaculate Conception is clearly implied; in the

understanding of the virginity of Mary throughout the cycle of poems; and in her final place in heaven and enduring influence on the world. There are, however, several places where the poet descends to a naturalistic interpretation, such as the rage of Joseph discovering that Mary was with child; the poet's odd address to Mary in the *Birth of Christ*; Mary's vanity in the *Marriage at Cana*; her lamentation in *Before the Passion*, in which she complains of her bitter role in the drama of the Redemption, and which, in fact, seems to contradict the closing lines of the poem on the *Presentation in the Temple*.

The poetry itself has a high spiritual quality, which admirably fits the subject-matter. All the poems are of exceptional beauty and often of a deeply moving simplicity. Among the best are the *Presentation in the Temple* with its fine last lines; the *Visitation*, which is of extreme delicacy and grace; the *Flight into Egypt*; *Before the Passion*; the *Consolation of Mary with the Risen Christ*; and the *Death of Mary*, in which the third part on the Apostle Thomas at the empty tomb is of extraordinary charm. Other poems likewise have special lines of exceeding loveliness, such as the third stanza of *Joseph's Suspicion*; the first stanza of the *Birth of Christ*; and the first three stanzas of the *Marriage at Cana*.

As to the English translation Mr. Spender says in the *Introduction* that his purpose is as follows: "(a) to bring a translation as close as I can to Rilke's form, (b) not to sacrifice the meaning to this aim, or to introduce extraneous images, (c) to make of the translation a poem of my own, in the only manner I use." Although Mr. Spender's translation for the most part is clear and smooth, it is far inferior to the German text. We must add, however, that the poetry of Rilke, with its rare musical quality, is very difficult to translate, his style, like that of any great poet, being in large measure inimitable.

Christopher's Talks to Catholic Parents. By DAVID L. GREENSTOCK.

London: Burns Oates and Washburn, Ltd., 1951. Pp. 287 with index. 18s.

We welcome another book of "Christopher's Talks" by Father Greenstock. His *Christopher's Talks to the Little Ones* and the two books of *Christopher's Talks to Catholic Children* have paved the way for this more comprehensive and perhaps more important work, *Christopher's Talks to Catholic Parents*.

The author begins with a discussion of parental obligations and the importance of preparation for parenthood. From this he proceeds to answer the question "What is Education?," making the fact quite clear and presenting his arguments in a forceful manner that complete education must

be a composite of physical, moral and supernatural principles to conform to the nature of the human being who is being educated. In his coverage of the specific items on a complete educational process he goes from diapers to doweries, touching upon each and every phase of physical growth and the educational training that should accompany this development. His knowledge of infancy and early childhood is lucidly expressed and will be a big help to those parents "expecting their first." But the book is such that it can be dipped into at any point for useful information on any stage of development.

In a general way Father Greenstock emphasizes the importance of impressing upon the growing minds of children proper attitudes toward life; this includes not merely the physical life, but the complete personal life with the recognition of the rights of others, especially God. One device he suggests for early instruction of little children is that of a "religious scrapbook" made by the child under parental supervision, thus employing one of the fundamental principles of visual education in the imparting of religious information. Regarding the question of sex instruction the author repeats the tried-and-true principle that it is the duty of the parents and not that of the school or of any other agency. He supplements this discussion with examples of how this information can be imparted from the days when the little child asks his first curious question. "Better a year too soon than a day too late" is the axiom he uses to answer the question concerning the "right moment" for sex instruction. But he also makes it plain that the instruction should be given in accordance with the age, sex and development of the child, which can best be done by the parents who know the child better than anyone else.

It is good to see a chapter on how to be good in-laws. Only three pages are devoted to the topic, "The Finished Product," but some very good advice is given for the days when the parents see the fruit of their love bearing fruit of its own.

The book is filled with considerations which are at the same time practical and sublime. The vocation as well as the career to married life is kept before the reader's mind. Marriage is proposed as a challenge to the best in a man and a woman, and useful information, gleaned from the experience of the successful as well as from extensive knowledge of human nature, is to be found on every page.

A thorough index, covering four and one-half pages, makes the contents readily accessible even to the casual reader.

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